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The energy sector faces sustainability challenges that are re-working the established 
patterns of energy supply, distribution and consumption (Anderson et al. 2008; Haas 
et al. 2008; Stern 2008; Shove and Walker 2010). Amidst these challenges, socio-
technical energy transitions frameworks have evolved that focus on transitions 
towards decarbonised, sustainable energy systems (Bridge et al. 2013). However, the 
‘socio-‘ or social is typically missing as we confront climate and energy risks in a 
moral vacuum (Sovacool et al. 2016). The energy justice framework provides a 
structure to think about such energy dilemmas. However, the full extent and 
diversity of justice implications within the energy system have been neglected. Thus, 
borrowing from and advancing the framework this research explores how energy 
justice is being articulated with attention to three emergent areas of growth, the 
themes of: (1) time, (2) systems component and (3) actor. It does so through a case 
study of nuclear energy, which was chosen because of its points of enquiry with 
regards to these three areas of growth, and its historical and on-going importance in 
the UK energy mix. Using results from 36 semi-structured interviews with non-
governmental organisations and policy actors across two case studies representative 
of the nuclear energy stages of energy production and of waste storage, disposal and 
reprocessing – the Hinkley Point and Sellafield nuclear complexes – this research 
presents new insights within each of these previously identified areas of 
development. It offers the contributions of (1) facility lifecycles, (2) systems 
approaches and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’ and concludes that the energy 
justice framework can aid energy decision-making in a way that not only mitigates 
the environmental impacts of energy via socio-technical change, but also does so in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The energy sector faces serious sustainability challenges that are re-working the 
established patterns of energy supply, distribution and consumption and have led to 
the widespread acknowledgement that our current ways of life and consumption 
patterns are unsustainable (Anderson et al. 2008; Haas et al. 2008; Stern 2008; Shove 
and Walker 2010). Amidst these challenges, energy transitions frameworks have 
evolved that focus on the desire to transition towards decarbonised, sustainable 
energy systems that provide both security of supply and universal access to energy; a 
process that it is widely acknowledged will require new ways of producing, living and 
working with energy (Bridge et al. 2013; IEA 2008; Mernier 2007). In aiming for a 
socio-technical fix, governments are increasingly utilising the language of transitions, 
and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries including 
Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK) (Foxon 2013; Lovell 2007; Bolton 
and Foxon 2015).  
 
However, the ‘socio-‘ or social element is frequently missing from such transitions 
frameworks as most of us confront climate and energy risks in a moral vacuum 
(Sovacool et al. 2016; Jamieson 2014; Markowitz and Shari 2012; Swilling and 
Annecke 2012; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). Eames and 
Hunt (2013) draw attention in particular to the fact that considerations of equity and 
justice are neglected within the socio-technical transitions literature and the wider 
energy transitions debate, despite the fact that the concept of sustainable 
development, the target of many transition plans, is inherently rooted in these core 
notions (Hopwood et al. 2005). Such failures include, but are not limited to, 
inattention to the burdens of having too much energy, including waste, over-
consumption and pollution, or from not having enough, where some individuals lack 
access, are challenged by under-consumption and poverty, and may face health 
burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool 
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et al. 2016). This research is concerned with the moral vacuum in energy decision-
making.  
 
In a bid to explore and understand the failures of our energy systems and the 
resultant challenges they produce, a range of conceptual frameworks have emerged. 
Each framework (which is inevitably contested) attracts a different emphasis on the 
content and purpose of energy research, as outlined originally by Jenkins et al. 
(2016a). Energy security assesses (a) the security of supply and production, and (b) 
emergent insecurities (such as availability and pricing), with a view to promoting the 
safeguarding of energy supply and ‘indigenous’ production capabilities (Ang et al. 
2015; Mansson et al. 2014). Fuel poverty on the other hand, scrutinizes energy 
vulnerabilities in communities in order to shed light on distributional unfairness and 
reduce such inequity with regards to a person’s ability to access and consume energy 
(Middlemiss and Gillard 2015). Energy justice, the focus throughout this research, 
takes a more broad-ranging approach as it evaluates (a) where injustices emerge, (b) 
which affected sections of society are ignored, and (c) which processes exist for their 
remediation in order to reveal and reduce such injustices. In focusing on the role of 
the energy justice concept in meeting the challenges outlined above, this thesis 
seeks to fill the emergent moral vacuum (at least partially) as it makes a case for the 
concept of energy justice as a tool that can help energy decision-makers to not only 
mitigate environmental impacts of energy production via socio-technical change, but 
also to do so in an ethically defensible, socially just, way. 
 
1.1 Research Structure 
 
This study explores the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical systems, the 
major transitions framework in Europe, which is frequently used to emphasise 
structural innovations in energy systems (Bridge et al. 2013). The MLP takes the form 
of a series of nested levels; the niche, regime, and landscape, which offer analytical 
and heuristic concepts to aid the understanding of socio-technical transitions (Geels 
 21 
2002, 2010). Researchers focus on how these levels interact to produce both stability 
and change, often with a particular focus on radical evolution of the system 
(Whitmarsh 2012). However, whilst much of the existing literature on socio-technical 
systems has been dedicated to understanding niche innovations (Kemp et al. 1998; 
Lopolito et al. 2010; Smith and Raven 2012), this has come at the expense of 
understanding landscape dynamics, the top of the three theoretical levels of the 
MLP. This research contends that it is within the overarching landscape of socio-
technical change that issues of energy justice emerge. It advances the energy justice 
framework as a means of integrating social justice concerns into energy transitions 
literatures and models, where inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, 
or alternatively via their inclusion can provide a means to solve them. This thesis 
represents the first research to explicitly combine the socio-technical systems and 
energy justice literatures. 
 
Within the broader context of the socio-technical systems literature, the research 
introduces, critiques, and reconceptualises the theory of energy justice as it stands to 
date, assessing if and in what form its core tenets of distributional justice, justice as 
recognition and procedural justice emerge in practice (McCauley et al. 2013). It is 
amongst the first to advance a whole-systems perspective on energy justice (Jenkins 
et al. 2014; Hall et al. 2013; van der Horst and Evans 2010; Adams et al. 2012; Hiteva 
2013; Harrison 2013), thus making a contribution to the concept’s development and 
to the field of energy geographies more generally. Further, it is the first to take an 
explicitly elite focus as it considers how elite organisations and individuals – those 
understood to hold more power, privilege and political influence than lay 
populations in energy decision-making – articulate energy justice1. The literature on 
energy justice to date has focused on a number of key social groups, including the 
fuel poor (Middlemiss and Gillard 2015; Chard and Walker 2016; Hiteva 2013; Teller-
Elsberg et al. 2016; Walker and Day 2012), disabled or unwell members of society 
(Snell et al. 2015; Liddell et al. 2016) and ethnic minority groups (Reames 2016), 
                                                     
1 The definition of elite is defined further in chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
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suggesting attention to those facing injustices. In contrast, by including an elite 
perspective the research seeks to move past the present application to promote a 
simultaneous consideration of who is responsible for the inequity and/or its 
remediation. As far as the author is aware, no other research has explicitly engaged 
with this question.  
 
In order to fulfill its overarching aim, the research investigates elite perspectives on 
energy justice at two case studies across the nuclear life cycle, (1) energy production 
at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and (2) waste reprocessing, 
storage, and disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. It samples 
representatives from the most prominent NGO and policy groups2 engaged with the 
research case studies – those for which the facilities in question were a direct 
concern of their work – in order to address the following overall research question 
and research questions (RQs): 
 
Overall Research Question: How do elite actors within the nuclear energy system 
articulate energy justice? 
 
RQ 1: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary through time? 
RQ 2: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary according to 
energy systems component in question? 
RQ 3: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary between actors? 
 
These research questions represent areas of growth within the energy justice 
framework identified throughout as: (1) time, (2) systems component and (3) actor 
(figure 1.1). The selection of these variables is explained in depth in chapter 2.  
 
                                                     
2 The term ‘policy’ or ‘policy organisations’ is used throughout for simplicity’s sake. This 
group contains policy as well as industry representatives and academic experts, as discussed 




Figure 1.1 The Three Variables of Investigation 
 
1.2 Why Nuclear Energy? 
 
Nuclear energy was chosen for the overall case study for three primary reasons. 
Firstly, nuclear energy is associated with a well-known set of risks and perceived 
injustices. For Sovacool (2011) these concerns include the facts that nuclear power is 
inherently associated with injustice through tragic global events, increased incidents 
of cancers, dependence on finite uranium resources, toxic pollution of the 
environment and terrorist threats, amongst others. Sovacool suggests that the 
occurrence of such injustices means nuclear power is not worth doing, well or 
otherwise. In examining discourses of justice around nuclear energy this research 
investigates whether these discourses emerge in popular discourse, and as a 









Secondly, nuclear energy provides three points of enquiry with regards to the three 
key variables of investigation of the research outlined above: (1) time, (2) systems 
component and (3) actor. With regards to the issue of time, nuclear energy is well 
known for its large, long-term infrastructure and its long lifespan, with a legacy of 
nuclear waste extending thousands of years into the future, so allowing investigation 
into temporally evolving energy justice discourses. Nuclear energy also has an 
international and complex lifecycle implicating eight systems components: uranium 
mining, uranium milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, production, 
recycling and waste, permitting exploration of the whole-systems approach 
advocated for in chapter 2. Furthermore, nuclear energy is famed for its divisive 
nature, with strong pro- and anti-factions and a traditionally hierarchical actor 
network with classical elites. This enabled investigation into the extent to which 
these assumed energy justice discourses are different/more nuanced.  
 
Thirdly, nuclear energy in the UK offered a logistically accessible, financially 
affordable, and timely case study. The UK has over 70 years of nuclear history, from 
its development of nuclear reactors for the purposes of creating a nuclear deterrent 
in the 1940s to its contemporary role as a provider of 20.8% of the UK’s electricity 
needs (DECC 2016). Now, the UK has developed a new nuclear programme with 
proposals for ten new reactors across five sites, with the first reactor initially 
expected to be in operation in 2018 (Bickerstaff 2008; Heffron 2013) – part of a 
(somewhat controversial) wider UK industry strategy to deliver around 16 GW of new 
nuclear by 2030, with proposed facilities at Hinkley Point, Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury 
and Moorside (BIS 2013). This programme sits alongside on-going deliberation over 
the treatment and storage of UK nuclear waste. The surrounding discourses provided 
ample opportunity to investigate energy justice articulations, as well as for the later 
dissemination of the research findings. This study represents one of the first 




1.3 Chapter Breakdown 
 
To set the context for the research’s contribution, the RQs and the methodological 
approach, chapter 2 presents a review of the academic literature. Overall, the 
chapter has two aims as it investigates the conceptual and theoretical background of 
the study. Firstly, it introduces the socio-technical systems literature and the three 
levels of the MLP – the niche, regime and landscape. It draws attention to the 
absence of justice considerations within such approaches and contends that it is 
within the landscape level of the MLP model – the top of the three theoretical levels 
– that issues of energy justice emerge. Secondly, it introduces, critiques and 
reconceptualises the theory of energy justice as it stands to date. It draws attention 
to three areas of growth within the energy justice framework: (1) time, (2) systems 
component and (3) actor, which inform the methodological approach taken. Chapter 
2 concludes that energy justice is neglected in transitions models, and that all three 
areas of growth are not explicit enough in current energy justice thinking, making a 
place for them in both present and future research. 
 
Following the review of the academic literature and the identification of emergent 
research gaps, chapter 3 then sets out the methodological approach taken. It 
explores the social constructivist epistemology and the research design. It also 
introduces the case study approach, which is understood to provide context to the 
results and allow for the exploration of both complementary and contrasting 
discourses across two UK research areas: (1) energy production at the Hinkley Point 
Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and (2) waste reprocessing, storage, and disposal at 
the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. Latterly, it outlines the approach taken to 
the two main research phases, data collection and data analysis, before reflecting on 
ethical considerations and the research limitations. The qualitative approach taken 
throughout is described as consisting of 36 semi-structured oral history interviews 
with participants identified through a directed snowballing approach. These texts 
were then analysed using discourse analysis in NVivo.  
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After an introduction to the background of nuclear energy in the UK and the two 
case studies in chapter 4, the results are presented in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 
explores articulations of energy justice around the first case study, the Hinkley Point 
Nuclear Power Complex in Somerset, UK. Results are presented according to the 
three tenets of energy justice, distributional justice, justice as recognition, and 
procedural justice. Chapter 6 then follows the same format, exploring articulations of 
energy justice around the second of the case studies, the Sellafield Nuclear Power 
Complex in Cumbria, UK. Both chapters contribute directly to the overall research 
question as they explore how elite actors within the nuclear energy system articulate 
energy justice, as well as the research questions as they consider variations in the 
energy justice according to the three variables of investigation.  
 
Chapter 7 then consolidates the results from chapters 5 and 6 and draws parallels 
with the wider literature presented in chapter 2. In so doing it discusses the 
contribution of the study to knowledge in relation to the study’s research questions 
and the wider literature. Following a case study comparison, it reflects on three key 
knowledge claims presented as an outcome of the research – those that either 
contrast with the current literature, advance it, or signal new avenues of future 
research. It does so according to the three variables of investigation – time, systems 
component and actor – as it offers the contributions of (1) facility lifecycles, (2) 
systems approaches, and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’. In its second half, 
chapter 7 presents initial interpretations of the implications of the three key energy 
justice contributions for nuclear energy scholarship, UK nuclear policy, and the wider 
energy transitions literature. It asks, in effect, why do the theoretical contributions 
presented through this research matter? 
 
Chapter 8 evaluates the extent to which the research met its aim and answered the 
overall research question and the three research questions. In closing, and in light of 
the evidence presented, it offers four suggestions for future research, promoting a 
legacy of study beyond the lifetime of this PhD.  
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Chapter 2: Socio-Technical Systems and Energy Justice 
 
Having provided background to the overall aim and structure of this thesis in the 
introduction, this chapter situates this within the appropriate academic literature as 
it presents the conceptual and theoretical background of the study. It has two main 
aims. Firstly, it introduces the MLP model as a mechanism for understanding socio-
technical transitions, before articulating the contention that it is within the landscape 
level of the MLP model – the highest of the three theoretical levels – that issues of 
energy justice emerge. Secondly, it introduces, critiques and reconceptualises the 
theory of energy justice as it stands to date, introducing three emergent areas of 
conceptual growth: (1) time, (2) systems component and (3) actor. It suggests that 
concepts from ethics and justice provide a structure to think about energy dilemmas, 
and that all three areas of growth are not explicit enough in current energy justice 
thinking. Before these sections begin, the following paragraphs provide a more 
detailed introduction to the structure, and indeed the necessity, of this argument. 
 
Firstly, section 2.1 provides an introduction to the background of the socio-technical 
systems literature. With sustainability challenges re-working the established patterns 
of energy supply, distribution and consumption, as outlined in the introduction, new 
social and technological solutions have emerged, and interest in the concept of 
socio-technical transitions has grown substantially (Verbong and Geels 2007). Within 
the abundant literature on socio-technical transitions, four major frameworks have 
received prominence; transition management (Kern and Smith 2008; Loorbach 2010; 
Rotmans et al. 2001; Kemp et al. 2007), strategic niche management (Kemp et al. 
1998; Raven and Geels 2010; Smith 2007), the multi-level perspective (Geels 2002; 
Smith et al. 2010), and technological innovation systems (Bergek et al. 2008; 
Jacobsson and Johnson 2000; Hekkert et al. 2007). Of these, the major framework in 
Europe has been the MLP,  – a model for understanding transitions that is composed 
of three theoretical levels, the niche, regime and landscape. Given its prominence in 
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energy research, its favour with the UK government, and its well-established 
literature foundation, the MLP is the model focused on within this chapter. 
 
Section 2.2 describes each of the three levels of the MLP in turn, whilst considering 
the role of nuclear energy as an issue of on-going socio-technical change. These 
sections argue that the ‘socio-‘ or social element is frequently missing from transition 
approaches as most of us confront energy risks in a moral vacuum (Sovacool et al. 
2016; Jamieson 2014; Markowitz and Shari 2012; Swilling and Annecke 2012; Newell 
and Mulvaney 2013; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). It argues that whilst much of the 
existing literature on socio-technical systems has been dedicated to understanding 
niche innovations (Kemp et al. 1998; Lopolito et al. 2010; Smith and Raven 2012), 
this has come at the expense of understanding landscape dynamics, the top level of 
the MLP. Moreover, it contends that it is within the overarching landscape of socio-
technical change that issues of energy justice emerge. In so doing, this section begins 
to make the case for the concept of energy justice as a tool that can aid ethically 
defensible energy decision-making. Whilst this issue has been problematised (see 
Butler and Simmons 2013; Eames and Hunt 2013; Fuller and Bulkeley 2013), this 
research represents the first research to explicitly combine the socio-technical 
systems and energy justice literatures. 
 
The second half of the chapter introduces, critiques, and reconceptualises the theory 
of energy justice as it stands to date, assessing if and in what form its core tenets of 
distributional justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice emerge in practice 
(McCauley et al. 2013). Section 2.4 starts with an exploration of the roots of energy 
justice in the field of environmental justice. It continues in section 2.5 with a more in-
depth exploration of the concept of energy justice to date and an overview of its 
three core tenets: distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. 
In a change from the norm, the core tenets of energy justice are reordered in favour 
of distribution, justice as recognition, and procedural justice. In so doing, it builds 
upon Jenkins et al. (2016a) who argue for a reordering of the tenets using the logic 
 29 
that if injustice is to be tackled, you must (a) identify the concern – distribution, (b) 
identify who it affects – recognition, and only then (c) identify strategies for 
remediation – procedure, so advocating throughout for a ‘what, who, how’ 
framework. 
 
Section 2.6 then critiques the energy justice framework. It does so according to three 
core variables of investigation – (1) time, (2) systems component and (3) actor – the 
applications of which are mirrored throughout the results chapters. It concludes that 
all three points are not explicit enough in current energy justice discourse, and 
makes a place for them in both this and future research. Finally, section 2.7 
advocates for a re-conceptualisation of energy justice that includes a whole-systems 
perspective at its core, building on the work of publications developed throughout 
the PhD process (Jenkins et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2016a,b). These contributions 
identify that one of the core challenges of energy justice is to apply the three-
pronged approach across the whole energy system, from resource extraction 
through to waste. It does so on the understanding that our tendency to break our 
energy systems into small and understandable pieces can lead to ad-hoc, detrimental 
policy, as some of our ‘solutions’ both cause and fail to recognise widespread 
externalities (Gagnon et al. 2002; Meadows 2009; Sovacool et al. 2014), including 
issues of social justice.  
 
2.1 An Introduction to Socio-Technical Systems 
 
The socio-technical transitions literatures were predominantly developed by the 
‘Dutch school of transition studies’ as a mode of governance for sustainable 
development (Jørgensen 2012; Loorbach and Rotmans 2010; Kern and Smith 2008). 
Since the first exclusively themed papers in the area in the late 1990s, there has been 
steady growth in journal publications, conferences, and even topic-specific journals 
such as Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions (Farla et al. 2012; van den 
Bergh et al. 2011). This growth stems from the desire to understand and stimulate 
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sustainable, low-carbon innovation, leading to a proliferation of academic studies 
applying the transition framework. This includes the use of the MLP model to analyse 
topics including transport and mobility (Whitmarsh et al. 2009; Nykvist and 
Whitmarsh 2008; Whitmarsh and Wietschel 2008), domestic energy (Nye et al. 
2010), housing (Bergman et al. 2008; Smith 2006) and food (Shove 2003). Brief 
background context to the development of the socio-technical systems theory is 
provided here before section 2.2 makes the case that it is within the landscape level 
of the MLP model that issues of energy justice emerge. 
 
Socio-technical regimes originate from a multidisciplinary framework, drawing 
notably from evolutionary economics, Science and Technology Studies and 
innovation studies (Geels 2005a). In the early literature, the drivers of transitions 
were thought to be primarily technology-push with social knock-ons, including 
changes in the way societal functions such as transportation were fulfilled (Geels 
2002; Grubler 2012). The ‘technological regime’, as initially proposed by Nelson and 
Winter (1977, 1982), was then advanced by Kemp et al. (1998, 2001), and has since 
expanded most substantially to appreciate social change alongside the technological, 
leading to the model of ‘socio-technical regimes’. The main characteristic that makes 
these transitions identifiably social in nature is the focus on and inclusion of changes 
in user practice and institutional structure alongside technological considerations 
(Markard et al. 2012). This comes as recognition that technologies are fundamentally 
intertwined with user practice, lifestyles, value changes and organisational 
structures, and that shifts in technology production and use have run parallel with 
widespread social change, including urbanisation and the growth of the consumer 
society (Murphy 2015; van den Bergh et al. 2011; McLellan et al. 2016). As one of 
innumerate examples, the introduction of automobiles occurred in tandem with 
changes in road infrastructure, car drivers, oil production and employment through 
new factories, automobile retailers and repair shops, as well as the increased 
interconnectedness of the labour force (Schot et al. 1994). 
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A socio-technical transition is seen to lead to a fundamental shift in the whole, 
interlocking, socio-technical system, including the technology, material, institutional 
setting, networked supply chains, regulations and belief systems, which, over long 
time periods, are replaced by new products, services and business models (Smith et 
al. 2010). Socio-technical transitions are seen to be long-term, multi-dimensional, 
fundamental transformations that, ideally, shift production and consumption to a 
more sustainable form (Geels and Schot 2010). This change in the socio-technical 
system partly complements the existing system, and partly substitutes it; take for 
example, the shift from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (Papachristos et al. 
2013; Geels 2005c). 
 
Geels and Schot (2007) identify in the context of energy provision, that whilst no 
transition is entirely planned or co-ordinated from the outset, contemporary 
transitions practitioners and theorists focus almost exclusively on the desire to 
transition towards a decarbonised, sustainable energy system that provides both 
security of supply and universal access to energy (Bridge et al. 2013; IEA 2008; 
Mernier 2007); a change necessitated as our current energy systems fail 
contemporary social, economic and environmental criteria (Grubler 2012). Fostering 
technological innovation is seen to fundamentally underpin these policies for 
sustainable development, raising the challenge of finding fast-acting, appropriate 
forms of governance and new, innovative technologies (Nill and Kemp 2009; Coenen 
et al. 2012). This has led to the development of a strong set of literature around the 
variety of low-carbon technologies, including renewables such as solar and wind 
(Jacobsson and Johnson 2000; Jacobsson and Bergek 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006), alongside the mapping of historical energy transitions (Geels 2002, 2005b, c, 
2006a,b; van den Ende and Kemp 1999). Work by Bridge et al. (2013) into historical 
transitions highlights that major shifts in energy fuel and conversion technologies 
have underpinned widespread social and geographical change throughout history, 
including the transition from wood and water power to coal in the 19th century, and 
then from coal to oil in the 20th. Grubler (2012) adds, in light of such investigations, 
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that by outlining the drivers and pace of these past transitions we can learn both 
valuable lessons and cautionary tales, including what is necessary to initiate and 
sustain the next energy transition towards sustainability.  
 
In addition, much of the early discussion on energy transitions also centred on 
building future scenarios and the use of visioning techniques, emphasising future 
energy potential (Elzen et al. 2004; Eames and McDowall 2010; Brown 1954, 1956, 
1976; Brown and Southworth 2008; Weinberg and Hammond 1972). The analysis of 
socio-technical transitions, therefore, can be of use in mapping and developing policy 
for potential future energy change. As such, governments are also increasingly 
utilising the language of transitions as a model for understanding their own energy 
transitions, and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries 
including Denmark, Switzerland and the UK (Foxon 2013; Lovell 2007; Bolton and 
Foxon 2015). UK engineers and social and policy analysts have entered the field too, 
developing a set of ‘transition pathways’ to a low-carbon, electrified economy. This 
includes engagement with not only physical infrastructure, but also of many 
companies performing different roles, including electricity generation, network 
companies and the National Grid – the UK systems operator responsible for 
balancing power supply and demand (Hammond et al. 2013), effectively highlighting 
complex human-technology interactions that transitions require (Kern and Smith 
2008). The UK government has followed a multi-level perspective to its transition, 
the format of which is explored in section 2.2. 
 
However, it is increasingly acknowledged that the ‘socio-‘ or social element is 
frequently missing in the transitions literature and transition plans, including failures 
to recognise their social justice and equity implications (see Sovacool et al. 2016; 
Jamieson 2014; Markowitz and Shari 2012; Swilling and Annecke 2012; Newell and 
Mulvaney 2013; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). As an illustration, the 2011 UK 
Government’s Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2011a) includes only passing 
reference to justice concepts as it mentions ‘fairness’, which is characterised as the 
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fair distribution of costs only without attention to siting issues, procedural justice, or 
justice as recognition concerns. Eames and Hunt (2013: 58) note that even ‘a “low-
carbon” transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as 
unequally [as historical fossil-based transitions] without governance mindful of 
distributional justice’ or, as is argued throughout here, issues of justice as recognition 
and procedural justice too. In light of this assertion, this chapter builds the argument 
that it is within the overarching landscape of socio-technical change that issues of 
energy justice emerge, where inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, 
or via their inclusion can provide a means to solve them.  
 
2.2 The Multi-Level Perspective  
 
The three levels of the MLP – the niche, the regime and the landscape – are 
introduced in the following paragraphs, which position nuclear energy as an on-going 
issue of socio-technical change. The core argument is that whilst much of the existing 
literature on socio-technical systems has been dedicated to understanding niche 
innovations (Kemp et al. 1998; Lopolito et al. 2010; Smith and Raven 2012), this has 
come at the expense of understanding landscape dynamics, the top level of the MLP. 
Thus, this section focuses in particular on the under-theorised macro-level of the 
landscape as it contends that this is where issues of energy justice emerge or 
alternatively, can be solved. As described, the MLP is chosen as the focus for this 
research due to its prominence in energy research, its favour with the UK 
government, and its well-established literature foundation.  
 
Rip and Kemp (1998) first developed the MLP in 1998 before it was adopted and 
theoretically elaborated by a number of authors, including, predominantly, Geels 
(2002, 2004, 2005a,b,c, 2006a,b, 2010, 2011). The MLP takes the form of a series of 
nested levels, the niche, regime, and landscape (figure 2.1). According to Geels 
(2010), these levels refer to heterogeneous configurations of increasing stability. In 
mobilising geographical metaphors, they aim to provide a contextual account of 
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technological change and systems innovation over time (Bridge et al. 2013; Geels 
2002). Geels (2002) stresses that these different levels do not represent ontological 
descriptions of reality, but instead offer analytical and heuristic concepts to aid the 
understanding of socio-technical change. They represent, therefore, levels of 
structural and temporal scale, rather than geographic, administrative or other types 
of levels (Grin et al. 2011). Researchers using MLP focus on how these levels interact 
to produce both stability and change, often with a particular focus on radical 





Figure 2.1 A Dynamic Multi-Level Perspective of STS  
(Source Geels 2002: 1263) 
 
The specifically nested nature of the levels is introduced in figure 2.2, giving an 
alternative graphical representation of the MLP. It is the interplay and dynamic 
between these three levels that creates or constrains technological transitions. 
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Change occurs when the pressures of multiple levels link up and reinforce each other 
(Geels 2002), with, according to current interpretations, the main drive for change 
occurring between the regime and the niche (Geels and Schot 2007). Thus, overall, 
the MLP examines and simplifies the interactions between niche-innovations and 
existing regimes, situated within a broader landscape environment. It is only when 






Figure 2.2 Multi-Level Framework for the Analysis of Socio-Technical Transitions 
(Source Genus and Coles 2008. Originally adapted from Geels 2002) 
 
 Niche Level 
 
This section briefly argues that current interpretations of the niche level over-
emphasise the role of new innovation at the expense of pre-existing technologies, 
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including nuclear energy. The niche is characterised as the lowest but most dynamic 
level, and is typically considered to be the site where radical, revolutionary 
innovation is developed and generated (Geels 2002; Smith et al. 2010). This micro-
level ‘incubation room’ partially shields new technologies from mainstream market 
selection, allowing the emergence of novelty and social learning (Verbong and Geels 
2007; Foxon 2013). In fulfilling this role, niches have been conceptualised as 
protected spaces, specific markets for example, within which radical innovations can 
develop without selection pressure from the prevailing regime (Kemp et al. 1998). 
Most transitions literature focuses primarily on the impact and development of 
‘novel’ technologies (Verbong and Geels 2007; Geels 2002) and their potential 
contribution to future sustainability (Coenen et al. 2012). In order to be considered 
‘transitional’ a technology is normally identified as stemming from radical innovation 
(Genus and Coles 2008). In the energy sector, this has primarily taken the form of 
renewables – the comparatively recent proliferation of commercial-scale wind 
energy and biogas, for example (see Juntunen and Hyysalo 2015; Yun and Lee 2015; 
Olsson and Fallde 2015). Change at this level is less constrained by status quo and 
business as usual, allowing radical alternatives to societal problems (Whitmarsh 
2012). Midttun (2012) notes, however, that development is an uphill battle, where 
new alternatives have to win favour from policy-makers, regulatory authorities, and 
investors in the regime in order to secure success. 
 
However, nuclear energy is also positioned as an on-going issue of socio-technical 
change. Nuclear energy has undergone explicit reframing by the pro-nuclear lobby in 
the face of the intersecting agendas of climate change, decarbonisation and 
sustainability, seeing it recast as a potential means of securing both security of 
supply and climate change stability, and a technology many are reluctantly willing to 
accept (Pidgeon et al. 2008; Poortinga et al. 2006). In 2008, for example, the UK 
government reversed its decision to decommission all nuclear power plants by 2025, 
announcing instead that new nuclear would play a role in low carbon electricity 
generation (Doyle 2011). Thus, despite being a comparatively old energy source in 
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terms of its development in the 1950s, it outlined that it had gained a new ‘niche’ as 
a result of climate change pressures. Furthermore, Taebi and van de Poel (2015) 
outline that alongside the 30 countries that currently produce nuclear energy, 
another 45 have expressed interest in developing the technology. It seems plausible 
that nuclear energy production will retain a role in energy mixes, adding to the 
continued legacy of nuclear wastes and infrastructure already produced. Taebi and 
van de Poel (2015), Taebi et al. (2012) and Landström and Bergmans (2014) outline 
that the ensuing questions of facility siting, hosting, the possible treatment of 
nuclear waste, the transfer of waste to the host sites, monitoring and final closure of 
stations all carry significant socio-technical implications. This is to say that the 
current and continued utilisation of nuclear power merits its consideration as an 
issue of socio-technical change, alongside more classically understood ‘innovative’ 
technologies, and validates its consideration as the case study of this research. 
 
 Socio-Technical Regime 
 
The socio-technical regime, or the meso-level of the MLP, comprises dominant 
institutions and technologies, and reflects the prevailing set of routines or practices 
that create and sustain technological systems (Foxon 2013). Due to vested interests 
and bureaucracy, it is often subject to incremental change (Fuenfschilling and Truffer 
2014). It is this level that creates the existing stability of technological development 
(Geels 2002), and changes slowly and ‘normally’ under the influence of niche and 
regime dynamics (Smith et al. 2010) – a so-called ‘deep structure’ that accounts for 
the stability of the dominant system (Geels 2011). In keeping with this 
characterisation, socio-technical regimes are often typified with a quality of 
‘hardness’ (Geels 2004). As transitions are defined as changes from one socio-
technical regime to another, this level often receives precedence in research (Geels 
and Schot 2007). 
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The core concept of the regime is that it imposes logic and direction for socio-
technical change along clear pathways of development (Markard et al. 2012). 
According to Loorbach and Rotmans (2010), this meso-level has an unstoppable 
tendency to self-regulate and operates in command-and-control mode, thus 
attempting to develop advisory boards and task forces, for example, in order to 
retain steering and control of the transition process. In most cases, then, the socio-
technical regime remains buffered and resistant to change, with a tendency towards 
path dependence and lock-in (Verbong and Geels 2007). This includes sunk 
investments, behavioural patterns, vested interests, infrastructure, favourable 
subsidies and regulations (Geels 2002). Geels (2004) explains as an illustration that 
once material structures such as nuclear re-processing plants are created they are 
not easily abandoned, creating a very physical lock-in. Verbong and Geels (2007) 
later split the elements resisting change into three interlocking dimensions, which for 
the purpose of this research, can be understood as the nuclear policy arena: 
 
a) Networks of actors and social groups e.g. utilities and large industrial users  
b) Formal, normative and cognitive rules that guide the activities of actors e.g. 
regulations, standards, laws, belief systems and guiding principles 
c) Material and technical elements e.g. resources and grid infrastructure  
 
The existence of these three dimensions highlights the co-evolution of social and 
technical considerations. Within the central, most complex, section of the socio-
technical regime illustrated in figure 2.1 above, Geels (2002) identifies seven 
heuristic dimensions or sub-regimes: technology, user practice and application 
domains (markets), symbolic meaning of technology, infrastructure, industry 
structure, sectoral policy and techno-scientific knowledge. A simplified 
representation of these heuristics is given in figure 2.3. These sub-regimes, according 
to Geels (2011), are the cause of both additional stability and tensions within the 
overall regime. Where these tensions exist niche ideas are able to breakthrough and, 
most importantly, as described in section 2.2.3, landscape pressures exert force. In 
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earlier work Geels (2002) also states that these different dimensions are both co-
evolved, and have their own internal dynamics. It is their interaction, therefore, that 
gives rise to the tensions represented by shorter, diverging arrows, and regular on-
going processes represented by relatively long arrows. These trajectories, Geels 






Figure 2.3 Alignment of On-going Processes in a Socio-Technical Regime 
(Source: Geels 2004: 912) 
 
 Landscape Level 
 
This section presents the argument that it is in the currently under-theorised 
landscape level of the MLP that issues of energy justice emerge. In placing emphasis 
in the role of the landscape level, it contributes to a growing body of work that 
emphasises how the landscape can exert pressure on the incumbent regime below 
(Hermwille 2016; Morone et al. 2015). The third stage of the MLP model, the macro-
level landscape, is theorised as containing slow changing external factors (Geels 
2002) – broader trends and global events, and the environmental, socio-economic, 
and cultural context, within which actors and institutions are situated (Lachman 
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2013; Smith et al. 2005). This level is often conceptualised as an environment 
external to the regime (Coenen et al. 2012), thus it represents the broader political, 
social and cultural values and institutions of society (Foxon 2013); so called quasi-
autonomous macro-dynamics (Grin et al. 2011). The shape or contours of this 
landscape make certain socio-technical trajectories more likely than others, and the 
landscape itself changes only very gradually under the influence of niche and regime 
dynamics (Verbong and Geels 2007). In this vein, according to Geels (2002) the 
metaphor of the ‘landscape’ is chosen to give the literal connotation of the relative 
‘hardness’ and material structure of society, including factories, highways and 
electrical infrastructure.  
 
Despite their acknowledgement that the landscape contains static or slow changing 
factors, such as the physical climate and demographic shifts, van Driel and Schot 
(2005) also attribute the landscape level with a degree of dynamism. This includes, 
predominantly, rapid external shocks such as war or oil price fluctuations as 
landscape dynamics. Moreover, Whitmarsh (2012) identifies a number of pressures 
on this landscape in the form of the environmental challenges of climate change, the 
economic challenges of oil prices, and the cultural challenge of value and behaviour 
change. This case can also be made using the example of nuclear energy. Hermwille 
(2016), Markard et al. (2016) and Cotton (2014) demonstrate for example that the 
rapid external shocks of the Fukushima nuclear disaster had significant impact on the 
energy sectors in Japan, Switzerland and Germany, with strong effects for the on-
going structural change of socio-technical systems.  
 
Despite being relatively slow moving, Geels (2010: 495) explains that niches can 
break through if the landscape level ‘creates pressures on the regime that lead to 
cracks, tensions and windows of opportunity’. Thus, landscape factors can exert 
pressure on the technological regime, the meso-level, challenging regime stability 
(Morone et al. 2015). It is this relationship that is seen to be most productive for this 
research. To illustrate such mechanisms, Kuzemko et al. (2016) outline that new 
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scientific knowledge on climate change has placed pressure on the lower two levels 
of the MLP, fostering widespread change to low-carbon technologies. In this regard, 
framings at the landscape level can play a role in shaping the energy mix and 
informing the criteria on which we select technologies, including, quite possibly, with 
attention to issues of social justice.  
 
Yet despite these examples, the landscape remains somewhat of a ‘black box’, which 
is less clearly conceptualised or operationalised than its counterparts (Papachristos 
and Adamides 2016); a residual ‘garbage can’ for many forms of contextual influence 
(Geels 2011). Indeed, it appears to some authors to be the spot for anything that 
does not readily fit anywhere else, with only environmental concerns sitting 
unambiguously and comfortably (Whitmarsh 2012; Morone and Lopolito 2015). 
Lawhon and Murphy (2011: 361) identify to this end that in practice many 
researchers struggle to do more than provide a coarse description of generic 
landscape factors. They identify that more studies are required that give insight into 
either conflicts or complementary landscape factors – including societal norms, 
values, geopolitics, and economic characteristics, niche innovations, and desired 
changes in socio-technical regimes. Morone et al. (2015) overcome this critique to 
some degree as they offer a functionally-driven understanding of the landscape level, 
suggesting that it is an external context for actor interactions where a range of local, 
national and global stakeholders can create pressure upon the regime level through 
social, political and economic channels, in keeping with Kuzemko et al.’s (2016) 
climate change argument given above. Therefore, Morone et al. (2015) Identify that 
the landscape level can contain (1) unintentional pressures – the earthquakes and 
wars introduced above and (2) intentional pressures – those deliberately exerted by 
stakeholders in order to initiate regime change. This includes both local and global 
actors through grassroots associations, supranational organisations, worldwide 
economic developments and trends, and political and economic channels (Morone 
and Lopolito 2015; Harris 2003). Framing energy justice as a matter of priority 
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alongside the motivations of energy security and environmental protection could 
lead to reappraisal of our energy choices, and integration of moral criteria.  
 
2.3 Summary of Socio-Technical Contributions 
 
In summary, the above sections have offered three main contributions: (1) they 
identified, in line with a growing body of authors, that energy decisions are made in a 
moral vacuum, (2) cast nuclear energy as an on-going issue of socio-technical change 
and (3) identified that it is within the landscape level of the MLP model that issues of 
energy justice emerge. Most pertinently, they contended that it is within this 
overarching landscape of socio-technical change that issues of energy justice 
emerge, where inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, or 
alternatively via their inclusion can provide a means to solve them. They argued in 
this regard that the bottom two and the top levels of the MLP model directly interact 
and play a fundamental role in ethically sensitive energy developments. In promoting 
energy justice as a component of this top level, this represents a case for not only 
mitigating environmental impacts of energy production via socio-technical change, 
but doing so in an ethically defensible, socially just way. This chapter now goes on to 
consider in more detail what ‘energy justice’ is. 
 
2.4 Environmental and Climate Justice: The Origins of Energy Justice? 
 
Energy justice has theoretical similarities with the field of environmental justice, and 
carries the same basic philosophy. Environmental justice is commonly defined as the 
distribution of environmental hazards and access to all natural resources; it includes 
equal protection from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair 
treatment in access to benefits (see Hofrichter 1993; Hockman and Morris 1998; Low 
and Gleeson 1998; Schlosberg 1999; Cole and Foster 2000; Bullard and Johnson 
2000). The environmental justice movement emerged in 1970s North America as a 
response to the unequal distribution of environmental ills – pollution and waste 
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facilities, for example – alongside the risks associated with them, which tended to be 
inequitably borne by poor coloured Americans (Davies 2006; Williams 1999). Thus 
the movement represents a concern for the ‘fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin or income with 
respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations and policies’ (Bass 1998: 83), and is driven by aspirations for 
empowerment, social justice, and public health (McCauley et al. 2013). Walker 
(2012) simplifies this interest into two core issues: (1) how some sections of society 
consume key environmental resources at the expense of others, and (2) how the 
power to affect change and influence decision-making is unequally distributed. 
 
Initially, environmental justice complaints focused on local, activism-led, community-
oriented means of ensuring the just distribution of toxic burdens; a distributionally-
based form of environmental justice inquiry that could be operationalised and 
measured on a local scale (Holifield et al. 2009). Since its inception, however, many 
authors have noted that the concept of environmental justice has grown both 
substantively and theoretically (Bevc et al. 2007; Buzzelli 2007; Downey 2003; 
Maantay et al. 2007; Mennis and Jordan 2005; Pulido 1996, 2000; Walker 2009; 
Schlosberg 2013). Williams (1999) illustrates, for example, that federal governments 
established policies to protect against future inequity in environmental decisions, 
recognising not just local, but also the national impacts of noxious facilities. Thus the 
geographical scale of application within the Unites States changed. In this regard, 
Agyeman and Evans (2004) identify two inter-related dimensions of this form of 
environmental justice: (1) a local, activist level using it as a vocabulary for 
mobilisation, action, and political opportunity, and (2) a government level that sees 
environmental justice as a policy principle, stating that no public action will 
disproportionately disadvantage any particular social group. Research by Reed and 
George (2011) demonstrates that despite some overseas proliferation, on the whole 
environmental justice research remains America-centric.  
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Alongside this scalar expansion in the application of the environmental justice 
concept, the topic of concern for the environmental justice movement has grown 
too, expanding past its original race, activism and toxic industrial-practice roots. In 
their review of environmental justice literature Reed and George (2011) state, for 
example, that whilst much research is still framed around the distribution of hazards 
and risk, the scope of what these risks are perceived to be has grown. Indeed, within 
the literature topics of concern range from prominent debates on toxic waste, air 
pollution and landfill sites, to new technology, ecological restoration, transport, 
health, energy, housing, access to food and forest management, amongst others (Sze 
and London 2008; Schlosberg 2013; Liu 2000; Walker 2009).  
 
Further, within academic discourse Holifield et al. (2009) highlight a shift within the 
movement towards a more multi-faceted understanding of the concept, where 
environmental justice is increasingly used in coalition with other theories and 
agendas, including the capabilities approach, social movement theories, 
assemblages, and actor network theory. This methodological and theoretical 
expansion Holifield et al. (2009) note has seen environmental justice focus on 
broader cross-disciplinary debates about knowledge, representation and meaning, 
opening it to more epistemological and ontological possibilities. In this regard the 
environmental justice agenda has gradually expanded from a social movement to a 
policy vocabulary, and a research field in its own right (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Agyeman 
2014; Walker and Bulkeley 2006).  
 
The broadening scope of environmental justice has also had a notable impact on its 
core tenets. Indeed, Reed and George (2011) identify a move past the original 
concern for the spatial distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ to include a 
consideration of participation and recognition, thus including a social dimension to 
spatial concerns. This tide change is observable in the literature. Williams and 
Mawdsley (2006: 661) effectively contrast two case studies: Dobson (1998) who 
focuses on environmental justice as a primarily distributive concern, and Schlosberg 
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(2004) who, drawing on Fraser (2001), ‘argues that questions of recognition are 
equally important, with recognition and redistribution both being essential elements 
of participatory parity which should itself be the basis of justice’. The emergent 
tenets – distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition – which 
form the baseline for modern-day conceptions of energy justice, are introduced in 
section 2.5.1. 
 
The methodological and theoretical growth of environmental justice, as outlined 
above, sits alongside the evolution of the climate justice concept and movement, 
which seeks to articulate the connections between climate change and human rights 
based on normative principles of social justice, democratic accountability and 
participation and ecological sustainability (Fuller and McCauley 2016). Bulkeley et al. 
(2013: 915) summarise the agenda as the mobilisation of justice with respect to 
climate policy, and state that the concept has ‘provided a means through which to 
bring concerns for the outcomes and processes of climate policy into the same frame 
of analysis’. They go on to state that in contrast to the origins of environmental 
justice in local struggles, climate justice appears predominantly at the international 
level. Heffron et al. (2015) point to the perceived failure of the Kyoto Protocol for 
example, which triggered climate protests and calls for climate justice. The climate 
justice framework has, however, more recently been applied to cities, demonstrating 
both local scale and international applicability (Bulkeley et al. 2013). 
 
Yet, despite their widespread uptake within academia, the environmental justice and 
climate justice agendas are both criticised for their failure to have a pervasive 
impact. As an illustration, Bickerstaff and Agyeman (2009) note the limited uptake of 
the environmental justice concept in the UK, where the environmental justice 
movement does not utilise the vocabulary of mobilising minority and low-income 
groups, and is yet to make any significant impact on policy and decision-making. 
Heffron et al. (2015: 175) reinforce this assertion by stating that environmental and 
climate justice face two problems: (1) that their definitions are too broad and (2) that 
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this has resulted in a difficulty to translate into economics and therefore, policy 
formation. Thus there is an increasing drive to find new, more focused, models, 
including those centred on energy issues. In this regard, Sze and London (2008: 1339) 
term energy issues ‘a new front-line in environmental justice research’.  
 
Against this background, and rooted in the growing awareness of the links between 
energy and social justice, the energy justice concept emerged, incorporating 
literature from environmental and climate justice as it developed (Hall et al. 2013). 
For Bickerstaff et al. (2013: 2), the resultant energy justice concept ‘provides a way of 
“bounding” and separating out energy concerns from the wider range of topics 
addressed within both environmental and climate justice analysis campaigning’. In 
this regard there are three distinguishing points about the evolution of energy 
justice: (1) it borrows heavily from the environmental and climate justice 
movements, but (2) it is far more targeted in its topic of concern, and therefore has 
the potential for policy uptake, and (3) unlike environmental and climate justice, it is 
not the outcome of anti-establishment social movements. The meaning of this latter 
point, which appears in Heffron et al. (2015) and Jenkins et al. (2016a), has not been 
explicitly clear to date. This means that energy justice is, first and foremost, an 
academic concept, albeit one that has emerged indirectly from decades of activist 
campaigning. Further, it is not a term that is frequently used in activist discourse. 
This lack of an anti-establishment past opens the door for significant contributions to 
mainstream policy-making (Jenkins et al. 2016a). In order to outline how energy 
justice can make such contributions, this chapter now introduces the tenet 
framework: distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. 
 
2.5 Energy Justice and the Tenet Framework 
 
Energy justice has emerged amidst the realisation that our energy structures require 
widespread reform, and out of a growing interest in the justice implications of 
energy consumption and energy’s societal impacts (Hall 2013). Against the 
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background of the environmental and climate justice literatures, and in light of this 
surrounding context, energy justice aims ‘to provide all individuals, across all areas, 
with safe, affordable and sustainable energy’ (McCauley et al. 2013: 1). It does so 
with a tenet framework informed by the environmental justice movement, including 
attention to the core tenets of distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as 
recognition. This section explores the emergence of energy justice, its meaning and 
its current uptake, and secondly, its three core tenets. 
 
Despite being a relatively new term, the concept of energy justice has gained early 
prominence as one of eight core themes of the new (2016) Nature Energy journal, as 
a recently named theme of the UK Energy Research Council (UKERC), as the subject 
of an upcoming special edition for the journal Energy Policy, and last as the topic of 
numerous peer-reviewed articles and edited books. Hall (2013) highlights the 
growing body of work around issues of energy, justice, equity and vulnerability, for 
example. Indeed, over the three years following the first academic contribution that 
explicitly reflected upon energy justice from a policy perspective (McCauley et al. 
2013), peer-reviewed articles and edited books published on energy justice have 
emerged with regards to whole-systems (Heffron and McCauley 2014; Jenkins et al. 
2014, 2016a), ethical behaviour (Hall 2013), climate change mitigation (Bickerstaff et 
al. 2013; McCauley et al. 2016), household energy consumption (Walker et al. 2016), 
energy policy-making (Heffron et al. 2015) and theorisation and methods (Sovacool 
and Dworkin 2014; Sovacool 2015). Moreover, there have been topic-specific 
contributions on cities (Bickerstaff et al. 2009; Bickerstaff et al. 2013), fuel poverty 
(Walker and Day 2012; McCauley et al. 2013; Sovacool 2015; Chard and Walker 
2016), the politics of energy infrastructures (Fuller and McCauley 2016; Jenkins 2016) 
and energy consumption and mobility (Liddell et al. 2016; Simcock and Mullen 2016; 
Walker et al. 2016; Chatterton et al. 2016; Mullen and Marsden 2016). Such rapid 
growth merits critical reflection.  
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Whilst in the early stages energy justice was often used in tandem with the concept 
of fuel poverty (Snell et al. 2015; Sovacool 2015; Reames 2016; Chard and Walker 
2016; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016; Walker and Day 2012; Middlemiss and Gillard 2015), 
as energy rises up the political and academic agenda this is just one way in which 
power relations, fairness, and disadvantage are created and expressed (Hall et al. 
2013). Thus, the energy justice tenets are increasingly utilised in the global context of 
energy production and consumption, including with attention to the issues of energy 
policy, energy production and systems, energy consumption, energy activism, energy 
security, the political economy of energy, climate change and many more (Jenkins et 
al. 2016a).  
 
Further, energy justice is increasingly characterised as an analytical tool; one that, for 
Heffron et al. (2015), can achieve a just balance between the three dimensions of the 
energy trilemma. As one example, Heffron et al. (2015: 172) develop an energy 
justice metric, which is designed to connect with economists through quantitative 
analysis of energy justice, allowing it to be evaluated in monetary terms. This 
approach produces three results: (1) an individual-country energy justice metric and 
(2) an energy justice metric for each type of energy e.g. nuclear power, both of which 
allow (3) the cost of energy justice to then be factored in to an economic model 
calculation in the form of a cost-benefit analysis. Sovacool and Dworkin (2015: 436) 
state in relation to such models, that energy justice thus ‘presents a useful decision-
making tool that can assist energy planners and consumers in making more informed 
energy choices’ as well as serving as ‘an important analytical tool for energy 
researchers striving to understand how values get built into energy systems or to 
resolve common energy problems’. In this regard the energy justice concept is 
increasingly seeking to move past academic discourse to non-academic applicability, 
including engagement with lawyers, economists and policy-makers (Heffron et al. 
2015; Sovacool and Dworkin 2015; Sovacool et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2016a), a 
concept explored further in section 2.7 as this research makes a case for its own 
 49 
model based on whole-systems thinking. Firstly, however, each of its core tenets is 
introduced in turn. 
 
 The Tenet Framework 
 
Within the field of environmental justice, and latterly energy justice, a range of tenet 
frameworks have emerged. McCauley et al. (2013) use three core tenets, 
distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition, whereas others 
dismiss the inclusion of recognition as a tenet, including Sidortsov and Sovacool 
(2015) who instead focus on distributional justice, procedural justice and 
cosmopolitanism as core concepts. In keeping with McCauley et al. (2013), however, 
this research utilises the framework of three core tenets, distributional justice, 
procedural justice and justice as recognition, including justice as recognition as the 
third tenet based on the works of Fraser (2014). Thus it borrows in part from Fuller 
and Bulkeley (2013), who focus on the application of distributional and procedural 
justice considerations in energy justice based on the work of Rawls (1991).  
 
In a change from the norm, however, the order in which they are typically used is 
altered – distribution, procedure, recognition –, and instead justice as recognition is 
placed in second place – distributional justice, justice as recognition, and procedural 
justice. This approach builds upon the work of Jenkins et al. (2016a) who argue for a 
reordering of the tenets on the logic that if injustice is to be tackled, you must (a) 
identify the concern – distribution, (b) identify who it affects – recognition, and only 
then (c) identify strategies for remediation – procedure. This framework adopts a 
‘what, who and how’ approach to tackling energy justice concerns, with the intention 
that energy justice can exist as a solution-based framework that not only 
characterises injustices but can also help tackle them, thus taking on both evaluative 
and normative roles. Each of these tenets is now introduced in turn.  
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2.5.1.1 Distributional Justice 
 
The first tenet of energy justice is distributional justice, which manifests at both the 
stage of energy production and that of energy consumption. Energy justice is an 
inherently spatial concept that includes both the physically unequal allocation of 
environmental benefits and ills and the uneven distribution of their associated 
responsibilities (Walker 2009: 615): for example, exposure to risk. Thus, energy 
justice can appear as a situation where ‘questions about the desirability of 
technologies in principle become entangled with issues that relate to specific 
localities’ (Owens and Driffill 2008: 4414), and represents a call for the distribution of 
benefits and ills on all members of society regardless of income, race etc. (Bullard 
2005).  
 
The concept of distributional justice has a strong foundation in the environmental 
justice movement. Bowen (2002: 3), comments in his review of early environmental 
justice literature, that ‘literally dozens of published articles on environmental justice 
begin by stating that a large body of empirical research demonstrates that 
minorities, low income, and otherwise disadvantaged and susceptible 
neighbourhoods are disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards’. Thus, 
past research focused on the physical siting of infrastructures, and the locational 
effects of environmental risk (Mitchell and Norman 2012). In this respect, since its 
earliest emergence as a civil rights concern environmental justice, and distributional 
justice within it, has been intensely geographical (Walker and Bulkeley 2006).  
 
More recently, Fuller and McCauley (2016) illustrate that distributional concerns 
appear on both sides of the energy production/consumption dualism. Production-
oriented questions of distributional justice often appear in relation to the siting of 
pre-existing energy facilities, and the development of new energy infrastructures 
(Fuller and McCauley 2016). Research has shown unequal placement of nuclear 
facilities in areas of low-income, for example (Sze and London 2008). Further, the 
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highly contentious matter of wind farm siting in Scotland illustrates concern over the 
placement of new build infrastructures (Warren et al. 2005) as, in the case of the UK, 
research demonstrates that it is often the deprived and least powerful social groups 
that are disproportionately impacted (Todd and Zografos 2005; Fast 2013). In 
consumption terms, distributional justice is typically discussed as access to 
affordable energy, as exemplified by the ready application of energy justice literature 
to the issue of fuel poverty (Fuller and McCauley 2016; Walker and Day 2012; 
McCauley et al. 2013; Sovacool 2015). In this vein, Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) 
highlight the consideration of distributional justice as issues of availability, 
affordability and sustainability.  
 
With this production and consumption dualism in mind, McCauley et al. (2013: 1) 
argue that energy policy needs to address the unequal distribution of ills across the 
energy system, including with attention to infrastructure siting, subsidies, pricing 
(e.g. fuel poverty) and consumption indicators (e.g. smart meters), to name but a 
few. This idea is developed this further in section 2.7 with the advancement of a 
whole-systems approach to energy justice. 
 
Distributional justice does recognise that some resources are naturally and 
unavoidably unevenly distributed – the distribution of fossil fuel resources or the 
suitability of sites for wind energy, for example. Thus, Walker and Bulkeley (2006) 
and Eames and Hunt (2013) note that unequal distribution is not always unjust. 
Instead, it is often the ‘fairness’ of the processes surrounding infrastructural 
development that is important (Walker and Bulkeley 2006: 4), and as such claims for 
distributional justice require that evidence of inequality are combined with an 
argument for fair treatment (Eames and Hunt 2013). Throughout this thesis such 




2.5.1.2 Justice as Recognition 
 
The inclusion of justice as recognition as a core tenet of energy justice is widely 
debated. For some the focus is primarily on matters of distribution (Vincent 1998; 
Dobson 1998), whereas for others justice as recognition is acknowledged, but only as 
a tacitly included element in the ideal definition of distribution and/or participation 
(Schlosberg 2004). Fraser (1999: 98) highlights further that some perceive it to be a 
‘false consciousness’, and a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. However, 
following both Fraser (2001, 2009) and Young (2011), recognition is now treated as a 
distinct tenet. Indeed, in line with the ‘what, who, and how’ tenet framework used 
throughout this thesis, justice as recognition is taken to be a means of explicitly 
engaging with the questions of ‘who’ is energy justice for, and, as outlined in section 
2.6.3, who is responsible for its provision. 
 
Justice as recognition appears as a concern for ‘how people are involved in 
environmental decision-making, or “who (and what) is given respect”’ (Eames 2011). 
Drawing on Fraser (1999), Schlosberg (2007: 18) conceptualises the concerns around 
justice as recognition as three separate issues: (1) practices of cultural domination, 
(2) patterns of non-recognition (invisibility of people and their concerns), and (3) 
disrespect through stereotyping and disparaging language: misrecognition. Within 
this context justice as recognition is more than tolerance, and requires that 
individuals must be fairly represented, that they must be free from physical threats, 
and that they must be offered complete and equal political rights (Schlosberg 2003). 
Each of these three points in now described in turn.  
 
The process of cultural domination may include, as one of innumerate potential 
examples, ‘the process of disrespect, insult and degradation that devalue some 
people and some places’ identities in comparison to others’ (Walker 2009: 615). In 
this context justice as recognition calls for the respect of difference, and a move to 
prevent one group dominating another (Martin et al. 2013). Further, justice 
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recognition also represents a call to acknowledge diversity within and between 
environmental justice movements (Hall et al. 2013). Thus it includes calls to 
recognise the divergent perspectives of different ethnic, racial and gender 
differences (Fraser 1999).  
 
As outlined above, justice as recognition also appears as non-recognition, the 
invisibility of people and their concerns, as exemplified by the often-cited issue of 
fuel poverty. Sovacool (2015), in his exploration of affordable warmth and justice, 
highlights concern for a particular group in society – those unable to access 
affordable heat. Sovacool (2015: 363) states that fuel poverty ‘can be read as a lack 
of recognition of the needs to certain groups, and, more fundamentally, as a lack of 
equal respect accorded to their wellbeing’. In the UK, Heffron et al. (2015) report 
that this has led In the UK to targeted policies that recognise the specific needs of 
particular social groups, including winter fuel payments for elderly and infirm 
members of society who rely on higher than average room temperatures. Thus, 
justice as recognition also emerges as a call to recognise differential needs and 
forgotten social groups.  
 
Finally, concerns may also arise not over a failure to recognise, but as misrecognising, 
a distortion of people’s views that may appear demeaning or contemptible 
(Schlosberg 2003). As one example of justice as recognition as a process of 
disrespect, McCauley et al. (2013) highlight the potential for organised 
misrecognition in the case of UK energy siting. They state for example that many 
regulators in the renewable power industry, and environmental NGOs, often deride 
local campaigns against wind farms as ‘not-in-my-backyard’ protests by self-
interested and misinformed individuals. This lack of recognition, it is claimed, can go 
on to damage the reputation of communities in the larger cultural and political 
realm. Thus misrecognition may not only harm and constrain individuals, but can 
serve as the foundation for distributional injustice (Schlosberg 2004).  
 
 54 
2.5.1.3 Procedural Justice 
 
The last tenet in the reordered energy justice tenet framework is procedural justice, 
or the ‘how’ of energy justice. Procedural justice concerns access to decision-making 
processes that govern the distributions outlined above, and manifests as a call for 
equitable procedures that engage all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way 
(Walker 2009; Bullard 2005). It states that all groups should be able to participate in 
decision-making, and that their contributions should be taken seriously throughout. 
It also requires participation, impartiality and full information disclosure by 
government and industry (Davies 2006), and the use of appropriate and sympathetic 
engagement mechanisms (Todd and Zografos 2005). It is concerned, then, about the 
fairness of decision-making processes, or justice in ‘doing’, and emerges as a claim 
for representational space and free speech (Sayer 2011; Sze and London 2008). For 
Walker (2012) these requirements can be split in to four key rights: 
 
(1) Access to information 
(2) Access to and meaningful participation in decision-making 
(3) Lack of bias on the part of decision-makers 
(4) Access to legal processes for achieving redress 
 
Claims for procedural justice initially became synonymous with politically excluded 
civil rights movements across North America (Gibson-Wood and Wakefield 2013), 
and have thereafter been applied to class (Taylor 2000), gender (Buckingham and 
Kulcur 2009) and religion (Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010). Procedural justice is 
underpinned by access to and pressure from multi-level legal systems (Walker and 
Day 2012) and is simultaneously driven by softer non-regulatory influences such as 
practices, norms, values and behaviours (Hall 2013). 
 
Procedural justice manifestations include, as an illustration, questions arising around 
how and for whom community renewables projects are developed (Walker and 
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Devine-Wright 2008), and the ethics of the emergent voluntarism debate, where 
communities volunteer to host facilities (Butler and Simmons 2013). In addition, 
Fuller and McCauley (2016) identify that procedural justice debates are increasingly 
becoming more prominent across the energy production/consumption dualism as 
outlined above, with, for example case studies around the siting of turbines versus 
the access of some groups to affordable warmth. Sovacool (2015) notes by way of 
illustration that the issue of fuel poverty intersects with procedural justice, as 
affected households have neither the time nor the means to participate in energy 
policy decision-making.  
 
To illustrate the broad applicability of the procedural concept Jenkins et al. (2016b) 
utilise the example of energy subsidies to illustrate the emergence of concerns that 
are subject to the issue of full information disclosure. They question, in particular, 
whether the public are in full knowledge of what subsidies different energy sources 
in the energy sector receive. Despite research in the UK into the energy subsidies 
each energy type receives and how this could inform the public’s choice as to the 
components of the future energy mix, there was not a conclusive outcome. Thus, 
Jenkins et al. (2016b) argue that there remains a lack of core procedural justice 
elements of participation, impartiality and full information disclosure by government 
and industry on the issue of energy subsidies, leading to potential artificial skews in 
public perceptions to one form of energy or another. Such information disclosure 
should be readily accessible so that all stakeholders can construct informed decision-
making as to what energy sources we should have. This is especially relevant given 
the notable effect of subsidy costs on societal welfare, as is discussed in Farrell and 
Lyons’ (2015) exploration of renewables subsidies in Ireland. Davies (2006: 709) 
cautions, however, that ‘while participatory mechanisms may appear to be 
equitable, they are inevitably set within broader social and political systems that can 
perpetuate established inequalities’. This includes the failure to recognise 
marginalised social groups: justice as recognition.  
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This statement highlights the inevitable overlap of the three tenets outlined above. 
According to Walker and Day (2012), the three tenets listed above are informed by a 
body of academic work that is directly interested with how justice is made sense of in 
everyday contexts. In reality, as with many academic concepts, the boundaries 
between the tenets often become less distinct (Jenkins et al. 2016b). According to 
McCauley et al. (2013: 1) they are frequently seen as interlinked, and are perceived 
to share many overlapping issues. So too, this chapter contends, do many energy 
issues when seen through a systems lens. It is in this statement that this research 
finds its niche, as this chapter makes the case for a whole-systems approach to the 
energy justice literature. To build the case, this chapter first considers current 
theoretical discussions around the issues of temporality, geographical scale and the 
roles of actors within the justice literature. 
 
2.6 Refining the Energy Justice Framework 
 
Based on the review of the literature above, three areas of conceptual growth in the 
energy justice literature appear – time, systems component and actor – the 
application of which is mirrored throughout the results chapters (figure 2.4). This 
section discusses firstly, the issue of temporality within the energy justice 
framework, including consideration of whether energy injustices change through 
time and whether the framework should remediate past and present injustices, act 
as a framework for considering future injustices, or do all of these. Secondly, it calls 
into question the spatial applicability of the energy justice concept, discussing the 
contexts of its current use and considering whether it is able to translate across 
scalar scales: local, national, international and global energy justice manifestations. 
Finally, this section explores the actor of concern for energy justice, before making 
the case that we should not only be concerned with the victims, but in order to make 
a just transition we should also be concerned with those that are responsible for 
energy-based decision-making. It concludes that all three points are not explicit 
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enough in current energy justice discourse, and makes a place for them in both this 




Figure 2.4 The Three Variables of Investigation 
 
 Reflecting on Temporality  
 
In line with Bickerstaff et al. (2013), Fuller and McCauley (2016: 8) identify that ‘the 
question of time may be significant in further understanding the impacts of energy 
justice activism for the future’. For the purposes of this research, however, the 
importance of temporality within the energy justice framework is taken far beyond 
the realms of activism. Indeed, in developing a temporal approach to the three-
pronged ‘what, who, how’ framework outlined above, this work exemplifies the 
range of temporal explorations required at all stages of an energy infrastructure and 








Heffron et al. (2015: 169) comment that ‘energy justice is an inherently spatial, 
temporal and social concept’. However, its treatment within current research is 
confusing as, where it does appear, it does so in strongly contrasting ways. Sidortsov 
and Sovacool (2015: 306) state, for example, that ‘energy justice is best understood 
by examining instances of injustice’ and that ‘it is unlikely that one would take note 
of how just and fair things are unless something disturbs the status quo’. In this 
regard they highlight a tendency to look back in time, take an evaluative approach, 
and consequently focus on the remediation of past injustice. In a separate piece, 
however, Sovacool (2013a: 959) observes that energy justice raises the issue of 
fairness for ‘future generations, as we will leave them with the legacy of polluted 
atmosphere and a potentially unstable climate’. In keeping with this statement, 
Heffron et al. (2015: 171) introduce the concept of thinking in the ‘future tense’, 
whereby specific attention is given to future generations, and to ensuring that they 
are treated as equally significant to the present populations. Thus they focus on 
mitigation of potential injustices in the future. In line with Jenkins et al. (2016a), this 
chapter highlights that this temporal division highlights both the evaluative and 
normative reach of energy justice, where practitioners can both assess injustices and 
also make recommendations on how they should be approached.  
 
Temporal issues are, however, more complex than that. As one example, the 
literature frequently fails to consider how justice manifestations can change through 
the lifespan of one energy site, for example at the stage of construction of a nuclear 
power plant as opposed to its decommissioning. As one further example, Heffron et 
al.’s (2015: 169) study on the utility of the energy justice concept for solving energy 
trilemmas argues that energy justice is specifically intertwined with the development 
of new energy infrastructure, and ‘that this is where the value and effectiveness of 
energy justice can be delivered in policy application’. In this regard they fail to 
address the potential to remediate past injustices at pre-existing sites, and as a 
consequence the potential for energy justice to inform procedures throughout the 
various stages of a site’s lifespan, including at the stages of development, operation, 
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and decommissioning. Indeed, by utilising the ‘what, who, how’ framework outlined 
above, it is possible to see that this is just one instance in which temporal reflexivity 
within the energy justice framework becomes significant (table 2.1). This idea of 
temporal reflexivity is developed throughout the results chapters as they consider 
past, present, and future manifestations of energy justice both across space, and at 
any one given facility. 
 
Tenet  Temporal Question Example of Shifting Concern 
What (distributional 
justice) 
Which stage of the operative 
facility’s lifespan is of 
concern: siting, operation or 
decommissioning? 
Siting: the potential for local 
landscape transformation 
Decommissioning: the loss of 
jobs and amenities 
Who (justice as 
recognition) 
Are you concerned with past, 
present or future 
generations?  







At what stage in the 




Operation: On-going Site 
Stakeholder Groups 
 
Table 2.1 Temporal Examples of the ‘What, Who, How’ Framework of Energy Justice 
 
 Reflecting on Systems 
 
This section argues that environmental justice, and resultantly the embryonic 
concept of energy justice, lack scalar focus. Bickerstaff and Agyeman (2009: 783) 
comment in line with this that early iterations of the environmental justice literature 
are characterised by formal, literal, representations of scale, but that such iterations 
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appear unable to cope with ‘multiplicity, change, and, by implication, the socially and 
politically constructed nature of scale’, adding that there remains a high level of 
spatial ambiguity in environmental justice research. To this end, Kurtz (2003: 888) 
highlights that ‘the problem of environmental inequity is thus characterised by 
spatial ambiguity and, with no indisputable rationale for favouring one scale of 
resolution and analysis over another, environmental justice politics are permeated 
by considerable debate over the nature and spatial extent of both problem and 
possible solutions’. In observing the early applications of energy justice, this also 
appears to be the case for this emergent literature. Energy justice has to date been 
applied at a range of spatial scales, including work on the local scale via cities 
(Bickerstaff et al. 2009; Bickerstaff et al. 2013), national fuel poverty issues (Snell et 
al. 2015), calls to apply energy justice to the Arctic region (Sidortsov and Sovacool 
2015) and explorations of the concept’s global applicability (Jenkins et al. 2016a). 
Alongside these are cross-scalar enterprises, including applying energy justice to 
energy supply chains (Heffron and McCauley 2014). There seems, therefore, relative 
lack of scalar focus for its applicability.  
 
As a response to such criticisms many authors (Heynen 2003; Heynen et al. 2006; 
Perkins et al. 2004; Trainor et al. 2007; Wolch 2007) argue for a multi-scalar focus 
and interconnected approach; an acknowledgement, according to Holifield et al. 
(2009: 4), that ‘place-specific policies and practices can have consequences that cross 
national boundaries, affect multiple scales, and extend across global networks’. The 
need for this is clear. Butler and Simmons (2013) draw attention to the fact that 
individuals that are considerable distances away from the negative impacts of 
uranium mining often garner the benefits of nuclear power. Further, Heffron et al. 
(2015) stress that globalisation has caused linkages that cross national borders and 
create solidarities between different communities, highlighting that the resulting 
issues, including atmospheric pollution, cannot be solved by one group alone. They 
go on to add that due process is relevant to every level of decision-making at local, 
provincial, national and global scales. Thus they promote the application of 
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cosmopolitanism to energy justice frameworks, a consideration of the idea that we 
are all global citizens. Within this they argue for a collective approach to resources, 
including a targeted focus ‘on energy resources, in an attempt to achieve a 
meaningful global change specifically in energy behaviours and attitudes’ (Heffron et 
al. 2015: 170). Whilst this concept is generally agreeable, it also appears highly 
problematic: who takes responsibility? How do we deal with past injustices? Whose 
rights do we promote? With such issues in mind, the energy justice framework 
requires a means of uniting these currently disparate scales of applicability and, as a 
result, of recognising the different actors they implicate (section 2.6.3). This claim 
builds upon the work of Fuller and McCauley (2016: 7) who state that ‘one 
opportunity for an energy justice frame is the ability to overlay specific normative 
claims of justice with questions about energy in a whole-systems approach, often a 
limitation of existing discourses of environmental justice’. 
 
 Reflecting on Actors 
 
The third and final factor which that needs more investigation is that of actors, or the 
‘who’ of energy justice. This is necessary on two counts, both in questioning ‘justice 
for whom?’, and as a reflection on ‘justice by whom?’. These questions move past 
the original application of energy justice, which focuses almost exclusively on those 
facing injustices, to promote a simultaneous consideration of who is responsible for 
the inequity and/or its remediation. In so doing it develops the work of Heffron et al. 
(2015), who identify that the purpose of energy justice is to (1) identify when and 
where injustices occur, and (2) to identify how best academics and practitioners can 
critically evaluate the impacts of energy policies, and how best they can respond – 
thus attributing accountability.  
 
Answers to the question, ‘who is energy justice for?’ have so far received a range of 
different answers: the elderly and infirm as those that suffer most from fuel poverty 
(Fuller and McCauley 2016; Walker and Day 2012; McCauley et al. 2013; Sovacool 
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2015), poor and ethnic communities who historically shouldered the burden of toxic 
waste dumps (Williams 1999; Davies 2006) or anti-wind campaigners whose opinions 
are often derided (Jenkins et al. 2016a), as three of innumerate potential examples. 
In this circumstance, the answer appears to be pluralist. Evidence from the 
environmental justice movement, however, suggests that we should further consider 
who is being ignored, and who we are not recognising. Environmental justice 
research frequently considers the burden of racial minorities, and more recently 
indigenous communities, but neglects other sections of society. As one illustration, 
Reed and George (2011) state that not enough attention is paid to the role of gender 
in justice disputes. Environmental justice is also frequently criticised for regarding 
communities as coherent, homogenous and united groups of people, whereas in fact 
residents are frequently far from that (Fan 2006a). Assuming this kind of collective 
advocacy, according to Bickerstaff and Agyeman (2009), neglects the potential for it 
to be parochial or inequitable at another scale. In the same vein, Heynen (2003: 993) 
points out that ‘little attention has been given … to understanding how socio-natural 
injustices at particular scales do not necessarily translate into injustices at other 
scales’. This section makes the case for a whole-systems approach to energy justice 
as a means of capturing the justice discourses of all actors across the relevant scales. 
 
Further, there needs to be a focus not only on ‘justice for whom?’, but ‘justice by 
whom?’. Sovacool et al. (2016: 1) offer one approach when they state ‘an important 
dimension to justice goes beyond concepts and analysis to decisions and thus 
decision-making, including policy-makers and regulators as well as ordinary students, 
jurists, homeowners, businesspersons, investors, and consumers’. In this regard, they 
highlight that we all bear the burden of creating energy justice, even when we make 
the most mundane energy choices such as turning on a light switch. Further, Heffron 
and McCauley (2014: 437) add that ‘justice is concerned with social responsibility by 
the private sector, the government and the public. The choices that they make will 
have a significant impact upon both global climate change, and in particular, inter-
generational justice’. Both statements, however, do not engage with the power 
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differentials in each group, their awareness of the issue, or their range of capabilities. 
These statements are too broad, and they permit the diffusion of responsibility. 
Instead, if the purpose of energy justice is to serve as an analytical tool and move 
past academic discourse, it must narrow its focus. Heffron et al. (2015) go some way 
towards this in designing an energy justice metric designed specifically with 
economists in mind. In taking an elite perspective and engaging with policy, industry 
and NGO groups, this research seeks to go further towards answering this question, 
identifying potentially new audiences that are capable of directly tackling the 
prevalence of energy injustices. 
 
2.7 Reconceptualising Energy Justice: A Whole-Systems Approach 
 
In promoting the increasingly recognised concept of energy justice and proposing a 
reconceptualisation of current theory that includes a whole energy systems 
perspective, this section builds on the work of publications developed throughout 
the PhD process (Jenkins et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2016a,b). These contributions 
identify that one of the core challenges of energy justice is to apply this three-
pronged approach across the whole energy system from the stages of resource 
extraction right through to waste. Thus, this research is situated within an emerging 
body of literature seeking to embed questions of justice and equity within energy 
systems (Fuller and McCauley 2016; Bickerstaff et al. 2013; McLaren et al. 2013; 
Adams et al. 2012; Sovacool 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Sovacool and 
Dworkin 2015). Further, it fulfils a research gap outlined by Fuller and McCauley 
(2016: 7), who state that ‘understanding and tracing the potential interconnections 
between production and consumption alongside distribution and procedure is 
fundamental to developing and articulating an energy justice frame’. This approach 
draws in particular on the issue of spatiality outlined above as it considers the 
geographical reach of the energy justice concept. Further, in looking across the 
energy system from mining to waste, this model seeks to capture the justice 
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discourses of all actors across the relevant scales, revealing groups that are often 
excluded from decision-making. 
 
The need for a whole-systems approach stems from both perceived and realised 
failures in energy systems governance (Gagnon et al. 2002). Meadows (2009) 
highlights the tendency to break our systems into small and understandable pieces. 
Yet such an ad-hoc, often national-scale policy approach can be detrimental, as for 
example some of our ‘solutions’ both cause and fail to recognise widespread 
externalities, including climate change and resource depletion (Gagnon et al. 2002; 
Meadows 2009; Sovacool et al. 2014). By way of illustration, Florini and Sovacool 
(2009) draw attention to gaps in the international system’s ability to manage 
energy’s externalities and so secure a transition to low-carbon sources, externalities 
that this research argues include questions of social justice.  
 
Our current approach, where we focus on production and consumption as distinct 
outcomes of energy provision, means that typically our supply is governed through 
piecemeal, ad-hoc responses (Florini and Sovacool 2009). Whilst the UK’s 2008 White 
Paper ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power’ mentions 
uranium mining in terms of security of supply and environmental damage, for 
example, it does not mention social implications of the process, including the health 
impacts on workers and recognition of indigenous peoples and treaty rights (BERR 
2008). To this end, Newell and Mulvaney (2013: 138) discuss the frequent 
presentation of nuclear power as ‘clean’ energy without acknowledgement of its 
social context, including the environmental injustices associated with 
uranium/yellow cake mining, and long-term nuclear waste storage problems. They 
warn of the burdens of nuclear power being unevenly distributed internationally, 
‘particularly if “clean energy” is pursued without attention to energy justice’.  
 
With such dilemmas in mind many authors (Heynen 2003; Heynen et al. 2006; 
Perkins et al. 2004; Trainor et al. 2007; Wolch 2007) argue for a multi-scalar focus; an 
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acknowledgement, according to Holifield et al. (2009: 4) that ‘place-specific policies 
and practices can have consequences that cross national boundaries, affect multiple 
scales, and extend across global networks’. In this vein Newell and Mulvaney (2013: 
138) comment too that the ‘social and spatial dimensions of energy and climate 
justice force us to consider the scope for stronger forms of energy governance 
beyond the state that are able to address these complex relationships’. Such an 
approach, according to Newell and Mulvaney (2013: 133) 'reiterates the importance 
of comprehending the global dimensions of the issue in the everyday, increasingly 
transnational, organisation of production and consumption through global supply 
chains, rather than through the dramatic, site-specific and more visible instances of 
environmental justice conflicts and mobilisations which feature in much of the 
literature’.  
 
As illustrated above, new perspectives and research are needed to understand the 
complex relationship between the global transformation of social and natural 
systems (Biermann 2012; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). 
This chapter proposes a whole-systems approach to energy justice as a tool. It 
advocates for a combination of the social science account of energy (policy) with its 
natural science counterpart (systems). This approach provides a more nuanced 
understanding of justice concerns through the exploration of distributional, 
recognition-based and procedural justice issues within the context of both energy 
production and consumption, questioning firstly where, across a global energy 
system, the injustices lie (Heffron and McCauley 2014: 435).  
 
A whole-systems approach involves identifying the characteristics of the system in 
question – its elements, interconnections and overall function – and examining the 
interactions between them (Meadows 2009). The energy system is defined as the 
entire energy chain, from mining, conversion, production, transmission, and 
distribution, right through to energy consumption and waste, and exists to fulfil the 
goal of energy production from a variety of sources (Bevier 2009; Alanne and Saari 
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2006; Gagnon et al. 2002). Such systems are taken as both material in terms of their 
physical infrastructures and also social in nature, as recognition that technologies are 
intertwined with user practice, life styles, value changes and organisations (Markard 
et al. 2012; Kern and Smith 2008). In line with Goldthau and Sovacool (2012: 233) 
then, ‘energy’ is referred to as a socio-technical system that includes traditionally 
overlooked elements of the fuel cycle such as coalmines and oil wells, in addition to 
the institutions and agencies that manage the system.  
 
In taking a systems approach this research acknowledges such externalities in the 
decision-making process, as recognition of energy’s far-reaching social, economic 
and environmental impacts (Stagl 2006). Furthermore, such an approach aims to 
identify, and where possible prevent, problems that can arise from otherwise unseen 
or unintended consequences by shifting the scale of focus to a global ‘bigger picture’ 
(Adams et al. 2013: 94). This concept builds to the idea that by bringing greater 
awareness of human needs and actions it is possible to improve the system overall 
(Bevier 2009: 202). Previous work in this area (Heffron and McCauley 2014: 435) 
suggested that such a system-wide focus had two implications: (1) it allowed the 
energy technology to be valued at full cost, and (2) this valuation would affect 
whether it is chosen as an energy source, with implications for energy security, the 
energy mix and climate change goals. This concept is developed throughout the 
results, as firstly the research case studies reflect on two indicative stages of the 
nuclear energy lifecycle represented by case studies of energy production at the 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and waste reprocessing, storage, and 
disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. Secondly, chapter 7 returns to 




This chapter started with the conceptual ambition to unite the socio-technical 
transition and energy literatures. Section 2.1 outlined that whilst interest in the 
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concept of socio-technical transitions has grown substantially (Verbong and Geels 
2007), the ‘socio-‘ or social element is frequently missing in the transitions literature 
and transition plans, including failures to recognise their social justice and equity 
implications (see Sovacool et al. 2016; Jamieson 2014; Markowitz and Shari 2012; 
Swilling and Annecke 2012; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Goldthau and Sovacool 
2012). Building on this argument, section 2.2 described the multi-level perspective 
(MLP) on socio-technical systems, the major transitions framework in Europe, which 
is frequently used to emphasise structural innovations in energy systems (Bridge et 
al. 2013). It outlined the three levels of the MLP in turn whilst considering the role of 
nuclear energy as an issue of on-going socio-technical change. It argued that whilst 
much of the existing literature on socio-technical systems has been dedicated to 
understanding niche innovations (Kemp et al. 1998; Lopolito et al. 2010; Smith and 
Raven 2012), this has come at the expense of understanding landscape dynamics, the 
top level of the MLP. Further, it contended that it is within this overarching 
landscape of socio-technical change that issues of energy justice emerge. In so doing, 
this section began to make the case for the concept of energy justice as a tool that 
can aid ethically defensible energy decision-making.  
 
In its second half, this chapter then took a three-pronged approach to exploring the 
concept of energy justice: introduce, critique, and reconceptualise. Sections 2.4 and 
2.5 presented an introduction to the concept of energy justice, an exploration of its 
roots in the environmental justice movement, and finally an overview of its three 
core tenets: distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. In a 
change from the norm, this chapter has argued for a reordering of the core tenets of 
energy justice in favour of distribution, justice as recognition, and procedural justice. 
It built upon Jenkins et al. (2016a) who argue for a reordering of the tenets on the 
logic that if injustice is to be tackled, you must (a) identify the concern – distribution, 
(b) identify who it affects – recognition, and only then (c) identify strategies for 
remediation – procedure. Thus this chapter advances a ‘what, who and how’ 
approach to tackling energy justice concerns, with the intention that energy justice 
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can exist as a solution-based framework that not only characterises injustices, but 
can also help to tackle them.  
 
Section 2.6 then critiqued the current energy justice framework using three core 
variables of investigation: time, systems component and actor. It discussed, firstly, 
the issue of temporality within the energy justice framework, including consideration 
of whether energy injustices change through time, and whether the framework 
should remediate past injustices, act as a framework for considering future injustices, 
or do both. Secondly, it called into question the spatial applicability of energy justice, 
discussing the contexts of its current use and considering whether it is able to 
translate across scalar scales: local, national, international and global energy justice 
manifestations. Finally, this section then explored the actor of concern for energy 
justice, before making the case that we should not only be concerned with the 
victims, but in order to make a just transition, with those that are responsible for 
energy-decisions. It concluded that all three points are not explicit enough in current 
energy justice discourse, and makes a place for them in both this and future 
research. 
 
 Finally, section 2.7 made the case for a reconceptualisation of energy justice that 
includes a systems perspective at its core. It does so as acknowledgment that the full 
extent and diversity of justice implications within the energy system are currently 
neglected and that to have any real impact energy justice is required to move 
beyond the pages of academia into the policy domain. It is hoped that in 
combination with a whole-systems application of energy justice within the socio-
technical systems framework this work will inform justice in practice, presenting 
knowledge that is essential for understanding the ways in which energy justice is 
constructed, understood, and tackled across a range of scales. 
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Chapter 3: Methods and Methodology 
 
Having outlined the overall research question and research questions of this study in 
the introduction, it is necessary to situate them within the appropriate methodology. 
This chapter justifies the research design and describes the methodology used. 
Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 detail the epistemological groundings of this research, the 
research design and the selection of the case study approach, which is understood to 
provide context to the results as well as allowing for the exploration of both 
complementary and contrasting discourses across two research areas. Sections 3.4 
and 3.5 then outline the approach taken to the two main research phases: data 
collection and data analysis, before sections 3.6 and 3.7 reflect on the ethical 
considerations and on the successes and limitations of this research. 
 
As an opening summary, this research investigates the energy justice discourses of 
elite individuals and organisations, sampling representatives from the most 
prominent policy, industry and non-governmental organisation (NGO) groups around 
two specific case sites: energy production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in 
Somerset, and waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at the Sellafield Nuclear 
Complex in Cumbria. Throughout this thesis the term energy is used as a ubiquitous 
term, with the recognition that nuclear power creates electricity only. Due to the 
sampling restraints described in section 3.3, the articulations of policy and industry 
representatives are combined in one ‘policy’ group. This chapter distinguishes 
between an elite organisation and an elite individual, where an elite individual was 
not perceived as the most senior in their organisation, but was deemed to be elite 
through their specialism in this topic area (section 3.4.1). Discourses were gathered 






3.1 Epistemological Groundings  
 
Epistemological considerations offer a theoretical contribution to research, with, 
according to Carter and Little (2007), a fundamental impact on the relationship 
between the researcher and the participant, voice and representation, and the way 
in which quality of method is demonstrated. Thus, in order to justify the chosen 
research design and methods presented below, it is necessary to explore and clarify 
the main epistemological assumptions of this work, and their implications.  
 
This research adopts a social constructivist (SC) epistemology, as is consistent with 
the main methodological tool, discourse analysis (Burr 2003). According to Potter 
(1996: 98), social constructivism sees the world as being ‘constituted in one-way or 
another as people talk it, write it and argue it’. In this regard, social phenomena, such 
as the occurrence of injustices for example, are continually produced through social 
interaction, and are in a state of constant revision (Bryman 2015). Indeed, according 
to SC thought, objects only exist after they enter communicative space and have 
been socially constructed; when the ideas that define that object have been 
negotiated (Keaton and Bodie 2011). SC prioritises the role of language, which is 
seen as a pre-condition for thought. Thus language becomes a form of social action, 
with a ‘performative’ role in shaping others’ conceptions. The outcome of these 
different constructions is seen through differentiated human action (Burr 2003). 
Indeed, social constructivism recognises that these meanings are varied and multiple. 
This is to say that any one object may carry different meanings for each individual or 
social group. A discourse researcher, then, must take a broad lens throughout the 
research, looking for complexity rather than a few ideas or categories (Creswell 
2007).  
 
In Burr’s (2003) exploration of SC she identifies key characteristics of constructivist 
thought which inform and affect the following research design. SC is characterised as 
anti-essentialist in nature; thus, as the social world is an outcome of social processes, 
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there cannot be a determined nature of the world or people. In this respect, SC 
questions a realist perspective, denying that knowledge is a direct perception of 
reality and questioning the idea of objective fact. Knowledge is perceived, instead, as 
a historically and culturally specific social outcome. As a result the focus of SC is not 
on identifying the nature of an object per se, but on a consideration of how certain 
phenomena or forms of knowledge are achieved by people in interaction; on 
determining the process through which it is socially created (Burr 2003). This 
determines the focus of this research, which aims to explore articulations of energy 
justice. 
 
However, whilst this research accepts SC thought, it also acknowledges natural 
science perspectives on energy systems. In combining a natural science (systems) 
perspective and a social science (policy and discourse) perspective as is discussed 
below, this research encounters a degree of epistemological tension. Under social 
constructivist thought a ‘systems component’ or ‘stage’ of the energy system is a 
social construct, rather than an identifiable juncture. For the purposes of this 
research, however, they are taken to be so as a means of comparing and contrasting 
stages of the nuclear lifecycle and of translating the findings of this research to non-
academic audiences. Thus, in acknowledging the existence of the energy system, 
including its well-recognised components, this research seeks to unite, or work 
within the bounds of, these two bodies of thought. It does so by using the different 
systems components of energy lifecycles as a structured framework through which 
to explore the discourses of energy justice. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
This research explores discourses of energy justice throughout the nuclear energy 
system as articulated by members of the policy and NGO elite. As is discussed in 
more depth in section 3.4.1, this research makes a distinction between an elite 
organisation and an elite individual, where it understands elites as groups or 
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individuals who hold comparatively more power, privilege and political influence 
than lay populations, and an elite individual as someone with a specialism in this 
topic area. Throughout, this research samples representatives from the most 
prominent NGO and policy groups engaged with the research case studies. For the 
purposes of this work, NGOs are defined in line with Lewis (2014: 3), who identifies 
them as ‘”third sector”, not-for-profit organisations concerned with addressing 
problems of global poverty and social justice’. Lewis identifies that these groups are 
normally linked with the concept of charity, while others give them more political 
motivations as ‘civil society organisations’, groups of organised citizens independent 
from the government or business sectors. This distinction justifies their treatment as 
a separate sample group from policy respondents throughout this research.  
 
Specifically, the research asks the following overall research question and research 
questions: 
 
Overall Research Question: How do elite actors within the nuclear energy system 
articulate energy justice? 
 
RQ 1: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary through time? 
RQ 2: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary according to 
energy systems component in question? 
RQ 3: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary between actors? 
 
In sympathy with the research epistemology and resultant qualitative approach, the 
research design is case-study based, exploring energy justice discourses through two 
UK case studies: energy production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in 
Somerset, and waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at Sellafield in Cumbria. The 
choice of these cases is fully justified in section 3.3.2. This case study approach 
allows for comparisons through time, between stages of the energy system, and 
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between different actors – the three variables of investigation throughout this 
research (figure 3.1). Discourse analysis is then used to analyse the data.  
 
The centrality of discourse throughout this research informs and justifies the 
research design and methodology. In line with a social constructivist epistemology 
outlined above, society is constituted by both written and oral language and that 
language produces social practice: a way of doing things (Wood and Kroger 2000). As 
the research field of energy justice is comparatively new and discourse fluid and 
dynamic, the methodology is largely explorative and inductive, where the inductive 
element naturally complements constructivist thought (Bryman 2015). As demanded 
by a discourse focus, the methods obtain qualitative data, using text based as 
opposed to numerical analysis (Wood and Kroger 2000; Carter and Little 2007). 
Throughout, discourse analysis provides an opportunity for measurement. Data is 
obtained via semi-structured oral history interviews, with the interview questions 





Figure 3.1 The Three Variables of Investigation  
 
3.3 Case Study Approach 
 
The following section justifies the case study approach used throughout this research 
before outlining the units of analysis – a particular nuclear facility, the Hinkley Point 
Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. The 
research design originally included case studies in Canada and the United States as 
exemplars of the uranium mining and energy production stages of the nuclear life 
cycle. However the international case studies were not undertaken as the funding 
bids needed to undertake these trips were unsuccessful, leading to the prioritisation 
of UK cases. This process is explored in full in section 3.3.2.  
 
Nuclear was chosen for the overall case study of this research for three primary 








perceived injustices. For Sovacool (2011) these concerns include the facts that 
nuclear power is inherently associated with injustice through tragic global events, 
increased incidents of cancers, dependence on finite uranium resources, toxic 
pollution of the environment and terrorist threats, amongst others. Sovacool 
suggests that the occurrence of such injustices means nuclear power is not worth 
doing, well or otherwise. In examining discourses of justice around nuclear energy 
this research investigates whether these discourses emerge in popular discourse, and 
as a consequence if nuclear energy can ever be a morally defensible choice. 
 
Secondly, it provided three points of enquiry with regards to the three key variables 
of investigation of this research: (1) time, (2) systems component and (3) actor. With 
regards to the issue of time, nuclear energy is most famous for its large, long-term 
infrastructure and its long lifespan, with a legacy of nuclear waste extending 
thousands of years into the future. Moreover, nuclear energy has an international 
and complex lifecycle implicating eight system components, uranium mining, 
uranium milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, production, recycling and 
waste. This allowed exploration of the whole-systems approach advocated for in 
chapter 2. Nuclear energy is also famed for its divisive nature, with strong pro- and 
anti-factions and a traditionally hierarchical actor network with classical elites. This 
background allowed investigation into the extent to which these assumed energy 
justice discourses were different/more nuanced.  
 
Finally, nuclear energy in the UK offered an accessible and timely case study. The UK 
has over 70 years of nuclear history, from the development of nuclear reactors for 
the purposes of creating a nuclear deterrent in the 1940s to its contemporary role as 
a provider of 20.8% of the UK’s electricity needs (DECC 2016), providing an 
opportunity for the assessment of changing energy justice discourses through time. 
Moreover, the UK has developed a new nuclear programme with proposals for ten 
new reactors across five sites, with the first reactor initially expected to be in 
operation in 2018 (Bickerstaff 2008; Heffron 2013). This is part of a wider UK industry 
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strategy to deliver around 16 GW of new nuclear by 2030, with proposed facilities at 
Hinkley Point, Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside (BIS 2013) and sits alongside 
on-going deliberation over the treatment and storage of UK nuclear waste. The 
surrounding discourses provided ample opportunity to investigate energy justice 
articulations. This research represents one of the first empirical investigations into 
energy justice as it relates to nuclear energy. 
 
 Rationale for Choosing a Case Study Approach 
 
According to Yin (1994: 13), case studies emerge from the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena, and can be defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly 
evident’. In this regard, a case study approach permits useful generations, enabling a 
researcher to seek out and explain patterns and relations that aid our understanding 
of the human and physical worlds (Clifford and Valentine 2003). Yin (1994) goes on 
to note that case studies are particularly advantageous for exploratory research 
which analyses phenomena over which the research has no control. As this is one of 
the first empirical investigations into energy justice as it relates to nuclear energy, 
case studies were deemed an appropriate research framework. Indeed, the 
exploration of two case studies allows for exploration of complementary and 
contrasting discourses, vastly enriching the results. Further, in examining both 
within-case discourses of energy justice and between-case discourses, this approach 
is seen to reinforce the research findings, appearing more reliable and less prone to 
criticisms of generalisability (George and Bennett 2005). This responds in some way 
to the criticism that the generality of the case is unknown and that extrapolating the 
findings can be seen as a matter of intuitive judgement for the investigator (Clifford 
and Valentine 2003). 
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 Selection of Cases 
 
The two UK case study locations selected for this research are based on a direct 
sampling approach. Each case was chosen as an indicative representation of a 
nuclear energy system component, encompassing the energy production and the 
waste storage, disposal and reprocessing phases. The process of identifying them 
and the logic behind the approach is outlined in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
For Wood and Kroger (2000) energy policy often focuses on one section of the 
energy system to the detriment of its overall effectiveness. With an aim to contribute 
to energy policy, this research emphasises the wider energy system and, as discussed 
in section 2.7, advocates for a whole-systems approach, whereby justice implications 
are considered across the lifecycle of a technology, from uranium mining to waste 
and decommissioning. It does so on the assumption that this provides a more 
accurate means of capturing the true nature of justice concerns surrounding an 
energy form. In addition, this structure provides a guiding framework, and a means 
of comparing and contrasting participant perspectives. Consequently, this research 
aimed to sample across the nuclear energy lifecycle. 
 
The nuclear energy system typically contains eight stages, or systems components: 
uranium mining, uranium milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
production, recycling and waste (figure 3.2). Originally, the research design sought to 
sample internationally across this spectrum, focussing on uranium mining, energy 
production and waste. This followed a trend in the literature towards consideration 
of systems-wide social justice implications and drew on Canadian, American and 
British sites as exemplars of mining operations, energy production and the nuclear 
waste stages. Case countries were identified at this stage as the largest and most 
accessible contributors to the nuclear energy system, the largest uranium producer, 
nuclear energy producer and waste processing facility. Unfortunately, however, the 
funding bids needed to undertake these trips were unsuccessful, including internal 
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applications to the Department of Geography and Sustainable Development and the 
Russell Trust Postgraduate Award at the University of St Andrews, as well as external 
applications to the ESRC Overseas Fieldwork Fund and RGS-IBG Dudley Stamp 
Memorial Fund. Thus, due to time and cost restraints, this international approach 
was reassessed and UK case studies were prioritised. The Hinkley Point and Sellafield 
Nuclear Complexes then became exemplars of the production and waste phases of 
the nuclear cycle, removing the US and Canadian cases entirely. This iterative 
process, whilst time consuming, provided excellent exposure to the practicalities and 
challenges of large-scale research on a budget and to a deadline. Further, as is 
discussed in the conclusion, it opened future avenues for international 
investigations, including research into the justice implications of uranium mining. 
 
Against the background of these time and cost constraints, this research focused on 
two of these stages in depth: energy production, and waste storage, disposal and 
reprocessing. These two natural science stages were chosen as the mid- and 
endpoint of the cycle that are most commonly cited in the literature, as well as two 
accessible stages of the nuclear system operating in the UK. Rather than being a 
limitation, the UK focus was deemed appropriate as the UK plays an on-going, 
fundamental role in the nuclear energy system, appearing as the oldest nuclear 
energy producer, formerly the largest nuclear waste-handling site, and the location 
of proposed new reactors, permitting insight into both past, present and future 





Figure 3.2 Conceptual Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
(Source: Congressional Research Service 2012) 
 
 Units of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis for both of the case studies is a selected site – a particular 
nuclear power station complex – around which the thesis identifies the relevant 
policy and NGO organisations to sample from. This grounded, site-based approach 
not only eases the identification of key actors within the policy and NGO 
communities, but also increases the comparability of participant experiences as 
interviewees discuss the same facility. These sites within the UK were selected for 
their prominent role in energy production, and waste storage, disposal and 
reprocessing. This research identifies Hinkley Point as its energy production case 
study as it has both currently operative reactors and also plans for two new reactors 
at Hinkley Point C. Thus, whilst it is not the largest nuclear site in the UK in terms of 
megawatt electricity (MWe) at present, it is set to be, and provides the opportunity 
to explore new build energy justice concerns. Sellafield was selected for its historical 
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and on-going role in nuclear waste management. Background information on each 
case study is provided in chapter 4 in order to contextualise the findings of this 
research. Across these two case studies all research participants were recruited 
through a directed snowballing approach, maximising the researcher’s pre-existing 
networks to ease access. This approach is expanded upon in section 3.4 within a 
consideration of data collection approaches. Given that developments are changing 
so rapidly around the proposed Hinkley Point C, this research takes a 1st of January 
2016 cut-off point for new developments. 
 
3.4 Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
This research captured the energy justice discourses from the two research cases via 
semi-structured oral history interviews. This research is primarily interested in 
energy justice as a mode of policy critique, which partially justifies the actors it 
samples. Participants were identified at each of the two systems components of 
concern, energy production and waste storage, disposal and reprocessing, with 
particular focus on elite participants; a concept expanded upon in section 3.4.1. This 
section outlines the sampling method in depth.  
 
The participants for individual, semi-structured interviews were sampled through 
direct snowballing, where individuals were contacted directly and either following 
interview, or a decline to participate, were asked to recommend appropriate 
alternatives (Lewis-Beck et al. 2004). Where possible, personal networks were used 
to aid the identification of participants. The researcher held previous contacts with 
Friends of the Earth and DECC for example, greatly aiding organisational access. The 
research did not aim to comprehensively cover all those whose discourses might 
relate to a specific case study; instead, aiming to provide a robust account of the 
contours of extant discourses (McDonald 2013). Therefore, a total of 36 interviews 
were undertaken. This was believed to represent theoretical saturation; the point at 
which all concepts are well developed and that no additional data was needed 
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(Morse 2004). Throughout, the views of participants are not taken to represent their 
associated organisations or peers. It was recognised that this approach has a 
tendency to generate perspectives similar to those of the person recommending 
other interviewees. However, given the sensitive nature of the nuclear industry and 
organisations involved, this was determined to be the best means of accessing 
interviews. 
 
However, the sample obtained is not in line with the number approached. 
Throughout the snowballing process approximately 90 individuals and organisations 
were contacted with invitations to participate in the research. Of those, 36 
responded and contributed. Those who did not participate cited a range of reasons, 
including unavailability and conflicts of interest. Representatives from policy and 
industry bodies were most difficult to obtain, which is taken to be an interesting 
insight into willingness to engage with energy justice debates in their own right. The 
resultant sample obtained the perspectives of policy, industry and NGO 
representatives, although in different numbers. As a result, the decision was made to 
combine industry and policy perspectives in the results chapters under the title of 
‘policy’. When taking this judgment, care was taken not to conflate the results of the 
two groups, adding researcher bias to the samples. Instead, these sections highlight 
contrasts and complexities in the discourses presented. The potential to refine this 
approach is discussed in section 3.7, the methodological reflection. 
 
The research questions include a temporal consideration, an assessment of changing 
energy justice discourses through time, thus an oral-history approach to the 
interviews was taken. Oral histories, according to Ritchie (2003: 19), ‘collect 
memories and personal commentaries of historical significance through recorded 
interview’. Such interviews ‘yield rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, 
opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings’ according to May (2001: 120). 
Furthermore, according to Shopes (2011), they connect the individual and the social, 
drawing on culturally agreed (or disputed) mental sets and modes of expression to 
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tell one’s story. In this respect, oral history interviews recognise the social and 
historical nature of experiences. Such an interview can produce research with 
textural depth and empirical strength (Lilleker 2003), a key complement to the 
discourse focus of this research. Ritchie (2003: 23) reinforces this statement further, 
asserting that they can ‘develop information that might not have appeared in print’. 
This despite the frequent criticism of ‘accuracy of recall’ effectively summarised by 
Sitton et al. (2011: 4): ‘oral history is subject to all the vagaries and frailties of human 
recall; yet, in this respect, it is not substantially different from history as a whole, 
which is often distorted, subjective, and viewed through the screen of contemporary 
experience’. 
 
Although framed by a broad set of questions or areas of inquiry, an oral history 
interview grants a high degree of flexibility, allowing the narrator to explore the 
chosen issues (Shopes 2011). To allow comparability between interviews, 
respondents were asked to reflect on the period 1986-2015, between the date of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, an identifiable, memorable juncture in nuclear history, 
and the present day. Within this timespan respondents were asked how their 
understanding or articulation of energy justice had changed and which, if any, events 
had prompted this. This allowed respondents to draw on their own varied expertise. 
Where respondents referenced events outside the sample range they were asked to 
make their personal timeframes explicit. Extensive research into the organisation, 
individual and background of the topic were undertaken before each interview to 
allow discussion around these points.  
 
Throughout the interviews, participants were guided through a standard set of 
questions and themes, asked of each participant, whilst allowing participants to 
elaborate as they wished (Bryman 2015). These interview questions were formed 
from initial readings, the overall research aim, and the above research questions. 
Over a period of weeks a total of 80 research questions were developed covering the 
following themes: definitions of energy justice, distributional justice, justice as 
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recognition and procedural justice as tenets of the justice literature. These themes 
closely mirrored the research questions, including questions around the three 
variables of investigation: time, systems components and actor. Developing this wide 
set of questions allowed reflection on the potential breadth of topics the research 
interviews might cover, as well as providing opportunity for background research. It 
was clear, however, that as the interviews were only to last an hour that the breadth 
and number of questions needed to be substantially condensed. Thus a later phase 
of refinement was undertaken, and in total, 17 main interview questions remained 
(Appendix 1). This process, whilst lengthy, proved invaluable throughout the 
research. 
 
As participants were chosen to represent different stages of the energy system and 
different elite organisational or individual specialisms, the interview questions were 
tailored as appropriate. It was anticipated, however, that participants would refer to 
other systems components and potentially, past organisational affiliations, 
throughout the process of the interview. Thus, where there was ambiguity over 
which section or group they were referring to, respondents were asked for 
clarification.  
 
Where possible all interviews were taken in person, in the locations dictated by the 
stage of the energy system. Interviews were recorded with full participant consent, 
and, following temporary secure storage, later transcribed. Transcripts were also 
combined with written notes taken during the interview. This was done as soon as 
possible after the interviews in order to maximise information retention. NVivo, a 
platform that allows the control of audio speed, was used to aid this process. 
Transcription is necessitated by the ESRC funding for this research, as all data will 
later be submitted to Economic and Social Data Service. If requested, transcribed 
interviews were returned to the participants for authentication in order to ensure 
the most detailed and accurate account of their views. 
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It is reiterated at this stage that the views expressed during interviews were not 
taken to represent those of the participant’s affiliated bodies. Thus, throughout this 
research the term ‘illustrative’ is used in an attempt to recognise elements of 
inherent subjectivity and data personalisation. Interview questions were also 
designed to explicitly detangle personal opinions. 
 
 Defining Elites 
  
This research sampled elite participants specifically, making the distinction 
throughout between an elite organisation and an elite individual. The choice to 
select elites was taken in order to address a gap in the energy justice literature, 
which, to date, most commonly approaches justice issues from a local community, 
activist perspective. The inclusion of elite participants within this research was also 
perceived to increase its potential impact and aid its dissemination. 
 
Despite extensive and growing literature around the definition of elites and the 
methodological challenges researching with them entails, the field has been 
criticised for its lack of a comprehensive, workable definition (Welch et al. 2002). 
According to Richards (1996: 199) an ‘elite’ is considered to be someone who, ‘holds, 
or has held, a privileged position in society and as such, is likely to have more 
influence on political outcomes than general members of the public’. Hornby et al. 
(1983: 280), on the other hand, gives a less overtly political definition, classing the 
elite as ‘a group in society considered to be superior because of the power, talent, 
privilege etc. of its members’. Providing a business perspective, Welch et al. (2002) 
draw attention to the traditional conception of elites as the top echelons of a firm – 
the highest management roles. Finally, but not exhaustively by any means, Lilleker 
(2003) adds that elite groups include primarily elected representatives, executive 
officers of organisations, and senior state employees. Thus, as is illustrated by this 
small set of examples, elites have been the focus of extensive definitional quarrels 
across a number of literature bases, with notable tensions around dualisms such as 
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the ‘powerful elite’ and ‘powerless others’ (Rice 2010: 71). There are definitional 
tensions too, when we consider the boundaries of this group and the unwillingness 
for someone to identify them as part of it. However, despite differences in 
definitions, perspectives are united by the idea that elites hold more power, privilege 
and political influence than lay populations. 
 
For the purpose of this research the distinction was made between an elite 
organisation and an elite individual. On an organisational level, the above definition 
is widened to include not only explicitly political and business bodies as the 
traditional elite, but NGO and industry. This research samples representatives from 
the most prominent policy and NGO groups engaged with the research case studies – 
those for which the facilities in question were a direct concern of their work. NGOs 
are defined in line with Lewis (2014: 3), who identifies them as ‘third sector, not-for-
profit organisations concerned with addressing problems of global poverty and social 
justice’. Lewis identifies that these groups are normally linked with either the 
concept of charity, while others give them more political motivations as ‘civil society 
organisations’, groups of organised citizens independent from the government or 
business sectors, hence their treatment as a separate group throughout this 
research. All are classified as elite due to their perceived influence, power and voice 
in political proceedings. NGOs such as Stop Hinkley, for example, adopt a 
commentary and advocacy role, and industry organisations such as Électricité de 
France (known as EDF throughout) have undeniable political influence. Attention was 
paid throughout, however, to the idea that these organisations may not consider 
themselves as elites and may be uncomfortable with this label, requiring sensitivity 
from the researcher. An NGO, for example, may perceive their classification as elite 
to go against their very ethos.  
 
On an individual, participant, level this research rejects what Welch et al. (2002: 626) 
identify as the ‘higher is better’ fallacy; the idea that we should always aim for the 
highest, most prominent individuals. Instead, interviewees and organisations were 
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selected primarily for their ability to answer the research questions. An elite 
individual, therefore, was not perceived as the most senior in their organisation, but 
was deemed to be elite through their specialism in this topic area. This approach led 
to the sampling of both individuals conceived as traditionally elite – the campaigns 
manager of Friends of the Earth, for example – and those that may not have 
otherwise fallen into this category, including community relations officers for the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). 
 
It is widely recognised within the literature that researching members of the elite 
raises unique methodological challenges. This includes, for Welch et al. (2002) and 
Cormode and Hughes (1999) power asymmetries between the interviewer and 
participants: issues of positionality around age, gender and status, for example 
(McEvoy 2006). From the outset this was recognised as a particular peculiarity of this 
research. Conducting interviews with members of elite policy and NGOs 
organisations required self-awareness of the researcher’s identity. Undertaking 
interviews with a senior member of an elite political organisation as a young, female 
researcher, for example, was taken to present fundamentally different challenges to 
researching with senior members of NGOs. Speaking to similar experiences, McEvoy 
(2006: 185) states ‘that as a young female I was aware of the “male space of politics” 
and that my gender would probably have an effect on the attitudes of the 
respondent, given that the majority of respondents are male and middle-aged’. Care 
was taken, therefore, not only to dress appropriately for interviews with each group, 
but also to undertake thorough background reading before the interview so that the 
researcher appeared knowledgeable and expert; overriding, to some degree, what 
McEvoy experienced as the tendency for some participants to be somewhat 
disdainful. Moreover, in the case of this research, this asymmetry occasionally 
included the researcher’s personal attitude to nuclear energy. Conscious of this 
potential bias, the researcher sought to provide an impartial account of the energy 
justice themes surrounding the energy form, permitting insights that move beyond 
classical pro- and anti-nuclear critiques. 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
 
 Discourse Analysis as Theory  
 
In line with the discourse focus throughout this research, discourse analysis was used 
as the main analytical tool. Discourse analysis (DA) is a well-tested and popular form 
of enquiry. Incorporating insights from philosophers including Michel Foucault. DA is 
concerned with ‘the way in which linguistic categories relating to an object and the 
ways of depicting it frame the way we comprehend that object’ (Bryman 2015: 499). 
In this respect, discourse studies believe that discourses form a version of that 
object’s reality, as is the case with social constructivism. Thus, natural, physical and 
cultural objects become ‘discursively constructed’ (Glynos et al. 2009). A discourse is 
a textualised or verbalised statement about the object in question, which can be 
spoken, written or even illustrated (McDonald 2013). These communicative events 
encompass beliefs, ideologies, identities, politics, and the like, which provide the 
basic terms for analysis, debate, agreement and disagreement about an object 
(Rahimi 2011; Glynos et al. 2009). Such social information is not often expressed 
explicitly, and is of particular concern for discourse analysts (Rahimi 2011). With little 
emphasis on naturally occurring talk, research interviews can be a legitimate target 
for discourse analysis (Bryman 2015). This research focuses on oral discourses 
converted to transcribed texts, as is most conducive to the elite actors that advance 
them (McDonald 2013). 
 
The constructivist underpinnings of DA recognise that dominant or hegemonic 
discourses – energy injustice as an outcome of primarily distributional concerns as an 
unfounded example – are just one of many viable renditions, and that it is during the 
process of becoming dominant that a certain reality is created (Bryman 2015). 
According to Hajer (1995: 60), where they do become dominant ‘they can define 
terms of debate about particular issues, become incorporated into political 
institutions, or require actors seeking credibility in a given domain to draw in the 
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ideas, concepts and categories of a given discourse’. Discourses, therefore, can 
provide philosophical anchoring for claims about subsequent responses, leading to 
real action. In McDonald’s (2013) exploration of climate change, this is why discourse 
analysis is revealing; it allows the recognition of different interpretations of climate 
change for example, legitimises the actors undertaking responses, and defines the 
terms of debate itself. The same is true of explorations of energy justice.  
 
Discourse analysis is seen as a theoretical perspective and methodology, which 
incorporates contributions from the fields of both linguistic and social analysis, 
rather than a set method (Nikander 2007; Rahimi 2011). Indeed, within this field DA 
encompasses a broad spectrum of techniques; Glynos et al. (2009) identify six 
dominant approaches for example, encompassing political discourse analysis, 
interpretive policy analysis, rhetorical political analysis, discourse historical 
approaches in critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology and Q methodology. 
These approaches vary widely, with critical discourse analysis frequently focusing on 
the macro-details of texts, while political discourse theory tends to take a much 
wider lens (Glynos et al. 2009). Furthermore, according to Rahimi (2011) some 
analysts do not follow any procedure for rigorous analysis, searching instead for 
patterns that may be linked to social or power structure and ideological colourings. 
Nevertheless, DA approaches are all concerned with implicit information, and the 
strategies used to create different ‘realities’. DA, therefore, is often action-oriented, 
with a focus on how things are done. This is clear via the consideration of three basic 
discourse-analytic questions: what is the discourse doing? How is this discourse 
constructed to make this happen? What resources are available to perform this 
activity? (Potter 2004). This research explores these questions through rhetorical 





 Rhetorical Political Analysis 
 
Of the many forms of discourse analysis, this research focuses on rhetorical political 
analysis. For Barry et al. (2008: 68), ‘rhetoric concerns both the practice and study of 
effective and persuasive communication with a specific purpose or intent on behalf 
of the speaker or writer’. It is in this regard rhetorical analysis is concerned with 
argumentation – the tools used to achieve dominant or hegemonic discourses 
regarding a particular object (Glynos et al. 2009). Indeed, Hauser (2002: 3) comments 
that the use of rhetoric ‘is not communication for communication’s sake; rhetorical 
communication, at least implicitly and often explicitly, attempts to coordinate social 
action’. Thus it has pragmatic intent and aims to influence human choice (Barry et al. 
2008). Discourse approaches focus on the persuasive and morally consequential 
aspects of language’s use (Nikander 2007). Table 3.1 describes the different forms of 
argumentation strategies used. Such analysis helps identify the resources, devices 
and technique employed to create an argument, as well as, according to Barry et al. 
(2008: 71) ‘the moral standing of the speaker/proposer, the justness or rightness of 




Table 3.1 Rhetorical Political Analysis Outline 
 (Adapted from Thomas and Harden 2008) 
Type of Argument Object of Argument Strategy 
Conjecture Facts Dispute is factual – whether or not 
something is the case 
Definition Naming Concerned with the naming of things 
Quality Nature of an act The nature of an act, and calls for 
judgement. 
Place Boundaries/staging Attempt to set the boundaries of 
political argument  
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Along with attention to these particular strategies, Billig (1987: 91) stresses the 
importance of knowing the surrounding ‘argumentative context’. This requires 
attention to the positions that are being criticised or being employed to support an 
argument, without which the wider argumentative meaning may be lost (Barry et al. 
2008). The use of rhetorical analysis within any qualitative research, therefore, 
requires a thorough understanding of the surrounding topic area and relevant 
history. 
 
Epistemologically and conceptually, rhetorical policy analysis is perceived to be 
sympathetic with the methodology, methods and aims of this research. Barry et al. 
(2008: 69) state, for example, that: 
 
‘(Most) policy and political developments, proposals and interventions rarely 
enjoy consensus but either reflect or reproduce underlying social dissensus. 
This is particular the case with technologically-based economic innovation 
which invariably generates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, as well as often raising 
difficult ethical questions and leading to value-base political debate and 
conflict’. 
 
Indeed, Barry et al. (2008) go on to write that after understanding how a 
protagonist relays their aims, concerns and fears, we gain a greater understanding 
of the positions underlying them. Thus, they claim, we can establish a starting point 
of a conflict resolution process. Whilst this research does not aim to resolve conflict 
per se, this contribution is seen as directly relevant to policy and academia as we 
strive to create just energy systems, the foundations of which are created thorough 






 NVivo Analysis  
 
Once transcribed and collated the interview transcripts were analysed using NVivo. 
In line with Thomas and Harden (2008: 8) from the ESRC National Centre for 
Research Methods, the process was seen to comprise three stages, (1) the free line-
by-line coding of data sources, (2) the organisation of these ‘free codes’ into 
‘descriptive’ themes and (3) the development of ‘analytical’ themes. This process is 
further described in the following paragraphs.  
 
Line-by-line Coding: During this early phase excerpts, quotations and passages were 
coded into themes, categories and case examples according to their meaning and 
content (Labuschagne 2003; Thomas and Harden 2008). These include, by way of an 
example, disruption during infrastructure development; health and safety; jobs and 
education; radioactive contamination; military usages; and planning for 
contemporary and legacy wastes. These themes and categories were initially 
designed to mirror the interview question topics, definitions of energy justice, and 
distribution, procedure and recognition as tenets of the justice literature. 
Throughout the phase of interview analysis piloting these categories were inductively 
developed to create a matrix of ‘nodes’ that described the content of the data 
sources. They included, for example, the energy form and systems component 
referenced. 
 
Construction of Descriptive Themes: At this stage, following exploration of 
similarities and differences between the emergent codes, new group codes were 
created that captured the meanings of codes within them. A total of 34 descriptive 
themes emerged which summarised, for example, all codes pertaining to the risks of 
nuclear energy. 
 
Development of Analytical Themes: The discourse focus of this research requires 
not just a record of conceptions of energy justice, but understanding their 
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construction and articulation. This stage of the process therefore follows Thomas and 
Harden’s (2008) strategy of ‘going beyond’, a stage they liken to meta-ethnography’s 
development of ‘third order interpretations’ (Campbell et al. 2003). This requires a 
move beyond the descriptive themes achieved above to create additional concepts, 
understanding or hypotheses (Thomas and Harden 2008). Referring back to 
rhetorical political analysis, this phase, then, included exploration of the different 
argumentation strategies used to articulate energy justice and inferred the moral 
and value-based assumptions behind them. The results are presented in chapter 7.  
 
Overall, this analytic approach to the data analysis not only allowed for in-depth 
exploration of the texts but of comparisons between the three variables of 
investigation, demonstrating how data vary according to the time, systems 
component and actor in question. In doing so it addressed how energy justice is 
being constructed and articulated more generally, answering the overall research 
question. 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations and Implications 
 
This research dealt with potentially sensitive information, high profile participants 
and a highly controversial topic, thus it raises numerous ethical considerations. As a 
first step towards consideration of these ethical issues, ethical approval was sought 
from the University of St Andrews Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) 
prior to undertaking this research (Appendix 2). Before participating, interviewees 
had the opportunity to read a Participant Information Form detailing the purpose 
and intentions of the study before each interview and, following reading, were asked 
to sign a Consent Form before agreeing to take part. Furthermore, all participants 
were made aware that they could omit answers and withdraw from the interview at 
any time. In the eventuality of incomplete interview transcripts, participants were 
made aware that their dialogue could still be analysed unless requested otherwise. 
Due to the identity of participants and their affiliations, particular care was taken to 
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offer anonymity where possible. It was made explicit throughout that the views of 
participants are not taken to represent their associated organisations or peers. 
 
Alongside traditional concerns of participant harm, informed consent, anonymity and 
confidentiality, the ESRC funding attached to this research brought particular data 
management requirements. All data created or repurposed throughout this PhD had 
to be submitted to the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), and is now available 
for future reuse. All participants were made aware of this condition before the 
interview began. 
 
3.7 Methodological Reflections and Limitations 
 
This section reflects on the methodological process, highlighting research areas that 
could have benefitted from refinement. It reflects in particular on the research 
limitations of data collection, both in terms of sample case studies and sample 
representatives, and on the validity of discourse analysis. These reflections are 
consistent with PhD level work and wider social science study and, as a result, are 
not critiques of this study per se. Instead, they are framed positively as areas of 
future research, building on the strong foundation of empirical findings and 
publications already produced from this thesis. 
 
Firstly, as is discussed above, this research took place under both time and financial 
restrictions, eliminating the possibility of investigations into energy justice discourses 
around uranium mining in Canada and the inclusion of the United States as a 
research location for nuclear energy production. Thus, this research may be criticised 
for its inability to capture discourses of energy justice outside of the UK, and at the 
front-end of the nuclear energy system. To counteract this, this research prioritised 
the depth of case studies rather than the breadth. This criticism was also overcome, 
to some degree, as respondents referred to other nuclear systems components 
when forming their answers. However, as is introduced above, future research could 
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engage with international investigations, including the missing uranium mining case. 
In so doing, there is potential to close the energy systems loop and develop source-
to-sink energy justice evaluation. 
 
Secondly, this research confronted issues of obtaining equal representative samples 
from each of its initial research groups, policy, industry and NGO, where 
representatives from policy and industry bodies were most difficult to obtain. As a 
result, the decision was made to combine industry and policy perspectives in the 
results chapters under the title of ‘policy’. Although care was taken not to conflate 
policy and industry perspectives within this grouping, their treatment as stand-alone 
participant samples would have created more nuanced findings. Thus, future 
research in this area would benefit from taking more discrete industry or policy 
stances. It is recognised that this would be possible given a longer research timespan 
and with stronger pre-existing research networks, which are especially important 
given that the UK nuclear sector is currently highly-studied and politically charged. 
 
Finally the use of DA itself may be refined. Dryzek (2005) notes in his analysis of 
environmental discourses, that there are always alternatives to any discourse 
groupings. Similarly, distinctions between frameworks of meanings are often 
imperfect and permeable (McDonald 2013). In this regard, DA is always a matter of 
interpretation, with no hard data or definite answers. Indeed, by engaging with 
discussions about energy justice, the researcher is unavoidably, partially creating it, 
and analysing responses through the lens of their own experience. This is perceived 
to be an inescapable fact of social science more generally. Where possible, however, 
future studies in this area would be conducted by a research team rather than an 
individual, permitting triangulation of the results.  
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Chapter 4: Background to Case Studies 
 
To set the context for the results and discussion this chapter provides background 
information on nuclear energy in the UK (section 4.1) and the two case studies: 
energy production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset (section 4.2), 
and waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in 
Cumbria (section 4.3). It offers both countrywide and site-specific detail, alongside an 
introduction to potential energy justice concerns on the basis of events and current 
discourses. Specifically, the sections below give context to the UK as host to the 
oldest nuclear programme in the world, to what was formerly the largest nuclear 
waste-handling site, and the location of proposed new reactors, illustrating that this 
background permits insights into past, present and future energy justice discourses 
throughout this research. As outlined in section 3.3, each case study was chosen as a 
logistically accessible indicative representation of a nuclear energy system 
component. The unit of analysis, a particular site, also allowed for the identification 
of relevant policy, industry and NGO organisations to sample from, and increased the 
comparability of participant experiences whenever interviewees discussed the same 
facility. The policy, industry and NGO divide brings an assumed starting point of pro- 
and anti-nuclear attitudes. However, as the results presented in chapters 5 and 6 
demonstrate, the energy justice concerns around nuclear power appear more 
nuanced. 
 
In addition to insight into the evolution of UK nuclear energy policies and site-specific 
contextual information, this chapter also provides a brief introduction to the core 
policy, industry and NGO groups around each of the two case-study locations. The 
organisations listed are the predominant stakeholders in the operation and oversight 
of each case facility, and therefore the target sample for this research. However, as 
outlined in section 3.4, this research took a direct snowballing approach whereby 
individuals were contacted directly and either following interview or a decline to 
participate, were asked to recommend appropriate alternatives. As this is the case, 
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the stakeholder groups introduced below do not provide an exhaustive account of 
the individuals and organisations represented in the research sample. Instead, these 
are the primary groups from which other research participants were recommended 
and identified. Full details of the participants and their affiliations, where given, are 
provided in table 5.1 and table 6.1 of the associated results chapter. 
 
4.1 UK Nuclear Context 
 
The UK has over 70 years of nuclear history, from its development of nuclear 
reactors for the purposes of creating a nuclear deterrent in the 1940s, to its 
contemporary role as a provider of 20.8% of the UK’s electricity needs (DECC 2016). 
Whilst it is outwith the scope of this section to provide an overview of this period in 
its entirety, it delivers a high-level overview of three main phases of nuclear 
development in the UK: (1) 1940-1960: research, weapons and Magnox reactors, (2) 
1960 – 1990: review of the industry, advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) and 
pressurised water reactors (PWRs), and (3) 1990 – to the present: civil nuclear and 
the nuclear renaissance. In so doing it provides broad context to the results, and 
highlights relevant changes in nuclear policy and discourses. This information 
contextualises many of the statements made by the research participants, as 
presented in chapters 5 and 6. This three-stage framework is an adaptation of the 
six-stage model used in the Chartered Quality Institute’s history of nuclear energy, 
which has been altered to provide energy-specific information, thereby reducing the 
focus on the militarisation of nuclear power (McNair 2013).  
 
 1940-1960: Research, Weapons and Magnox Reactors 
 
The UK was a pioneer in the development of the global nuclear power programme 
both before and after the Second World War, making the UK’s nuclear program one 
of the earliest in the world (Davis 2009). The MAUD Committee, an independent 
scientific body established in 1939, developed the UK’s nuclear energy programme 
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throughout 1940 and 1941 under a project called ‘Tube Alloys’. Later, the UK 
cooperated with the 1943 Quebec Agreement, part of the USA’s Manhattan Project, 
an American scheme to develop a nuclear weapon, which led to the atomic bomb 
being dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Thus, Taylor (2016) identifies two 
foundations for Britain’s pioneering role in nuclear power, firstly its long-standing 
nuclear research record, including the world’s first artificial nuclear fission reaction in 
1932, and secondly the involvement of British scientists in the development of 
nuclear bombs. Following the UK Government’s initial interest in nuclear weaponry, 
the Atomic Research Centre was established in 1946 at Harwell, Oxfordshire, 
creating the first experimental reactor. The new facility, the Graphite Low Energy 
Experimental Pile (GLEEP) began operating in 1947. In the same year that GLEEP 
came on line, the UK began developing its own atomic bomb using weapons grade 
uranium produced at Capenhurst, Springfields and Windscale in England (NIA 2013; 
Davis 2009; McNair 2013). In this respect the UK’s nuclear programme began with 
distinct military origins. 
 
Alongside the use of nuclear technologies for the production of weapons grade 
plutonium, it was later realised that nuclear reactors could also form the basis for 
electricity generation, marking the start of the civil nuclear energy programme in 
Britain (NIA 2003; Davis 2009). According to Taylor (2016: 1), this ‘brought high 
hopes for cheap electricity, energy security, and export success’. In 1954, the Atomic 
Energy Authority Act established the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA), which took responsibility for developing this infrastructure. The first 
commercially operative civil nuclear power plant was Calder Hall within the original 
Windscale complex, which began producing energy in 1956 and became the 
forerunner for nine Magnox stations across the UK, a now-obsolete reactor design. 
The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in England and Wales, and the South 
of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) in Scotland (McNair 2013) operated the facilities. 
This 1950s drive towards a civil nuclear power programme coincided with the UK’s 
drive for economic recovery post World War Two and represented a means of 
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diversifying the UK economy during a time that the UK remained heavily dependent 
upon indigenous coal production (NIA 2013; Chesshire 1992). However, despite the 
early successes of the nuclear programme, public opposition began to increase as the 
Windscale Pile fire in 1957 led to concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors 
(section 4.3.2), concerns further compounded by the UK’s nuclear bomb test 
(Pidgeon et al. 2008; Taylor 2016). Latterly, this fall in favour led to a re-evaluation of 
the UK’s nuclear energy policy. 
 
 1960s Review of the Industry, AGRs and PWRs 
 
Following a review of energy policy in 1963 there was a notable change in tack for 
the nuclear industry. Subsequent to the review, the 1964 government White Paper, 
‘The Second Nuclear Power Programme’, established a second wave of UK nuclear 
investment, heralding the shift from Magnox reactors to AGRs. The UK’s selection of 
the AGR went against the trend of the US, France and Japan, who built light water 
reactors (LWRs), pressurised water reactors (PWRs) or boiling water reactors (BWRs) 
(Davis 2009). In total, five new AGR reactors were built in England – Dungeness B, 
Hinkley Point B, Hartlepool, Heysham 1 and Heysham 2 – alongside two reactors 
constructed in Scotland – Hunterston B and Torness (McNair 2013). In tandem with 
the shift to new nuclear reactor designs, the UKAEA was restructured to focus on 
research and development, with the aim that a single company would be responsible 
for design and construction, and another for new fuel supply and manufacturing 
(McNair 2013).  
 
In the 1980s, the PWR was selected for the next round of nuclear development in the 
UK under the direction of the Margaret Thatcher Conservative government (1979-
1990), who planned to build ten new stations. These reactors were intended to 
reduce dependence on coal mining, protecting against the insecurity of supply 
caused by trade union strikes (Davis 2009), as well as to buffer the risk of high oil 
prices following the Iranian Revolution of 1979-1980 (Taylor 2016). However, only 
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one plant was ever constructed, Sizewell B in Suffolk, which began operating in 1988 
and proved to be the last station to date to be constructed in the UK. Plans for a 
successive facility at Hinkley Point C were scrapped due to uncertainty around the 
proposed new electricity market and safety concerns following the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986 (Davis 2009). Davis (2009) goes on to identify that in the following 
decade two significant events prevented further investment in new nuclear power: 
the development of combined-cycle gas turbine technology, which rapidly decreased 
the cost of gas power station electricity supply, and the privatisation of the electricity 
supply industry. Thus, despite early growth the nuclear industry fell out of favour. 
 
 1990s to Present: Civil Programme and Nuclear Renaissance 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, government energy policy fluctuated as a 
consequence of the privatisation and reorganisation of the industrial sector. During 
these rearrangements the CEGB and SSEB were phased out in favour of British 
Energy, who from 1996 onwards operated the AGR and PWR stations. The older 
Magnox sites were not commercially viable, and as a result remained under public 
ownership via Magnox Electric, which later merged with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd 
(BNFL) and finally became BNFL Magnox Generation (Taylor 2016). Today the UK 
operates 15 nuclear reactors, with a further 29 already undergoing decommissioning 
(Bolton 2013). There are three types of units remaining, the AGRs, two Magnox 
Reactors, and one PWR (Heffron 2013). In 2015 nuclear energy production in the UK 
totalled 20.8% of the total energy mix (DECC 2016). Alongside electricity production, 
the UK’s nuclear sector also includes non-power-producing facilities, including those 
reprocessing nuclear fuel, the decommissioning of nuclear infrastructure, defence 
facilities, and nuclear new build (ONR 2013). The inclusion of new build nuclear 
represents a tide change in UK nuclear policies. 
 
Nuttall and Earp (2014) identified that since 2006 UK policy has moved consistently 
and strongly towards incentivising new nuclear. This change reflects the national 
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desire for energy independence, and a long-term shift towards green, low-carbon 
technologies (Florini and Sovacool 2009; DECC 2011b; Watson and Scott 2009); a 
transition driven, in part, by the prospective energy gap caused by existing facilities 
coming to the end of their operational lifespans. In essence, new nuclear power has 
two roles: (1) to replace ageing energy infrastructure, and (2) to contribute to 
climate change targets. Indeed, plans for future decommissioning mean that by 2020 
the UK’s total nuclear capacity will have reduced by around three quarters (BERR 
2008; Bickerstaff et al. 2008). Even with lifetime extensions on some pre-existing 
facilities, new energy production infrastructure will be required.  
 
The government’s ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Energy’ 
highlights a public shift in attitudes towards nuclear energy and makes the case that 
new nuclear power stations have a role to play in this future electricity-generating 
mix alongside other low-carbon sources, as a means of ‘tackling climate change’ and 
‘ensuring secure, clean and affordable energy’ (BERR 2008: 6; Jenkins et al. 2016b; 
Bolton 2013; Heffron 2013). As a result, the UK has developed a new nuclear 
programme that envisages ten reactors being built on five sites in the UK by three 
different companies, with the first reactor initially expected to be in operation in 
2018 (Bickerstaff 2008; Heffron 2013). This is part of a wider UK industry strategy to 
deliver around 16 GW of new nuclear by 2030, with proposed facilities at Hinkley 
Point, Sizewell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside (BIS 2013). These proposed 
developments have been dubbed part of Britain’s ‘nuclear renaissance’ (Johnstone 
2014). Taylor (2016: 2) writes that in enthusiastically promoting new nuclear builds 
the government sought to create a vision where ‘new nuclear would be built without 
subsidy, and a new generation of safer, more efficient plants would be competitive in 
a market that factored in the price of damaging carbon emissions’. 
 
For Scotland, whose partially devolved government gives it autonomy over its energy 
infrastructure, the low-carbon drive does not include nuclear energy. England, 
however, has begun nuclear redevelopment, with the first of the new nuclear 
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reactors being the EDF-led development at Hinkley Point in Somerset. If completed, 
these will be the first new reactors since Sizewell B (Bickerstaff et al. 2008). However, 
as is outlined in more depth in section 4.2.3, there have been successive delays in the 
development of the new facilities and there is no indication of when the first might 
become operational. Consequently, there is increasing scepticism as to whether they 
can play a role in filling the energy gap. Alongside the controversies concerning these 
delays, Nuttall and Earp (2014) also identify that in the drive for new nuclear some 
long-standing axioms of policy have been quietly dropped. This includes the 
commitment to no special subsidy for nuclear power. The uncertainty of future 
developments and the high levels of public discourse around these proposals are 
seen to provide an excellent backdrop for the results of this research, which occur 
around the two case studies: the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and 
waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in 
Cumbria. Each case study is introduced below.  
 
4.2 Energy Production, Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex 
 
The following sections outline the potential energy justice concerns around the 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex on the grounds of both discourses and events. These 
sections also introduce the predominant policy, industry and NGO organisations 
involved in the operation and oversight of the complex. The Hinkley Point Complex in 
the West Somerset District of the County of Somerset, Southwest England, is 
comprised of two pre-existing reactor facilities: Hinkley Point A, which is undergoing 
decommissioning, and the currently operative Hinkley Point B. Both sites are 
adjacent to the building works for the first of the UK’s proposed new reactors, 
Hinkley Point C (Magnox 2014). Situated 25 km to the east of Minehead and 12 km to 
the North-West of Bridgwater, the permanent nuclear power development site, 
including pre-existing infrastructure and that which is currently being developed, will 
eventually cover 69 ha of land (EDF 2009a). The site is surrounded by land that is 
deemed to be of high ecological value; for example part of the site borders the 
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Bridgwater Bay Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) (NDA 2006). Figure 4.1 shows 
the location of the complex in relation to local towns and villages referenced in 
chapter 5. Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 give brief histories of each of the stations, A, B, and 
C. Finally, appendices 3 and 4 provide an overview of their development timeline and 
management structure.  
 
Given the focus on energy production as a distinct stage of the nuclear lifecycle, it 
primarily focuses on the energy justice discourses surrounding Hinkley Point B. 
However, Hinkley Point C, which will undergo construction subject to financial 
agreement, is included in this research on the grounds of its role in contemporary 
energy politics, and the relevant interest of its on-going energy justice implications. 
Further, it provides insight into the energy justice implications of the site selection 
process for nuclear new build, as part of the energy production process. Given that 
developments are changing so rapidly around the proposed Hinkley Point C, this 
research takes a 1st of January 2016 cut-off point for new developments. Information 
on Hinkley Point A is included as background on the development of the complex 





Figure 4.1 Location of Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex  
(Source: Google Maps) 
 
 Hinkley Point A (Operative 1965-2000) 
 
The following information on Hinkley Point A is included as background on the 
development of the site only, and by way of illustrating its long-term role in the local 
area. The facility is not a direct case study for this research, which instead focuses on 
Hinkley Point B and Hinkley Point C as both current and future energy producers.  
 
As part of the move to diversify the UK economy during a time where the UK 
remained heavily dependent upon indigenous coal production, the first round of 
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Magnox power stations development was led by the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) (Chesshire 1992). Amongst these developments was the construction 
of Hinkley Point A, which began in 1957 and first contributed electricity to the grid in 
1965 (Magnox 2014). During its operational lifespan, 1965-2000, the Hinkley Point A 
site housed a twin Magnox station with a combined output of 470 MW per annum, 
or 103 TWh of electricity in total. Producing throughout the privatisation of the UK 
energy sector, the reactors were initially owned by the CEGB before Nuclear Electric 
and finally Magnox Electric Ltd, who retained ownership of the facility until it was 
transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) following its closure in 
2000 (NDA 2006).  
 
The decommissioning process at Hinkley Point A is split into four stages: (1) 
defueling, (2) care and maintenance preparations, (3) care and maintenance, and (4) 
final site clearance. The first stage, defueling, took place between 2000 and 2004, 
during which 71,828 spent fuel elements were removed and sent for reprocessing. 
Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) is retained on site for interim storage (NDA 2006). 
Following the completion of defueling and an intermediary phase of preparation, the 
site entered a care and maintenance process, composed of monitoring and remedial 
work. The site will now remain in this passive state for around 80 years, throughout 
which the facilities are monitored to ensure safety and minimise their environmental 
impact. This period is designed to permit the natural radioactive decay of the reactor 
materials following which they are safer to handle. This phase of care and 
maintenance is expected to extend until around 2095, when final demolition, 
clearance, and land remediation can take place (NDA 2006). 
 
The current storage of Intermediate Level Wastes (ILW) at Hinkley Point A is 
contingent on the development of a national repository. Only once it is developed 
will the stored waste on-site be removed and the storage facilities demolished. Such 
a facility is planned to become available in 2040, with the disposal of Hinkley Point 
A’s ILW set to take place between 2046 and 2048 (NDA 2006). The development of a 
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geological disposal facility is outlined in more depth in section 4.3.4. Table 4.1 
provides a summary of the decommissioning developments at Hinkley Point A and 
the processes they entail. 
 
Key Phase Focus Area Timespan 
1. Generation Statutory requirements 1965-2000 
Generation 
Generation throughput Improvements 
2. Defueling Statutory requirements 2000-2004 
Defueling preps 
Defueling 
Defueling throughput improvements  
3. Care and 
Maintenance 
Preparations 
Statutory requirements 2004-2014 
Waste removal or packaging 
Facility clean-up 
4. Care and 
Maintenance  
Statutory requirements 2014-2095 
Monitoring 
Remedial Work 
5. Final Site Clearance  Statutory requirements 2095-2104 
Demolition and Clearance  
Land Remediation 
 
Table 4.1 Hinkley Point A Site Treatment Phases 
 (Adapted from NDA 2006) 
 
Given that the facility is in its long-term care and maintenance phase with only 
monitoring check-ups, Hinkley Point A is not commonly mentioned in public 
discourse, in contrast to the currently operative Hinkley Point B and the proposed 
Hinkley Point C stations. The processes and actors present at these sites are outlined 
below. 
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 Hinkley Point B (Operative 1976-Present) 
 
The Hinkley Point B station was constructed during the second wave of UK nuclear 
investment, which saw the shift from Magnox reactors to AGRs. Hinkley Point B was 
amongst the first of these new AGRs to undergo construction, opening in 1976, a few 
years before the Three Mile Island accident of 1979 (Grimston et al. 2014). Hinkley 
Point B, which remains operative today, is the main subject of the energy production 
case study of this research. The following paragraphs give an overview of the 
processes undertaken at the site, its ownership model, and the core actor groups 
involved in its operation, who represent the target sample groups. 
 
The Hinkley Point B power station is situated immediately to the east of Hinkley 
Point A and is run by EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd, a subsidiary of the French-
based company Électricité de France (EDF) (Magnox 2014; EDF 2012). For its nuclear 
fleet and developments EDF is partnered with Centrica, who have a 20% stake in the 
company’s 15 reactors, which are split across eight plant sites throughout the UK. 
This includes a share in the pre-existing reactors at Hinkley Point B. EDF are the 
public face of the Hinkley Point facility and one of the most prominent industry 
groups in the Somerset area, employing approximately 535 full time EDF Energy 
employees and around 200 contractual workers (EDF 2016).  
 
Hinkley Point B itself is composed of twin AGRs known as Reactors 3 and 4 (ONR 
2016a). Construction began in 1967, before contributing electricity to the grid in 
1976. Originally destined to operate until 2016, the plant was granted a seven-year 
life-span extension in 2012, extending its operating date until 2023 (EDF 2009a; EA 
2013).  
 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is the lead department for the 
management of radioactive and nuclear substances in the UK, as well as for the 
disposal of radioactive waste. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) regulates 
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operations at Hinkley Point B and is responsible for ensuring site safety and security. 
The ONR is concerned with the continued safe, reliable operation of the reactors, 
which require examination, inspection, maintenance and testing, alongside plant 
upgrades where reasonably practicable (ONR 2016a). Thus, their primary concerns 
are for the technical operations of the facilities. Alongside the ONR, the Environment 
Agency (EA), the principal environmental regulator of the nuclear industry in 
England, oversees Hinkley Point’s environmental impact. The EA is a non-
departmental public body sponsored by the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) that regulates the disposal and discharge of radioactive waste, 
the discharges of cooling water, and the operation of standby generators, alongside 
other environmental matters such as surface waters and construction effluents (EA 
2013). 
 
 Hinkley Point C (Proposed) 
 
The first public inquiry about the construction of Hinkley Point C took place between 
1988 and 1989. However, taking place at the same time as the ‘dash for gas’, and 
given unfavourable economics following the privatisation of the electricity sector, a 
new reactor was never constructed (Johnstone 2014). In the wake of these 
developments, the mid-1980s saw the establishment of the Stop Hinkley anti-nuclear 
campaign group, which was originally called Stop Hinkley Expansion, or SHE. The 
group emerged to fight against proposals for the new PWR known as Hinkley Point C 
and, according their literature, played a central role in opposing construction during 
the 14 month long public inquiry into the reactor. Following the abandonment of 
plans for the reactor in 1996, the group then formally changed its name to Stop 
Hinkley to reflect its new campaign role, advocating in favour of decommissioning 
the nuclear reactors on the Bristol Channel and Severn Estuary. Stop Hinkley is still 
active, and plays an on-going role in campaigning against the revised plans for a 
Hinkley Point C reactor, which are outlined below, advocating instead for renewable 
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energy and energy conservation (Stop Hinkley 2016). Stop Hinkley represent the 
NGO focus for this case study. 
 
Despite the initial failure to develop a Hinkley Point C facility in the 1980s, the 2006 
Government White Paper ‘The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006’ (DTI 
2006) identified a move towards new nuclear and the concept of the facility was 
rekindled. Following the decision to proceed with nuclear power, a Strategic Site 
Assessment process was launched in 2008, leading to the identification of 11 
potential areas for the new reactor, three on green-field sites and eight at the 
location of pre-existing facilities (Thomas 2016). During this process, Hinkley Point 
was put forward as a potential site by EDF, and following extensive consultation was 
selected in 2013 (EA 2013). EDF identified their rationale for the site selection as 
being that there has been a nuclear power station operating at Hinkley Point since 
1965, and consequently that the local community is familiar with the technology and 
the employment opportunities it can offer (EDF 2009b). The initial public 
engagement around the facility has taken place both as consultations on a national 
basis and as localised consultations (Johnstone 2014). Taylor (2016: 166) notes that 
in contrast to the initial opposition against the facility in the 1980s, ‘the prospect of a 
new nuclear power station attracted only muted criticism, mainly in respect of the 
construction works and new transmission cables. There is very little evidence, 
however, of opposition to the new nuclear station itself’. 
 
Plans include the construction of two European Pressure Reactors (EPRs – also 
known as Evolutionary Power Reactors) and associated facilities, which were initially 
anticipated to come online by 2023 and would be operated by a multinational 
consortium led by EDF (EDF 2009a; Černoch and Zapletalová 2015). This reactor is 
the first of a new set of reactors, which, according to the UK Government, play a 
fundamental role in securing a low carbon, secure, and affordable energy future 
(DECC 2013). The preparations for Hinkley Point C began in 2014 (Černoch and 
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Zapletalová 2015), sparking debate about the necessity and environmental and social 
implications of nuclear power. 
 
Following completion, which is contingent upon final financial investment, the 
expected electrical output of Hinkley Point C will be approximately 1630 MW per 
unit, giving a total site capacity of 3260 MW; equivalent to supplying approximately 
five million homes or approximately 7% of the UK’s electricity generation capacity by 
2025 (EDF 2009a; Černoch and Zapletalová 2015; Richards et al. 2013). However, the 
Hinkley Point C project has faced critiques, including, but not limited to, concern over 
state-aid inquiries, the formation of a finance consortium or lack thereof, loan 
guarantees, the collapse and refinancing of Areva, and reactor vessel design faults 
following issues in the construction of a sister facility – the Flamanville reactor in 
France (Thomas 2016). Nuttall and Earp (2014) add that further hindrances include 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 and the Fukushima Diiachi accident in 
Japan in 2011. Indeed, to date there is no indication of when construction may be 
completed. 
 
Thomas (2016) provides an effective summary of the delayed developments around 
the most recent Hinkley Point C proposal. He develops his timeline by stating that in 
September 2010, EDF claimed it would make a Final Investment Decision on Hinkley 
Point C in 2011, with construction starting in 2013 and the first power entering the 
grid in 2017. However, following several rounds of delays, EDF then announced that 
while projected costs remained the same as 2013 estimates, the completion date 
was extended until 2025. By early 2016, the time at which this chapter was 
completed and Thomas’ review was published, the contracts for Hinkley Point had 
still not been signed and EDF acknowledged that the 2025 target was probably 
unattainable (the contracts were finally signed on the 29th of September 2016). 
Heffron (2013) discusses the implications for this for UK energy policy, highlighting 
that taking into account the long planning permission process and construction 
periods required for new infrastructure, there is concern that the 20 GW of new 
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electricity generation capacity required over the next decade would not be met by 
nuclear power as planned. As a consequence, the developments at Hinkley Point C 
are accompanied by the critique that they may come too late to make a meaningful 
contribution to filling the impending energy gap.  
 
4.3 Waste Storage, Disposal and Reprocessing, Sellafield Nuclear Complex 
 
In tandem with nuclear energy production, the UK plays both a historic and an on-
going role in nuclear waste storage and reprocessing, as a consequence of a nuclear 
legacy reaching back to 1950, and also on-going negotiations to find a suitable 
geological disposal site. Utilising approximately the same format as above, the 
following sections provide background information on the second of the two case 
studies: waste reprocessing, storage and disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex, 
which has played a fundamental role in nuclear waste handling throughout this 
period. These sections use a temporal approach to exploring the evolution of the 
Sellafield site, illustrating the relevance of past, present and future energy justice 
discourses. These sections also introduce the predominant NGO, industry and policy 
organisations involved in the operation and oversight of the complex. However, as 
noted above the groups discussed do not denote an exhaustive list of the individuals 
and organisations represented in the research sample. Full details of this list are 
given in chapter 6, table 6.1.  
 
Throughout its lifespan Sellafield has been the source of numerous controversies and 
accidents relating to radioactive environmental discharges and to workforce 
radiation exposure. As a result, it has been the centre of criticisms of alleged 
mismanagement and of insufficient/ineffective regulation. Further, questions have 
been raised around the poor understanding of its environmental impact and the 
economic rationale of the recycling option in nuclear fuel-cycle policy (Wynne 2013). 
Thus, in addition to the information outlined above, some of the most prominent 
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discourses and events are reflected upon below as a means of highlighting relevant 
energy justice concerns around the facility. 
 
The range of radioactive waste materials present in the UK is more complex than in 
any other country due to the range of uses, number of different reactor structures, 
and ways in which radioactive materials have been treated throughout the UK’s 
nuclear history (CoRWM 2006). Depending on its radioactivity level, this nuclear 
waste is reprocessed to make alternative fuels, or alternatively, can be stored, 
disposed of, or used for defence purposes. Both legacy and contemporary low, 
intermediate, and high-level nuclear waste from the UK are treated at Sellafield, 
which hosts processing and storage of these wastes alongside fuel manufacturing 
and recycling, and the decommissioning of ageing facilities (NDA 2013). 
 
The Sellafield site on the West Cumbrian Coast of England is amongst the largest and 
most prominent nuclear waste facilities in the world, with facilities that span the 
entire history of the UK’s civil nuclear industry (NAO 2012; NDA 2013). Figure 4.2 
shows the location of the complex in relation to local towns and villages referenced 
in chapter 6. Extending over four km2 in total, it is also one of the most complex 
nuclear sites globally, with over 1000 simultaneously operational facilities (NDA 
2013). Historically, Sellafield – or Windscale as it was originally known – first existed 
for military purposes, and then secondly, as a commercially operative energy 
production facility. Today, approximately 95% of the UK’s nuclear waste as measured 
by radioactivity is held at the facility (NAO 2012). Sections 4.3.1-4.3.3 give a brief 
history of the site’s three main phases of development: (1) military plutonium 
production, (2) commercial energy production, and (3) waste storage and 
reprocessing, before section 4.3.4 introduces proposals for a Geological Disposal 
Facility (GDF). Because of the complexity of current operations, emphasis is placed 
on section 4.3.3 in this research. Finally, appendices 5 and 6 provide an overview of 




Figure 4.2 Location of Sellafield Complex 
(Source: Sellafield Ltd) 
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 Military Plutonium Production (1940-1951) 
 
As briefly outlined in section 4.1.1 above, the weapons grade plutonium produced 
for the UK’s nuclear programme and its associated atomic bomb was produced 
between three sites, Capenhurst, Springfields and Windscale, where the Sellafield 
site sits today. Capenhurst in Cheshire was responsible for uranium enrichment, 
Springfields in Lancashire for fuel manufacturing and Windscale for the production of 
plutonium through the reaction process (McNair 2013). Developed in 1947, 
simultaneously with the Graphite Low Energy Experiment Pile (GLEEP) at Harwell in 
Yorkshire, the Windscale Piles were Britain’s first plutonium-producing 
infrastructure, and were owned and operated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) (Davis 2009). 
 
The two original reactors, also known as the Windscale Piles, came on line in 1950 
and 1951 and were developed alongside a first generation reprocessing plant and the 
Pile Fuel Storage Pond, which was used to store, cool and prepare Windscale Pile 
Fuel for reprocessing. Following a fire caused by poor staff judgement and faulty 
instrumentation in Pile One in 1957, both reactors were permanently shut down on 
safety grounds, well in advance of their expected decommissioning date (Davis 2009; 
NDA 2011). The Windscale fire was the world’s worst nuclear reactor accident before 
Chernobyl, and the most significant in British history as it led to the spread of 
radioactive iodine and caesium isotopes across the Cumbrian countryside (Wynne 
2013; McNair 2013; Davis 2009). Wynne (2013: 288) comments further, that the fire 
and its environmental impact were ‘surrounded by a great deal of secrecy’, leading 
to later concerns over the transparency and openness of operations at the site. Davis 
(2009: 7) adds that ‘the incident marked the end of the early euphoria that had 
accompanied the development of nuclear power in Britain’. This incident led to the 
creation of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, which oversaw the licensing of 
nuclear installations and insurance arrangements for all sites by 1959 (McNair 2013). 
Despite the incident, however, the area continued to play a central role in the British 
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Nuclear Weapons Program throughout the 1950s and 1960s as it sustained the 
handling and production of weapons-grade material (Davis 2009; Martiniussen 
2003). Work on the decommissioning and clean up of the original Windscale Piles 
began in the early 1980s and continues today (NDA 2011). 
 
This background highlights both a strong link at the Sellafield facility to a military past 
and, as a consequence of the Windscale Fires, consciousness of the potential for 
nuclear incidents. At the time this led to a surge in anti-nuclear campaigning, 
including the foundation of a local campaign group in 1980, Cumbrians Opposed to a 
Radioactive Environment (CORE). Over its history, the group has campaigned against 
the import of foreign nuclear waste into Sellafield, for the elimination of sea and air 
discharges at the site, in favour of just compensation for workers and members of 
the public suffering ill-health effects as a result of the processes at Sellafield, against 
all nuclear waste dumping, for lower radiation levels from all man-made sources, and 
for the cessation of nuclear power for both civil and military purposes (McSorley 
1990). With their longstanding interest in campaigning against Sellafield and their 
overtly anti-nuclear commentary role, CORE represents the main NGO case study. 
 
 Commercial Energy Production (1956-2003) 
 
As part of the realisation that nuclear reactors could both produce weapons grade 
plutonium and form the basis of electricity generation, the first reactors with dual 
military and electricity-generation roles were developed at Calder Hall in 1956 
following the Magnox design (Davis 2009; NIA 2013; Bolton 2013). The Calder Hall 
facility was the world’s first commercial power station and was followed by seven 
more prototype reactors, three more at Calder Hall and four at Chapelcross in 
Scotland (ONR 2013; NIA 2013). These initially dual-purpose plants – which 
plutonium-producing and commercial energy capacities – were later optimised for 
energy production only, with the role military plutonium production being returned 
to other Windscale facilities.  
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In the late 1950s the UK Atomic Energy Authority began its search for a successor to 
the Magnox programme. The Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor, or AGR, was identified 
(Davis 2009). Windscale was identified as the site to test the UK-specific design. The 
Windscale Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (WAGR) were constructed between 1957 
and 1961, operated successfully, and became the forerunner of 14 reactors of this 
design built throughout the UK using four different designs, with mixed results (Davis 
2009). Following the closure of the WAGR facilities in 1981, decommissioning began 
in the mid-1980s (NDA 2011). Table 4.2 gives an overview of the lifespan of the 
commercially operative nuclear reactors at Sellafield. 
 
The final closure of Calder Hall’s fourth reactor in 2003 signalled the end of 
Sellafield’s commercial energy role and a change in focus to fuel manufacturing and 
the storage and reprocessing of nuclear waste from both the UK and abroad 
(Martiniussen 2003).  
 
Reactor Reactor Type Power Operation Start Closure 
Windscale Pile 1 ACR 180 MWt 1951 1957 
Windscale Pile 2 ACR 180 MWt 1951 1957 
Calder Hall 1 GCR (Magnox) 50 MWe 1956 2003 
Calder Hall 2 GCR (Magnox) 50 MWe 1956 2001 
Calder Hall 3 GCR (Magnox) 50 MWe 1958 2001 
Calder Hall 4 GCR (Magnox) 50 MWe 1958 2001 
WAGR AGR 36 MWe 1962 1981 
 
 (MWt = megawatt thermal effect, MWe = electrical power) 
 
Table 4.2 Sellafield Reactor Overview 
(Adapted from Martiniussen 2003) 
 
Across this timespan, Sellafield continued to be a source of controversy. Wynne 
(2013) draws attention to two prominent events. Firstly, in the early 1980s the 
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Sellafield site was linked to excess childhood leukaemia clusters. This official inquiry 
into this occurrence was overseen by Sir Douglas Black, and subsequently became 
known as The Black Report. Despite the fact that the report was sceptical as to the 
cause of the increase in leukaemia incidence, the controversy continues today. 
Secondly, in 1984 Greenpeace accused Sellafield of radioactive discharges above the 
legal limit and the subsequent contamination of local beaches and water, for which 
Sellafield was later prosecuted. Wynne (2013) adds that despite heavy investment in 
public relations following these events, perceptions of the openness and honesty of 
the facility operators remained and remains, poor.  
 
 Waste Storage and Reprocessing (1964-Present) 
 
Following the division of the UKAEA in 1971, control of Sellafield was given to British 
Nuclear Fuels Limited. However, since 2005 it has been owned by the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and operated by Sellafield Ltd (NAO 2015). 
Sellafield Ltd is the main industry group of this research sample. Sellafield Ltd holds 
and is responsible for site licenses at the Sellafield and Capenhurst sites. At Sellafield, 
their role includes responsibility for hosting fuel manufacturing and recycling 
alongside the processing and storage of low, intermediate and high level waste, and 
the decommissioning of ageing facilities (NDA 2013). Thus, Sellafield Ltd operates as 
a commercial body responsible for the safety of the Sellafield site. These three 
functions are explored below in turn. Today, Sellafield Ltd is the largest employer in 
the Cumbrian area with a workforce of approximately 5000, with a further 5000 
contractual construction workers. Thus it is seen to play a domineering role in the 
local economic, social and cultural landscape (Wynne 2013). Sellafield Ltd operates 
under contract to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). 
 
The Energy Act 2004 established the NDA, which was tasked with the 
decommissioning and clean up of the UK civil nuclear legacy (DECC 2016; McNair 
2013). The NDA is a non-departmental arm’s-length public body sponsored by the 
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DECC, the leading department for managing the use and disposal of radioactive 
waste in the UK (Sellafield Ltd 2012; HoC PCA 2013). The NDA is responsible for the 
decommissioning and clean up of the UK’s 17 legacy sites, for which Sellafield 
accounts for approximately 75% of the total estimated lifetime costs (DECC 2016). In 
addition to partnership with the NDA, Sellafield Ltd also consults with the ONR, who 
regulate nuclear safety and licenses, and the Environment Agency, which oversees 
compliance with environmental regulations (NAO 2012). The ONR works with the 
NDA to optimise the safe decommissioning of its sites (ONR 2013).  
 
Fuel manufacturing and recycling: As outlined in table 4.3, Sellafield currently holds 
one of the largest nuclear waste reprocessing facilities in the world. There are two 
nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants at Sellafield. The first, the Magnox Reprocessing 
Plant, handles Magnox fuel from Britain’s early nuclear reactors, including the 
reactors at Calder Hall; the Magnox Reprocessing Facility came online in 1964. The 
second, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) handles fuel from British 
AGRs, and LWRs around the world. THORP begun operation in 1994, and is the only 
oxide fuel reprocessing facility in the UK (NDA 2011). Within both, the reprocessing 
process recovers unused uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel, closing the 
fuel cycle and allowing the fuel to be reused in nuclear reactors (Martiniussen 2003). 
Through the process, 97% of spent fuel can be recycled to produce new fuel (96% 
uranium, 1% plutonium); the remainder of the output is nuclear waste (NDA 2011). 
The UK is one of few countries in the world with these capabilities, and reprocessed 
fuel from Sellafield is used internationally (NDA 2013). Reprocessing at THORP is due 
to end in 2018, following which some parts of the facility will begin decommissioning 
and others will be modified to allow interim storage of wastes from AGR reactors 
(Sellafield Ltd 2014). 
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  Tonnes per year 
LWR Fuel 
France, La Hague 1700  
UK, Sellafield (THORP) 600  
Russia, Ozersk (Mayak) 400  
Japan (Rokkasho) 800*  
Total LWR (approx.)  3500 
Other Nuclear Fuels 
UK, Sellafield (Magnox) 1500  
India (PHWR, 4 plants) 330  
Japan, Tokai MOX 40  
Total other (approx.)  1870 
Total Civil Capacity   5370 
*Now expected to start operation in 2016  
 
Table 4.3 World Commercial Reprocessing Capacity 
(Reproduced from WNA 2015) 
 
Processing and storage of low, intermediate and high level wastes: The facilities at 
Sellafield store both legacy and contemporary wastes. There are four main legacy 
ponds and silos on the site, which were historically used to prepare fuel for 
reprocessing: the Pile Fuel Storage Pond, the First Generation Magnox Storage pond, 
the Magnox Swarf Storage Silos, and the Pile Fuel Cladding Silo. These units were not 
designed with decommissioning in mind, and over five decades have gradually 
deteriorated (NDA 2011). As a by-product of reprocessing in the Magnox and THORP 
facilities, high-level contemporary waste is also produced. At Sellafield, this waste is 
treated through vitrification, a process that allows the material to be stored safely in 
preparation for its eventual transportation and disposal (NDA 2011). The waste 
produced by these facilities sits alongside that already held in legacy storage ponds 
and silos, created throughout Sellafield’s operation (NAO 2015). 
 
Decommissioning: The National Audit Office (NAO 2015) criticises successive 
operators of the Sellafield site for not giving sufficient thought to the 
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decommissioning of facilities or the retrieval and disposal of radioactive waste 
throughout the facility’s lifespan. Today, the site is characterised as extremely 
hazardous due to the historic build-up of contaminated buildings and untreated 
waste on the site, as well as the age of its facilities (NAO 2015). As a result, around 
240 of the 1400 buildings on the site are either operating nuclear facilities or are 
legacy buildings housing radioactive material that ‘are deteriorating or fall short of 
modern standards and pose significant risk to people and the environment’ (NAO 
2015: 4). The ponds and silos built during the 1950s and 1960s to store fuel for 
reprocessing operations and radioactive waste are reported as the most hazardous 
(NAO 2015). Sellafield Ltd anticipates having decommissioned and cleaned-up 
Sellafield by 2020. As of March 2014, the projected cost of this operation was nearly 
£48 billion after discounting future cash flows, an increase of £6 billion since March 
2013. Clearing the site requires the transfer of all wastes into to a Low Level 
Repository and proposed Geological Disposal Facility, outlined in section 4.3.4 (NAO 
2015). 
 
 Geological Disposal Facility Proposals (Present) 
 
The waste currently housed at Sellafield is in interim storage (defined as up to 100 
years), following which the plan is for long-term storage. According to Butler and 
Simmons (2013), the plans for the long-term management of higher-activity 
radioactive waste have been a contentious issue in the UK for over 30 years. Butler 
and Simmons outline that over this period the government policy has predominantly 
been for a geological disposal facility, but that successive attempts to carry out site 
investigations have provoked opposition from the communities nominated as 
potential host sites. Such a facility was initially projected to be online by 2040 (NAO 
2012), but to date no host site has been identified and no infrastructural 




The last of these consultative processes to find a host community in 1997 was a 
failure, forcing the government to recognise the need for a different approach. 
According to Butler and Simmons (2013), this created the opportunity for the 
consideration of ethical issues in the disposal of nuclear waste. This later became a 
core focus of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), which 
was established in 2003 with the remit of evaluating options for the long-term 
management of waste and advising government. Today, the UK Government’s 
Managing Radioactive Waste Safety (MRWS) policy sets out an approach to 
implement the geological disposal of higher activity nuclear wastes (Miller 2015). 
Within that policy all wastes, excluding those from Scotland, are to be placed 
underground in geological disposal facilities, sited and developed in partnership with 
a willing UK community. In contrast, Scotland’s policy is for long-term management 
in near-surface facilities (DECC 2013). A volunteer process is currently on-going, with 
a view to identifying a host community sited within any of the potential rock types 
and suitable geological environments in the UK. The Government intends that waste 
should be stored in safe and secure interim storage facilities prior to a geological 




This chapter has provided background information on nuclear energy in the UK and 
the two case studies of this research: energy production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear 
Complex in Somerset, and waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. It explored the evolution of nuclear politics and 
provided site-specific details, illustrating throughout that this background permits 
insights into past, present and future energy justice discourses. Within this broad 
remit, it also introduced the potential energy justice concerns around each facility on 
the basis of events and current discourses. Finally, it has provided a brief 
introduction to the core NGO, industry and policy groups around each of the two 
case-study facilities, who, given their role as the predominant stakeholders in the 
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operation and oversight of each case facility, represented the target sample for this 
research. It did caution, however, that because of the snowballing approach taken to 
participant sampling the stakeholders introduced did not provide an exhaustive 
account of the individuals and organisations represented in the research sample, 
which, instead, are introduced in table 5.1 and 6.1 in the corresponding chapters. In 




Chapter 5: Energy Production: Hinkley Point, United Kingdom Results 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the energy justice themes emerging from the 
semi-structured interview data around the first of two case studies, energy 
production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in the UK. As outlined in chapter 4, 
this includes the discourses around the currently operative Hinkley Point B station as 
well as considering the government’s proposed new reactor at the site, Hinkley Point 
C. Results are presented throughout section 5.1 according to the three tenets of 
energy justice: distributional justice, justice as recognition, and procedural justice. In 
outlining the energy justice discourses around Hinkley Point it addresses the overall 
research question of this thesis – ‘how do elite actors within the nuclear energy 
system articulate energy justice?’ – from an energy production perspective. 
Throughout, attention is paid to the analytical themes of time, systems component 
and actor. This approach allows comparability across the responses garnered from 
each of the research groups sampled: 16 NGO respondents and 21 policy 
respondents3. Section 5.2 then draws together common themes emerging from the 
results and presents them in table format as a means of contrasting them to the 
second case study, waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at Sellafield in the UK. 
Given that developments at Hinkley Point C are changing on a daily basis, this 
analysis takes a cut-off point of the 1st of January 2016, after which no further 
empirical investigations were undertaken. 
 
5.1 Articulations of Energy Justice: Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex  
 
The themes presented throughout this results chapter were derived from both top-
down coding based on the research questions and literature, and bottom-up coding 
emergent from the interview transcripts. During the first phase of top-down coding 
using NVivo, excerpts, quotations and passages were coded into themes designed to 
                                                     
3 The term ‘policy’ or ‘policy organisations’ is used throughout for simplicity’s sake. This 
group contains policy as well as industry representatives and academic experts, as discussed 
in section 3.4. 
 124 
mirror the interview question framework, focussing on distributional justice, justice 
as recognition and procedural justice. Following explorations of similarities and 
differences between the emergent codes, new group codes were then created that 
captured the meanings of information within them. This bottom-up process allowed 
identification of new details from the interviews. Overall, the analytic approach to 
the data analysis not only allowed for in-depth exploration of the texts, but of 
comparisons between the three variables of investigation: time, systems component 
and actor. This process is outlined in full in section 3.5. In all sections the results are 
presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from policy respondents in 
order to highlight contrasts between their given perspectives.  
 
During the interviews the respondents requested varying degrees of anonymity, 
which are outlined in table 5.1 overleaf. Where participants requested full 




Name Position Organisation 
NGO 
Allan Jeffrey Assistant Co-Coordinator  Stop Hinkley 
Josephine Smolton Member Stop Hinkley 
Sue Aubrey Coordinating Team Member Stop Hinkley 
Roy Pumfrey Spokesperson Stop Hinkley  
Pete Roche Press Officer Stop Hinkley/No 2 Nuclear 
Power 
Nichola Clark Member South West Against Nuclear 
Rowland Dye Steering Group Member South West Against Nuclear 
Eurig Scandrett Chair Friends of the Earth Scotland 
Pete Wilkinson Director Wilkinson Environmental 
Consulting Ltd 
Regan Scott National Secretary Research 
and European Coordination  
UNITE, formerly TGWU  
Policy 
Andy Blowers Emeritus Professor Open University 
David Elliott Professor Open University 
Steve Thomas Professor of Energy Policy University of Greenwich 
David Sigsworth - - 
Doug Bamsey Corporate Director Sedgemoor District Council 
Joel Kenrick Special Adviser DECC 
Jude Maxwell Sustainability Specialist Scottish Enterprise 
Robert Armour Chairman Smarter Grid Solutions Ltd 
Hergen Haye - - 
Oliver Epsom Lead Mechanical Engineer APL 
Rep One - Energy Company One 
Rep Two - Energy Company One 
Rep Three - Energy Company One 
Rep Four Head of Sustainability, 
Generation 
Energy Company One 
Niall Riddell - - 
Robert Birkenhead - - 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of Hinkley Point Site Interview Participants 
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 Distributional Justice 
 
Across the two case studies, the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex and the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex, 12 distributional themes emerged from the interview discussions. 
For Hinkley Point, these included six primary topics: disruption during infrastructure 
development; radioactive contamination; health and safety; jobs and economic 
prosperity; education; and cost. Each of these themes is discussed here. These 
themes represent common threads of discussion and topics of concern as raised by 
the interview participants, and were identified via the coding process outlined above. 
The extent and form of these concerns varied according to the time, systems 
component and actor in question. These differences are explored in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Within the emergent articulations of energy justice it was possible to identify, most 
prominently, differences in the framing of energy justice according to the actor in 
question. Broadly speaking, NGO respondents focussed on occurrences of 
‘injustices’, points at which the site was perceived as negatively affecting the local 
area, whereas policy groups focused positively on the provision of ‘justice’ in terms 
of local benefits. Within this framework, NGOs were typically understood to be the 
recipients of just or unjust practices, and policy groups as the providers. These 
contrasts are illustrated below. Where policy respondents cited negative 
distributional concerns they were in relation to the potential disruption caused by 
site developments and were characterised by an attitude of reluctant acceptance. 
 
5.1.1.1 NGO Distributional Justice Articulations  
 
Outside of the recognised benefit of job provision, NGO respondents reported largely 
negative attitudes to the Hinkley Point Complex around four of the aforementioned 
themes: (1) disruption during infrastructure development, (2) radioactive 
contamination, (3) health and safety, and (4) cost. The discourses presented 
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primarily focus on the B and C stations at Hinkley Point, with only passing reference 
to the Hinkley Point A station, which is currently undergoing decommissioning.  
 
On the first theme, disruption during infrastructure development, all NGO 
respondents referenced the on-going construction works at Hinkley Point C. Pete 
Roche, Press Officer for the anti-nuclear campaign groups Stop Hinkley and No 2 
Nuclear, emphasised the impacts of lorry traffic on local villages, the influx of 
workers, and local biodiversity impacts, such as badgers being cleared from the site. 
Further, all NGO respondents highlighted the site’s impact on housing development 
and rent prices, transport, urban renewal, and bypass provision (this primarily 
included concern over local road infrastructure given that access to the site is along 
C-class roads), and the disruption to housing stock caused by the Cannington Bypass 
developments.  
 
Roy Pumfrey, a spokesperson for the campaign group Stop Hinkley, remarked that 
proposals for a bypass around Bridgwater during the 1988 Hinkley Point C inquiry 
were excluded from EDF’s plans for the new reactor development, and that 
consequently traffic continued to use minor roads. He reflected on this as an 
unpopular decision, given the town’s narrow streets and the high frequency of 
construction vehicles. Allan Jeffrey, Assistant Co-ordinator of Stop Hinkley, 
reinforced his sentiments as he highlighted that local residents had ‘remembered 
from Mrs Thatcher’s inquiry that the inspector had said … that there should be a 
road that went from the northern junction to 23 right across the river and straight up 
to Hinkley’. Without its provision, he perceived road access to be a primary topic of 
concern for local residents as the A39, the remaining access route to the complex, 
was full of tourists, farm workers and hundreds of pieces of machinery, causing 
gridlock. Allan added that as a consequence of these developments, ‘various groups 
formed at Cannington and the villages by the motorway, including Combwich. They 
were making a fuss about the traffic gridlock because they could see it already – ten 
years of big problems on the roads over the building timescale’. He continued that 
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eventually, 70% of the weight of materials for the facility will come by sea, but that 
that can only take place when the jetty at Hinkley Point comes into being, which is a 
long way off. 
 
For Allan Jeffrey, who reflected on disruption during the development stage of 
Hinkley Point C at length, one of the primary issues was the process of site 
preparation. Allan explained that before EDF were given planning permission for the 
developments, and despite the fact that ‘there were lots of committees, and 
planning things and financial things which meant that it may never be built, they 
were going to tear up the land, and that is what they did’. Allan explained that EDF 
and its associated contractors cut down trees and hedges and cleared significant 
areas of archaeological finds as part of the site foundations before the station had 
been given the go-ahead. Allan expressed both frustrations at the impacts of the 
developments on local flora and fauna, and, as is explored in more depth in section 
5.1.3, the order of the development process. The example of concerns over the 
negatively perceived impacts of road infrastructure and site clearing illustrates that 
NGO discourses were not always explicitly anti-nuclear or exclusively directed at the 
burdens or benefits of the Hinkley Point facility itself. Instead, they also manifested 
as concerns over its associated developments, highlighting a more benign edge to 
their energy justice concerns. This finding was taken to represent a degree of ‘non-
nuclearity’, the detachment of energy justice discourses from energy production – a 
concept considered further in section 7.1 of the discussion. 
 
Returning to more classical critiques of nuclear facilities and to considerations of the 
Hinkley Point B facility, six respondents raised concerns about the potential for 
radioactive contamination and health and safety, the second and third distributional 
justice themes. Sue Aubrey, a coordinating team member for Stop Hinkley, expressed 
dissatisfaction over the monitoring of health at the local level as a consequence of 
the potential radioactive impact of the facility. She stated that ‘I think they feel 
frightened and a bit intimidated in discovering this, because they have to do 
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something about it’. Sue Aubrey went on to give the example of the apparent failure 
to investigate the high occurrence of Down’s syndrome babies around Windscale in 
Cumbria following the 1957 Windscale Pile fires, expressing concern that the same 
would happen at Hinkley Point. Throughout such discussions, Sue Aubrey framed the 
government’s approach to nuclear energy as short-term, stating ‘it is almost as if 
they are not worried about the future’. Thus, she demonstrated that in her opinion, 
the two themes – radioactive contamination and health and safety – were intimately 
linked, and highlighted perceived reluctance from policy bodies to engage with the 
issue. Nichola Clark from the group South West Against Nuclear (SWAN) agreed, 
stating that no matter what the source of nuclear material is, whether it is energy 
provision or nuclear weapons, the ultimate concern is for their radioactive influence 
on health and the environment; ‘the issue always comes back to being the same, and 
that is that the stuff when it comes into contact with us is deadly’.  
 
Also speaking to issues of health and safety, Allan Jeffrey recalled an accident at the 
Hinkley Point B facility where a bolt came loose and broke a hole in one of the pipes, 
causing radioactive material to leak out. He explained that this was the first time 
local communities were asked to use iodine tablets, which inhibit the uptake of 
radioactive iodine into the thyroid gland. He added that there have been various 
other incidents, which have been covered up. The potential radioactive impact of 
nuclear energy was a motivation for fellow Stop Hinkley member Roy Pumfrey to join 
the local NGO as he had watched the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster, which 
included Welsh farmers having to have their sheep tested before they could sell 
them into the food chain. Throughout the interviews these concerns for the 
radioactive burden of the site manifested not only as distributional concerns – the 
unequal distribution of radioactive risk – but as justice as recognition concerns, as 
described in section 5.1.2. 
 
Developing the theme of health and safety further, Nichola Clark went on to state 
that there are insufficient plans for what happens at Hinkley Point should the 
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reactors stop producing electricity. Nichola gave her opinion that we are living in a 
world where the majority of scientists, climate scientists, and people that know 
about the finiteness of resources subscribe to the concept of Peak Oil, and yet, she 
stated that ‘EDF have designed emergency diesel generators to be running in 60 
years time. It is an interesting concept that that is going to be how we are going to be 
keeping things cool…they are certainly not thinking long term, I do not think’. Her 
concerns illustrated the possibility of evolving energy justice concerns through time. 
 
Nichola Clark believed that the military past of nuclear energy was the driver of its 
continuation as a civilian energy source and as a result, the reason we faced the 
hazards of nuclear power and the volatility of energy supply:  
 
‘It is the ultimate threat, is it not? It is the ultimate weapon, it is a thing you can 
threaten your neighbour with in a way that no other weapon can. It is a nice 
little exclusive club where only a few countries are allowed to have any. That, at 
the macro-level, is what drives it; all of that dark shadowy world of money and 
power … is what drives it. There is no mistake that there is uranium 236 from so 
called power facilities in parts of the Middle East where they have dropped loads 
of bombs’. 
 
Nichola recalled that throughout the early 1980s, when she was a child, there was a 
prevalent societal fear of the nuclear bomb, which permeated the mainstream songs 
of the day. In light of these statements, Nichola went on to summarise her objections 
to Hinkley Point (as well as nuclear more generally) as ‘the unholy trinity’, the fact 
that (1) nuclear contamination is invisible, (2) the industry is secretive and known for 
its secrecy so they do not want you to talk about it, and (3) our unwillingness to 
grapple with complex issues. She closed, ‘those three things they work together. 
Those are the things as a campaigner you have to try and break through’. 
 
 131 
Finally, four NGO respondents went on to highlight dissatisfaction with nuclear 
subsidies, raising the theme of cost. The financing of the new Hinkley Point C project 
raised concerns about the perceived maldistribution of financial subsidies, including 
tax money gained from the general populous. In this regard these critiques moved 
past local-level concern to consider the financing of nuclear power as a national 
distributional burden. Regan Scott of UNITE and formerly The Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU), reflected that if private companies did not meet the costs 
for the new Hinkley Point C facility, the money for it would come from the ‘public 
purse’. This is not where she perceived the burden should lie. Roy Pumfrey extended 
this case as he explained that at the first meeting in Cannington to discuss plans for 
Hinkley Point C, the construction price was estimated at £8 billion, but later 
increased to £12 billion, and, at the time of his interview, £24 billion. Thus, Roy 
summarised his objection to nuclear to three main points (1) the existence of 
renewable energy alternatives, (2) the fact that the new Hinkley Point C is an untried 
and untested reactor design, and (3) that in his view, it is so expensive, especially 
given the high guaranteed strike price for energy from Hinkley Point C. Further, Allan 
Jeffrey explained that EDF know delays mean money, and that each month or year 
that the process is held back means millions and millions of pounds lost. He 
continued: 
 
‘At the moment EDF are in financial dire straights. France has got to find that 
money, it is not up to our politicians. It is a French plant being built with French 
technology and they are the people that have got to pay the money. The deal 
that the government has signed is very, very bad for English citizens and 
businesses, because if it ever does get built eventually – which might be in ten or 
fifty years time – we will be paying for the most expensive electricity in the 
world. By that time any rate renewables will probably made centralised power 
stations redundant’.  
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Speaking to the same topics, Pete Wilkinson, Director of Wilkinson Environmental 
Consulting Ltd expressed frustration not only over the costs and validity of the 
nuclear case, but also over the stalled developments at Hinkley Point C: 
 
‘Hinkley C still has not gotten any planning permission. There is nothing signed 
or sealed about Hinkley C... so the whole thing is built on a bed of sand it seems 
to me. It is smoke and mirrors to convince people that this is the best deal 
around. We have got to go for it. It is going to give you lots of jobs. It is going to 
keep the lights on. The whole thing is just a propaganda exercise if you ask me. 
Well the energy security issue has been out the window for a long time because 
it is not going to keep the lights on at all, because they will not be turning 1 KW 
of nuclear energy for decades yet. Probably 2025 might be the first time that 
Hinkley C turns 1 KW of nuclear generated electricity’. 
 
In a similar vein, Roy Pumfrey went on to question the contribution of nuclear energy 
in the UK’s energy mix in general, questioning not only the viability of the project, 
but also the government’s perceived disregard of the potential dangers of nuclear 
power, including the leukaemia and cancers referenced above. 
 
However, despite the broad critiques and concerns outlined above, Sue Aubrey 
stated that as the A and B stations have been in operation for so long without any 
obvious accidents, and because the Hinkley C discussions have been going on since 
the late 1980s, the local populous has become somewhat blasé towards the 
complex. Roy Pumfrey shared her sentiments, adding that ‘I think there are people 
who are concerned about nuclear power but you know, they have sat here in the 
shadow of a nuclear power station for a long time’. Roy went on to state that local 
support for the station existed because people have worked at, are retired from, or 
have family that work at the Hinkley Point A or B stations. Given this was the case, 
the Stop Hinkley ground had experienced limited uptake for their anti-nuclear 
campaigns as, according to Sue Aubrey, ‘in the local community people are so 
 133 
desperate for jobs that they are not going to listen to it. Generations of workers are 
all right, so why worry about this?’. In this regard, Sue and Roy represented their 
views towards the site as being in a minority and stated that as the facilities have 
presented no perceptible risks, the majority of the local population tolerates their 
presence. 
 
5.1.1.2 Policy Distributional Justice Articulations 
 
Generally speaking, policy framings of distributional justice focused positively on the 
provision of ‘justice’ in terms of local benefits in relation to two key themes, (1) jobs 
and economic prosperity, and (2) education. This includes new infrastructure created 
as part of the Hinkley Point C site. In this regard, the policy discourses surrounding 
distributional justice were concerned with the provision of ‘environmental benefits’ 
rather than ‘environmental ills’, in contrast to the NGO discourses presented above. 
Where negative attitudes were presented they were in recognition of potential 
disruption caused by site developments and the issue of cost, and were 
characterised by an attitude of reluctant acceptance. Policy respondents also spoke 
to their understanding of the views of others, referencing ‘local’ acceptance of the 
facilities in contrast to ‘regional’ scepticism, suggesting a geographical distribution of 
justice as recognition concerns. Illustrative examples are presented throughout the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Firstly, all policy respondents referenced the positive impact the Hinkley Point 
Nuclear Complex had on the local job market, and consequently the local economy. 
The stability of the job opportunities provided by the current A and B and proposed C 
stations was seen by Representative One from Energy Company One as a positive 
input into what he characterised as relatively deprived local areas affected by the 
recent closure of a number of medium-scale industrial facilities, including the 
cellophane factory on the outskirts of Bridgwater. He added too that the economic 
benefits of the facility extended beyond job opportunities at the sites themselves to 
 134 
knock-on employment opportunities in the surrounding area, including rental 
accommodation for contractors and restaurant provision. This included positive 
accounts of job provision following the announcement that the initial phase of 
development for Hinkley Point C was going to begin. Representative One explained 
that the station had received requests from local hoteliers asking to be included on 
their accommodation list for workers, adding that these opportunities were long-
term in nature given that the Hinkley Point Complex has been in operation for 40 
years and, with the assumed completion of Hinkley Point C, is set to operate until 
2060 or longer. With such opportunities in mind, two policy respondents used 
positive discourses to characterise local opinions and impacts: 
 
 ‘Now, these communities want a nuclear power station, they know this is their 
lifeline in terms of economic growth and sustaining the economy’ (Hergen Haye, 
Unaffiliated) 
 
‘… A lot of local communities really want nuclear on board because they want 
the jobs and they want the development in potentially under-invested parts of 
the country. So, you know, if you look at Somerset where we are building Hinkley 
Point C, it is actually quite a deprived area and bringing jobs and skills there is 
going to be a massive thing for them. The key there is obviously the construction 
– it is building a transferable skill…’ (Representative Four, Energy Company One) 
 
In this context, the siting of the proposed Hinkley Point C station was taken to be 
contingent upon the social acceptance of the pre-existing Hinkley Point A and B 
facilities:  
 
‘In nuclear terms, we have identified all the communities that already have 
nuclear power – have had it for the last 40 years – and broadly speaking (there 
are always pockets) but broadly speaking, these communities want nuclear 
power stations to be built’ (Hergen Haye, Unaffiliated) 
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Alongside job provision, three anonymous respondents from Energy Company One, 
Representative One, Representative Two and Representative Three, highlighted the 
role of the Hinkley Point Complex around the second theme, education provision. 
This included engagement with the Cannington College in Bridgwater and visits to 
primary schools, including Millerton School near Taunton, which is a member of the 
eco-schools scheme. For Representative Two, such engagement provided an 
opportunity to inform school children, and as a consequence take some of the 
‘mystery’ out of nuclear energy. He believed this was ever more important since 
9/11, which led to the belief that you had to close all visitor centres on safety 
grounds, which in turn has led to nuclear becoming a lot more mysterious. 
Representative One highlighted a desire to go further with their input, including 
vocational courses for people who might want to work at the station or to work for 
related contractors.  
 
These discourses are taken to highlight two key points of interest; firstly, they 
demonstrate the ripple effect of the production of nuclear energy in terms of its 
associated impacts. As reiteration of the above, for example, Doug Bamsey, 
Corporate Director of Sedgemoor District Council, highlighted that when working 
with the leading energy company the priority for local negotiation primarily 
concerned the mitigation of associated impacts, including incoming populations, 
increasing life opportunities, training and skills, housing development and associated 
rent increases, transport, and urban renewal. In this regard, Hinkley Point was 
perceived as a facility with far-reaching local socio-economic impacts. Secondly, 
these results demonstrated the relatively benign character of concerns; contrary to 
typical concerns around nuclear energy and despite the contributions of anti-nuclear 
respondents, discussions did not typically revolve around critiques of nuclear itself. 
This illustrates differences in energy justice framings according to the third variable 
of investigation, actor. 
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Alongside the reported benefits, however, policy respondents also acknowledged the 
negative effects of infrastructural development at the Hinkley Point C facility. Yet, in 
contrast to the NGO perspectives presented above, these were considered necessary 
and as such were characterised by an attitude of reluctant acceptance. Hergen Haye 
stated, for example: 
 
‘Does everyone want seven or eight years of disruption in terms of building 
these things? Obviously not. These are very, very large installations and there 
will be inevitably some in the community who will be affected; their homes may 
have to be bought off them, some will have to move away, some will choose to 
move away, and that is hard for someone who bought their retirement home 
there, thinking they live in the beautiful countryside of Shurton in Somerset and 
all of a sudden there are three lorries a minute passing by their front door. That 
is regrettable, but unfortunately it is not possible to build a nuclear power 
station without that disruption, so you have to work with them to find the least 
disruptive way of doing it’.  
 
Policy discourses also highlighted the scalar complexity of energy justice articulations 
as, in drawing on experiences of attitudes to nuclear energy from further afield, 
three interviewees highlighted scalar differences in the perceived health and safety 
impacts of nuclear energy. Robert Birkenhead, an unattributed respondent, stated to 
this end that: 
 
‘The county council of Somerset, they are all for Hinkley Point C, our local MPs 
are all for Hinkley Point C, but it seems the further you go away… they are anti-
nuclear because they are scared, they think the nuclear power station is going to 
blow up and they are all going to have to be evacuated… They only understand 
the risks’.  
 
 137 
Robert Birkenhead went on to link such attitudes to the weapons-based past of 
nuclear energy, stating that it is an ‘unfortunate legacy of the industry and some 
people still think that Hinkley Point is going to explode like a bomb’. Robert 
continued that ‘the local people are more worried about the disruption, nationally 
they are more worried about nuclear power and what happened about Chernobyl 
and what happened at Fukushima, and the whole debate’. Representative Three 
from Energy Company One seconded his view: 
 
‘With a nuclear power station… those who live closest to it know most about it 
and those used to it are least opposed to new build, and then as you get further 
out that relationship is not as strong. The knowledge is not as strong, and the 
fears … grow the further away you are from it’.  
 
‘I think there are differences, we have actually seen a change depending on how 
close you are to the site and as you get towards even Bridgewater actually. You 
get more of the national perspective and the national perspective tends to be 
more about the broader and longer-term issues, so more about energy security 
and national issues, concerns about what are we going to do with radioactive 
waste come out in a different way in that people are thinking on a national 
basis, whereas close in to the site it tends to be about the direct impacts of the 
power station. And it is surprising, you do not have to go that far from the site 
to get to that national average picture, if you like’. 
 
Outside of this reference, the role of nuclear energy internationally and the idea of 
energy justice having international impacts was only mentioned in passing, 
demonstrating a focus from all but two policy respondents towards its local and 
national manifestations. Where mentioned, Doug Bamsey highlighted inattention to 
international concerns stating, by way of an example, that ‘uranium mining is never 
really considered as an issue and if it is, the anti-nuclear lobby only raises it’. 
International considerations were raised by Hergen Haye as a reflection on the role 
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of nuclear energy in matters of energy security and international business, including 
work with French or Chinese companies to explore differing community integration 
programmes or finance options for Hinkley Point C. Speaking in terms of energy 
security, Hergen stated that: 
 
‘Whenever we look at policies for energy generation we also look at what fuel is 
necessary and what are the implications for accessing that fuel. So, across ”the 
company” (name substituted for anonymity purposes) we have numerous 
debates – is it really worthwhile to solely be dependent on fossil fuels from 
abroad? It is an energy security issue. So we do look at uranium mining in 
Canada, Africa, Australia, because it is a relatively secure source of fuel’. 
 
These results highlight the scalar tension between what both NGO and policy 
respondents described as local, generally ambivalent attitudes to nuclear energy, 
and regional, more sceptical perceptions of the nuclear facilities, including both 
safety and health fears. They also demonstrate a focus on national or local-scale 
issues. Such discussions typically revolved around the scale of the complex’s 
potential impacts, both in terms of infrastructure and the impacts of the facility in 
case of an incident. These manifestations were understood to be the outcome of the 
perceived distribution of benefits and the range of their impacts. 
 
Finally, in keeping with NGO discourses, policy respondents also shared concerns 
over the price of new nuclear energy at Hinkley Point C, suggesting an alignment of 
concerns and shared interest in a ‘fair’ price for energy supply. David Sigsworth, an 
unaffiliated respondent, stated that Chinese and French investment in the new 
Hinkley Point nuclear station is giving rise to ‘a belief by several leading 
commentators that there is a substantial amount of overpayment for the contract 
and that is going to result in loading more costs into UK energy bills… because the 
Westminster government plans that those costs will pass as a surcharge or a levy 
 139 
into customer’s bills’. David believed that this would increase the prevalence of fuel 
poverty in the UK.  
 
5.1.1.3 Summary of Distributional Articulations  
 
Alongside a high level of evaluative detail, the results above provide two main 
insights into distributive energy justice in practice as they relate to the Hinkley Point 
Nuclear Complex. Each of these findings is briefly reinforced here. Firstly, the results 
revealed that articulations of distributional justice do not just focus on the nuclear 
facility itself, instead manifesting as concerns over its associated developments, 
including local road infrastructure and the necessity of recognising ‘non-nuclear’ 
concerns. Secondly, the results demonstrate both variation and consistency in the 
distributional justice articulations according to actor in question, thus moving past 
typical pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear divides. This primarily emerged as united 
concerns over the costs of new nuclear power. Thus, in the case of policy 
respondents, they demonstrate attention to ‘non-nuclear’, the promotion of jobs 
and economic development and education, and more negatively perceived nuclear 
elements in terms of financial affordability. A summary of the distributional justice 
themes is provided in table 5.2. 
 
NGO Policy 
 Disruption during infrastructure 
development  
 Radioactive contamination 
 Health and safety  
 Cost 
 Jobs and economic prosperity 
 Education  








 Justice as Recognition  
 
Across the two case studies, the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex and the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex, 13 justice as recognition themes emerged from the interview 
discussions. In the Hinkley Point case, this included concern for those at risk of 
potential health impacts, local communities that were unaware of developments at 
the complex, international actors that were not represented in decision-making 
processes, future generations, the electricity consumer, youth, and the local 
community within a defined impact zone. Each of these groups is discussed here. 
Across the two sample groups the results show that NGOs were primarily concerned 
with those negatively affected by the facility, whereas policy groups focused on 
those that would gain from it. Policy groups did, however, question the scalar extent 
of benefits from the site, again moving past assumed pro- and anti-nuclear stances. 
These findings are explored in the following paragraphs.  
 
In addition, the results of the interviews gave insight into the questions of not only 
‘justice for whom?’ but also ‘justice by whom?’. In this regard, the respondents 
highlighted who is perceived to be responsible for remediating injustices, or 
conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. Across the two sample 
groups, NGO and policy, there was recognition that although all actors play some 
role in the provision of energy justice, industry and policy bodies carry the majority 
of the responsibility. In discussing this idea of accountability, the respondents 
advanced the typical application of justice as recognition, which, generally speaking, 
has focused on the recipient of benefits or ills only, not those who create them – an 
aspect of justice that is very pronounced in climate justice debates. Illustrative 
examples are provided in the following paragraphs. Throughout, the results are 
presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from policy respondents in 
order to highlight contrast between their given perspectives.  
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5.1.2.1 Justice for Whom? 
 
In the discourses gathered from the ten NGO respondents sampled for this case 
study, justice as recognition discourses reflected four key groups, (1) those at risk of 
potential health impacts, (2) international actors that were not represented in 
decision-making processes, (3) women, and (4) future generations. Despite the 
acknowledgement of some benefits gained from the site, these discourses were 
predominantly framed with attention to ‘injustices’, the negative impacts of the 
facility on the aforementioned social groups.  
 
Both Sue Aubrey and Allan Jeffrey began by recognised that the Hinkley Point 
Complex was a good source of employment in an area where no other industry was 
particularly stable. However, they also identified concern for those at risk of 
potential health impacts. Primarily, this concerned workers at the facility who faced a 
greater risk of exposure to radioactive contamination, thereby recasting the 
provision of jobs in a negative light. Adding to this theme, a respondent who will 
remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the information, gave an example of a 
family in their local village that had a child with Down’s Syndrome around 25 or 30 
years ago and later lost the father to leukaemia, both health impacts which they 
attributed to the facility: 
 
‘The father of these children worked at Hinkley and he got leukaemia and died 
pretty quickly, and his wife would not ever talk about it at all. It was a closed 
book for her to talk about the dangers. She also gets a very good pension as I 
understand’. 
 
Continuing this theme, Nichola Clark from the group South West Against Nuclear 
(SWAN) stated that ‘we are messing around with things and making things that have 
the potential to mess up the DNA of everything. I fail to see how we are ever going to 
contain it and stop it from doing that’. Further highlighting the perceived risks of the 
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site, Allan Jeffrey expressed concern that workers were accidentally exposed to 
radiation doses, and explained that local communities were asked to carry iodine 
tablets in case of emergency; a necessity he perceived they should not face.  
 
Alongside concern for those facing potential health impacts, three NGO respondents 
also stressed responsibility to international actors who they perceived to be absent 
from decision-making processes. Thus, they did so in a normative capacity, arguing 
that international actors ought to be included as part of a just system. This included 
the need to recognise those in uranium mining areas in terms of their rights to 
energy justice, and to recognise the potential health impacts of international disaster 
and radioactive contamination on a globalised scale. Josephine Smolton, a member 
of Stop Hinkley, stated to this end that approaches to nuclear energy in the UK were 
too narrow and did not take into account the full life cycle implications of the 
technology: 
 
‘When it comes to something that you are creating that affects the planet, the 
whole planet needs to be around that table, not a government. It is not one 
government’s decision; it is unethical to make decisions in one country that are 
going to affect people around the world’.  
 
She added that in terms of decision-making ‘it is on an individual level, it is on a 
country level and I am afraid it will be on a global level at some point. With 
Fukushima there will be a crisis and globally we will have to come together at that 
point’. In this case, Josephine perceived that the only situation during which she could 
get the international focus she advocated for came as the outcome of a nuclear 
disaster. 
 
Roy Pumfrey agreed that whilst nuclear power arguably does something for global 
warming, it also requires uranium mining, ‘which is a particularly unpleasant affair’. 
Nichola Clark noted that when you talk to people about uranium mining, most people 
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do not know anything about it, ‘and they certainly do not know anything about the 
plight of communities that do live with uranium mining’. She continued, ‘if we had to 
live with uranium mining next to us as well as the power station fairly close by then 
people’s attitudes might be a little different’. Adding a different edge to international 
concerns, Sue Aubrey later reflected on the ethics of proposed Chinese investment 
into Hinkley Point C given what she perceived to be the country’s poor safety and 
human rights record. Across these discourses, then, the NGO respondents gave 
attention to international, whole-systems approaches to energy justice, recognising 
not only the implications of the process in the UK, but abroad. 
 
Nichola Clark went on to highlight the issue of gender as she revealed perceived 
inattention to the role of women in the nuclear industry – the third justice as 
recognition theme. Nichola explained that during her time with Stop Hinkley, which 
preceded her work with SWAN, herself and a colleague presented a report to the 
DECC NGO Forum on nuclear new build on gender issues. The report questioned the 
role of women in the nuclear industry, decision-making and politics. Within, she 
highlighted a gender bias, where in her view women suffer most of the radiological 
burden of nuclear power despite it being a male-dominated industry with male-
dominated decision-making. Nichola stated that gender is dealt with as a minority 
issue alongside ethnic minorities and sexual minorities, but that ‘we are not a 
minority, we are 50% of the population’. She recalled that following the report there 
was an increase in mentions of women in the nuclear industry, meaning that 
‘someone sat up and paid attention’. However, she was dissatisfied with this result 
as their response appeared to say ‘”well, we will just recruit more women into the 
industry”, and that does not really address the fundamentals of gender issues, it is 
far more fuzzy and complicated than they would have it’.  
 
Nichola later went on liken the neglect of women issues to environmental racism and 
institutional racism, which she believed could be seen across the UK as, in her 
opinion, energy infrastructures are disproportionately sited next to marginalised and 
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poorer communities. She gave the example that in the Somerset community – 
especially at the time when reactors were first constructed – it was an economically 
marginal area which she suspected would have lower than average rates of literacy 
because of its farming roots. Thus, for Nichola, the siting of nuclear facilities is ‘an 
issue of poverty and class on some levels’. 
 
Finally, NGO respondents also reflected on the necessity of recognising future 
generations. To this end, Josephine Smolton commented that her definition of 
energy justice would include ‘the right of all the people that are coming on the 
planet after us’. She added, ‘and that is where the abomination is, because the 
decisions being made now are not respecting the rights of the people that are going 
to be living on this planet’.  
 
In contrast to the often trans-boundary and inter-generational focus of NGO 
respondents, policy respondents focused most notably on local and national level 
actors, including (1) the electricity consumer, (2) youth, (3) workers, and (4) the local 
community within a defined impact zone.  
 
Speaking to the first theme, the electricity consumer, Representative Four from 
Energy Company One stated that their responsibility ultimately lay with the 
electricity purchaser: 
 
‘It is for the general public; that is your major stakeholder. Your customer who 
ultimately needs the energy is who you are ultimately providing for, be it a 
business customer or a household customer...’.  
 
The consumer, in this instance, was framed as a national collective. On the whole, 
however, policy respondent discourses primarily recognised groups at the local level 
and manifested as both recognition of those that are currently represented in 
developments and those that are not, introducing evaluative and normative 
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statements. For Representative One from Energy Company One, this included the 
necessity of engaging with local authorities, parish councils, and the public. More 
specifically however, Representative Three from Energy Company One perceived the 
planned construction of Hinkley Point C to be a positive opportunity for youth groups, 
the second policy category. Representative three explained that as a result of their 
focus on youth, their company had visited local colleges and schools, established 
youth forums, and developed school competitions. Doug Bamsey from Sedgemoor 
District Council, who also focused on youth as an area of priority, explained that this 
indirectly represented a concern for future generations as the children in that are in 
the education system at the moment could gain employment in the new Hinkley 
Point C facility after the ten-year construction phase. Robert Birkenhead also 
recognised that particular groups would benefit, including the youth that will gain 
employment and the local businesses that will benefit from increasing trade. This 
came alongside the UK public, who he believed would gain from a low-carbon, secure 
supply of electricity. In this instance, justice as recognition emerged as expressions of 
who is included in the operations at Hinkley Point Complex, or as the benefits they 
present.  
 
In keeping with NGO discourses and in addition to considering who is involved, three 
policy respondents also focused on currently under-represented groups. In this 
regard they discussed who ought to be included and emphasised the desire to engage 
with under-represented sectors of society. Representative Three from Energy 
Company One focused on middle-aged women, for example, due to their absence 
from both the workforce and from more general engagement with the facility. 
Representative Three went on to state that Energy Company One were ‘actively going 
to choose those and try to get that group of the population involved’. Doug Bamsey 
also explained who he considered to be vulnerable groups – those that might not be 
recognised in energy developments. These included incomers and retired local people 
who had relatively little to gain from the construction works at Hinkley Point C and 
the job opportunities this would provide. In addition, he expressed concern for those 
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in need of housing because of the potential for rental prices increases as workers 
move in to the area. For Hergen Haye, the necessity of including under-represented 
groups was often accompanied by the acknowledgement that it is necessary to 
engage with stakeholders with opposing views, including ‘some environmentalists 
who think what we are doing is the worst thing we can ever imagine… You have to 
listen to them and understand where their concerns are coming from’.  
 
In addition to engaging with environmentalists, Hergen Haye stated that for his role, 
he was answerable to a number of stakeholders. Firstly, he identified that his overall 
responsibility was to provide energy to the national population, who he believed 
were primarily concerned with affordable prices. Secondly, he identified 
stakeholders as being the local community in which the station was built. Latterly, he 
identified a responsibility to business and industry since (1) they were reliant on 
large quantities of base-load energy, and (2) the nuclear industry and associated 
wider industry groups themselves created and sustained a broad spectrum of jobs 
and careers that could capitalise on – in this case – a new fleet of nuclear power 
stations. In this regard, the results demonstrated a sense of dual responsibility to 
both national and local stakeholders. This sentiment was reinforced by Joel Kenrick, 
Special Advisor for now-defunct Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 
who stated that the key stakeholders are the local community and workforce, but 
that because nuclear has the potential for such a big impact there also needs to be 
national level discussions; ‘you cannot just say, well, if the people in Somerset want 
to have Hinkley then go ahead. There does need to be a discussion at a larger level’. 
He continued: 
 
‘I think in Hinkley it is the local community and the workforces who are there. I 
suppose they are the key stakeholders I would say... but because nuclear has 
such a potentially big impact there also needs to be national level discussions 
about this, right?’. 
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Continuing this theme, Steve Thomas, Professor of Energy Policy at the University of 
Greenwich, distinguished between taxpayers and consumers as he stated that ‘they 
are the same people but the distributional effects might be different. If you subsidise 
it comes from the same people, but some people might pay more…you know the 
rest’. In this context, and in keeping with the distributional justice articulation 
presented above, there was not only a concern for the cost of nuclear power, but the 
different sections of society that were burdened. Here recognition was given to the 
energy purchaser as a consumer of a commodity. 
 
Finally, in addition to variation in energy justice articulations according to the actor in 
question, it was possible to identify variations according to the lifecycle stage of the 
power plant. Alongside comparing articulations of energy justice across different 
stages of the nuclear energy system (energy production and waste) the results found 
that each stage – in this case, production – was subject to its own lifecycle variation. 
This includes the simultaneous decommissioning of Hinkley Point A, operation of 
Hinkley Point B and construction of Hinkley Point C, all on one site. Robert 
Birkenhead stated in relation to employment opportunities created by the new 
Hinkley Point C developments, for example, ‘there will not just be employment at 
Hinkley Point, there will be employment to serve the 900 people who are going to 
work there, 450 of those 900 will probably evolve from the B station, and the A 
station as it stops doing its decommissioning and goes into safe storage’. Thus, the 
different cycles of a station’s development required engagement with a different set 
and number of actors. Furthermore, according to Doug Bamsey the Hinkley Point A 
primarily revolves around issues of waste, contamination and safety, as opposed to 
the area transformation focus present in the case of Hinkley Point C. 
 
5.1.2.2 Justice by Whom? 
 
In addition to considering the question of ‘justice for whom?’, interview respondents 
also highlighted, albeit more briefly, who they perceived to be responsible for 
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remediating injustices, or conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. 
Consequently, the results advance the energy justice literature to question who is 
responsible for the inequity and/or its remediation. The results reflect on both 
evaluative and normative examinations as respondents considered (1) who is 
responsible (evaluative) and (2) who ought to be responsible (normative). Further, 
respondents reflected both on their own responsibilities and on those of others, 
acknowledging, therefore, that all groups represented in this research study – NGOs 
and policy – are involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice. 
Evidence supporting this assertion is given below. The results are presented firstly 
from NGO respondents and secondly from policy respondents in order to highlight 
contrast, or more pertinently in this case the similarities, between their given 
perspectives.  
 
NGO respondents’ responses were split across two sectors, (1) responsibility of non-
NGO groups and (2) responsibility of their own faction to continue to represent their 
views. Josephine Smolton reflected firstly on responsibility from external industry 
and policy groups, representing a focus on ‘people at the top’. This included EDF 
workers, DECC, the ONR, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in particular. 
Josephine continued by highlighting her belief that where they are representative of 
the government, these groups and individuals should be questioning whether 
investing in Hinkley Point C was sensible or not, with emphasis, in her opinion, on the 
fact that it is not. Josephine’s discourses reflected the opinion that this role was not 
being performed well. Restating the importance of DECC and ONR in decision-making 
around Hinkley Point, Sue Aubrey not only highlighted the importance of their role, 
but questioned their suitability for it. Sue noted in particular that when Stop Hinkley 
attended DECC and ONR meetings, a large contingent of the DECC representatives 
were recent graduates from Oxford and Cambridge. Given their youth, Sue reported 
that they lacked historical awareness and experience – including knowledge of the 
1988 Hinkley Point C inquiry and the Flowers Report, for example. Thus, without a 
working oral history and information being passed on, she believed that they were 
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not able to adequately address the questions that they were being asked. Finally, 
Nichola Clark reflected on the difficulty of identifying who is ultimately responsible as 
she stated that ‘you cannot say who because we have structured our society in ways 
and we have put procedures in place that perpetuate this and all the other stuff that 
we are getting completely wrong’. She closed that whilst the government might be 
described as being ultimately responsible, the government is hard to define and is 
constantly evolving. She also added that companies come and go and EDF probably 
will not exist in 150 years time. 
 
NGO respondents also discussed the on-going role of NGO organisations themselves 
as contributors to energy justice, given their assumed role in commenting on 
operations at the Hinkley Point site. Sue Aubrey outlined that historically NGOs were 
paid to make such contributions – Greenpeace was employed as a key voice for one 
NGO during the 1988 inquiry, for example. Now Sue believes that despite her on-
going engagement and interest, Stop Hinkley is not big enough to make a notable 
impact. Building the case for the role of NGOs, Josephine Smolton drew on her 
personal experiences of the latest Hinkley Point inquiry, where she got the 
impression that ‘the people who were making the decisions were relying on groups 
like us, and other NGOs presumably, to point things out to them so that they could 
investigate it a bit further’. However, she did reflect negatively on whether that was 
appropriate, as she continued that at the time she was thinking ‘wow, this is 
worrying because I have only been involved with this for a little time and they are 
actually going to look at what my comments are to decide on what they are looking 
at?’. In this regard, Josephine reflected with some discomfort that her opinions took 
such a role. Finally, Nichola Clark stated that part of what makes her continue to 
work on the nuclear issue is her own sense of responsibility to both wider society 
and to her children and as yet unborn grandchildren.  
 
Policy groups also attributed responsibility for the enactment of energy justice. 
Robert Birkenhead outlined his opinion that post-privatisation of the energy sector 
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the responsibility for energy justice was shared between the industry and the 
government, based on the ideas that firstly, the industry want to make money from 
that station, therefore it is in their interests to ensure that it can do so, and secondly, 
the government wants to ensure continuity of supply for its citizens. Responsibility 
was attributed to regulators and site developers as an outcome of government 
procedures. Representative Two from Energy Company One stated, for example, that 
following the reviews on their planning application they have to prove that they have 
understood all issues and undertaken appropriate checks. In this regard it was their 
responsibility to ensure due process, with oversight from government bodies. Giving 
a less positive overview of the drivers of due process, Steve Thomas stated that ‘if 
you are EON or RWE or EDF, you are looking to fulfil what you are obliged to do at 
the minimum cost to yourself. You should not be surprised when that happens. Their 
shareholders would be very upset if they were acting with a social conscience. It is 
not their fiduciary duty to have social consciences and spend shareholders’ money 
on that’. 
 
Finally, Doug Bamsey gave attention to not only policy groups at the national level, 
but at the local level too as he discussed the responsibility of local councillors and 
MPs to serve as a conduit for information provision. He suggested, as an illustration, 
that the role of the Parish Council was to guide local groups, ‘let them digest the 
information and with time, develop their own opinions’. Doug also cautioned about 
complexities in the role of local bodies, as in this case most developments came 
through the Sedgemoor District Council despite the fact that the station itself is in 
West Somerset. For Doug, this resulted in difficulties in establishing who the local-
level lead is. 
 
5.1.2.3 Summary of Justice as Recognition Articulations 
 
The results presented above provide a series of insights into justice as recognition in 
practice as they relate to the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex. Primarily, they 
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demonstrate that calls for justice as recognition vary according to the sample group 
in question. In this regard, operations at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex were not 
perceived to be to the benefit or burden of any one particular social group, but 
rather a range of groups. As outlined above, this included those at risk of potential 
health impacts, international actors that were not represented in decision-making 
processes, women, future generations, the electricity consumer, youth, workers, and 
the local community within a defined impact zone. Furthermore, they show that 
justice as recognition discourses vary not only according to the sample group, but 
also according to the lifecycle stage of the facility in question. As a consequence of 
the lifecycle variation of each station – Hinkley Point A, B and C – employment 
opportunities fluctuate as facilities either enter decommissioning, operate or in the 
case of Hinkley Point C, are constructed. In this regard the different cycles of a 
station’s development require engagement with a different set and number of 
actors. Finally, they illustrate that NGO respondents take a cross-scalar approach to 
recognition discourses, drawing case studies from across the local-global spectrum, 
in opposition to policy groups who typically focused on the local and national levels. 
 
In addition to these empirical findings, the results demonstrate novel insights due to 
the methodological approach used as they reveal not only who justice is for, but also 
who is responsible for it. They demonstrate that whilst all groups represented are 
involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice, industry and 
policy respondents are assumed to have a higher degree of responsibility. Within 
these statements, respondents also reflected both on their own responsibilities, 
therefore acknowledging that all groups represented in this research study – NGOs 
and policy –have a role to play in both production and continuation of energy justice. 






Question NGO Policy  
Justice for whom?  Cross-scalar: Workers 
 Those affected by health 
impacts 
 International actors 
 Future generations 
 Local and national: 
 Consumers 
 Youth,  
 Workers  
 Local community 
Justice by whom?  Industry 
 Policy  
 NGO groups 
 Industry 
 Policy (Inc. local councils) 
 Regulators 
 
Table 5.3 Summary of Justice as Recognition Results by Sample Group and Question 
 
 Procedural Justice  
 
Throughout the interviews, all respondents referenced and evaluated a range of 
procedural mechanisms through which decisions about the Hinkley Point Complex 
were made. The mechanisms mentioned included the following stakeholder 
engagement and consultative exercises, which took place at the local, national and 
international scale: 
 
 Local Site Stakeholder Groups (quarterly) 
 The first Hinkley Point C Inquiry, led by Margaret Thatcher (March 1988-
September 1990) 
 EDF-led Public Meetings and Exhibitions in Bridgwater, Cannington, 
Combwich and Nether Stowey (2009-present) 
 EDF Drop-in Sessions (intermittently beginning 2010-present) 
 DECC NGO Forums (beginning September 2010, occurring semi-annually) 
 The Second Hinkley Point C Inquiry, led by the Planning Inspectorate (March 
2012-September 2012) 
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 Environmental Agency Meetings to discuss potential environmental impacts 
(Autumn 2012) 
 The EDF visitor centre in Bridgwater (beginning December 2012-present) 
 
Throughout the interviews the majority of procedural justice discussions revolved 
around the development of the new Hinkley Point C facility. The procedure consisted 
of EDF-led consultations prior to a six-month formal hearing led by the Planning 
Inspectorate, beginning in March 2012. For NGOs the discussions primarily took the 
form of critiques of their experiences of procedural engagement, including concerns 
over the scope of the discussions, the accessibility of mechanism both in terms of the 
technicality of the process and physical attendance, and the exclusion of individuals 
and groups from the proceedings. However, in addition to these critiques, four 
respondents also drew on positive experiences, offering insight into perceived ‘just’ 
processes. Policy respondents gave more mixed evaluations, reporting on both 
successful procedural mechanisms and areas of future development. In addition to 
describing current and past procedural mechanisms, respondents also described 
potential improvements to the procedural systems, providing normative insight into 
how procedural justice might materialise. Section 5.1.3.1 introduces the evaluative 
constructions before section 5.1.3.2 discusses normative constructions. In keeping 
with the format used above, the results are presented firstly from NGO respondents 
and secondly from policy respondents. 
 
5.1.3.1 Evaluation of Procedural Mechanisms 
 
Throughout the interviews the primary area of focus was on the legitimacy of the 
aforementioned procedural mechanisms i.e. their validity and effectiveness for 
achieving just outcomes. From an NGO perspective, discussions primarily took the 
form of critiques, including concerns over (1) the scope of the discussion, (2) its 
accessibility, both in terms of the technicality of the process and physical attendance, 
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(3) the timing of procedural engagement, and (4) the exclusion of individuals and 
groups from the proceedings. Each of these ideas is exemplified in turn below.  
 
Considering the scope of the discussion, Sue Aubrey used the original Hinkley Point C 
inquiry in the 1980s as a point of reference, contrasting it with the 2012 Planning 
Inspectorate’s inquiry into the proposed Hinkley Point C developments. Here she 
highlighted changing energy justice discourses through time. Sue praised the 1980s 
inquiry, which took around 18-months and was led by an inspector ‘who took it 
seriously and really listened to people’, including a trip to Chernobyl to assess 
potential damages in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet in contrast, Jill Sutcliffe, a 
member of the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates, reflected on the Hinkley Point 
Inquiry in 1988/1989 with dissatisfaction. Jill ran the objectors office with 
consultation from CORE, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace, amongst others. 
Explaining that the process engaged around 600 participants, she stated that finding 
funding for the process was very problematic, leading to a ‘David and Goliath’ 
situation where the industry was given £30 million from the electricity board but the 
opposition camp was required to fund their own case. She concluded that in her 
opinion such processes are meant to look like democracy, but democracy is being 
stripped out of the processes. Sue and Jill were amongst the ten NGO respondents 
who all expressed frustration at the most recent 2012 inquiry into the development 
of Hinkley Point C. 
 
Firstly, in terms of the scope of the 2012 Planning Inspectorate discussions Josephine 
Smolton of Stop Hinkley gave her opinion that the consultation topics were 
intentionally limited. Josephine stated that they were allowed to discuss the 
transport system, the effects on the tourism, and what the new Hinkley C facility was 
going to look like, but that they were not allowed to talk about the fact it was a 
nuclear power station, that it would produce nuclear waste, or that there were 
alternative energy sources: ‘we were not allowed to talk about any of the important 
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issues actually and it was so frustrating’. In reference to a Planning Application 
Meeting in North Petherton, Josephine went on to say that: 
 
‘I was quite surprised at the comments that my peer group were saying as 
regards “we will go in there gagged” and I was thinking, “oh, that is a bit 
extreme”, but actually that is exactly what we should have done! We should 
have actually explained that we were having our rights taken away with this 
façade – they were throwing money at this kind of “procedure” that meant 
nothing to anybody. It was there to allow us to think that something was going 
to be going on. Quite honestly, if they thought that that was going to be 
successful, they should have done it better because it was so apparent even at 
the first meeting that it was a façade’. 
 
Sue Aubrey reinforced this statement as she outlined that NGO respondents were 
directed to a narrow set of queries only and were not allowed to stray: ‘I think we 
tried in very obscure ways of bringing in the things we wanted, but no’. Sue 
explained that from an NGO perspective, the inquiry was not seen as a robust 
opportunity to represent their views and was taken to be a ‘waste of time’. She 
continued: 
 
‘I suppose that is the other thing I have learnt; the government tries to obscure 
the facts. Andrea Leadsom came to talk – she said there was less waste coming 
out of the new set of nuclear power stations and someone pointed out that yes, 
it was in quantity, but that it was far higher in fact in radioactive terms. Ed 
Davies made the same mistake. [Plus] EDF work in DECC – what they think 
about and what they talk about for nuclear power is not going to be objective, 
how can it be?’. 
 
This view was shared by Regan Scott who stated that site developers and planners 
are responsible for taking an impartial stance, whereas, at the moment, ‘consultation 
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protocols seem to be being abused routinely with experts being taken on board by 
developers’. Allan Jeffrey agreed as he explained that throughout the decision-
making process some councillors stood down from their positions because of vested 
interests in the power station, which he believed removed key people from the 
decision-making process, whereas one councillor who was part of the ‘nuclear 
promotion society’ retained his position. Allan reported ‘that makes a crazy idea of 
democracy and I think there was a bit of fiddling that went on’. 
 
Further, Roy Pumfrey gave his experience of the planning inspectorate hearings, the 
first of which was designed to discuss the motorway junction in Bridgewater. Roy 
recalled that the event was a huge affair, but that if you were not a council or EDF 
representative it was difficult to have any say, even if you had submitted what you 
wanted to talk about in advance. Roy commented that later consultative exercises 
were more intimate and user friendly, where you got to sit at a table with a 
microphone in front of you and where you could put your point across. 
 
Finally, Nichola Clark also expressed her concerns as she explained that during her 
time as a spokesperson for Stop Hinkley on the DECC NGO Forums for the Hinkley 
Point C proposals, she had an issue with the process from the outset because of its 
terms of reference. Nichola stated that: 
 
‘We felt that the NGOs on a point of principle should probably pull out and 
refuse to engage with them unless the terms of reference were something that 
the NGOs agreed to. The terms of reference were “this is all about making new 
build go forward”. Well, we were not there to make new build go forward and 
most people just decided to gloss over and ignore those terms of reference. 
Everyone is so desperate to have a seat at the table to talk to DECC that they are 
willing to gloss over stuff like that whereas I wanted to rip it out and say, “no, … 
we should be part of setting up the terms of reference”. I think a lot of the 
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reason DECC did that was to cover their ass and be able to say, “we had a 
process, look, it is legitimate”’.  
 
NGO respondents also questioned the accessibility of procedural mechanisms, the 
second theme. Four respondents highlighted that when meetings did take place, 
they were not thoroughly advertised. For the 2012 inquiry Allan Jeffrey of Stop 
Hinkley explained to this end that individuals had to register up-front to engage with 
the process, and that past the original deadline it was not possible to participate. 
Josephine Smolton added that later on in the process, the time for contributions was 
limited. She stated ‘that just smacks of corruption before you start, because they 
want to limit the people involved, they want to limit the time, they want to limit the 
interaction potential – you are only given two minutes or whatever it was’. Further, 
both respondents went on to highlight the application itself was launched over 
Christmas and had a two-week turnaround time, making interaction with the 
documentation impractical; for Josephine ‘that was the first sign of, actually, we are 
not supposed to engage in this process, we are not supposed to look at it’. Finally, 
accessibility was also taken in financial terms. By way of an example Roy Pumfrey 
explained, in keeping with the views of Jill Sutcliffe surrounding the 1980’s inquiry, 
that ‘EDF funded planning officers up till the point the planning inspectorate was 
being heard, and then cut off the funding, so our council tax has had to go to pay for 
the council making representations to EDF – a substantial cost for West Somerset 
Council which is cash strapped and small’. He continued that for working people, 
‘there was precious little opportunity to put your voice across without losing 
opportunity to work and giving up time’, and that part of the challenge was learning 
to write stuff in the sort of manner which the planning inspectorate responded to. In 
terms of accessibility then, the NGO stance was that the process was not designed to 
be user-friendly or to garner local opinion.  
 
Continuing these ideas Nichola Clark reflected her dissatisfaction with the Site 
Stakeholder Groups for Hinkley Point as she stated that: 
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 ‘If you look at the stakeholder groups that we have got at the moment for 
nuclear facilities, they are a joke. They are largely made up of people who are 
not going to ask too many questions or make things too uncomfortable for the 
industry. It is all a bit of window dressing really. I am sure whoever decided that 
stakeholders should be involved was being quite progressive and radical at the 
time, I am sure they had a vision of people like us trying to be involved, and yet 
what we have got is a few councillors, a few people from the industry. Do you 
know what I mean? It is not really grass roots’.  
 
Speaking to the third theme, the timing of procedural engagement, two NGO 
representatives felt that procedural engagement came too late and in response to a 
‘foregone conclusion’. Sue Aubrey stated that it was being ‘railroaded’ and that they 
could not influence the decision-making process. In support, Roy Pumfrey added in 
relation to early meetings for the 2012 Hinkley Point C inquiry that they basically 
existed to say ‘we have consulted, so there are going to be some new nuclear power 
stations and it really does not matter what you thought. Their consultation paper 
was not a consultation; it was “this is what is going to happen”’. In this regard both 
respondents felt that procedural engagement occurred too late and as a result, 
restricted their ability to meaningfully participate. Alongside this desire for 
engagement however, there was recognition that due to the long lifespan of the site 
– from Hinkley Point A through to Hinkley Point C and all of the decision-making 
junctures therein – there was also the potential for ‘consultation fatigue’: 
 
‘Because it is gone on so long people just say I cannot keep on doing this, or it is 
making me ill. I am not denying that. It is very depressing trying to keep going 
because of that time. It is such a long process it is wearing people down’. 
 
Finally, two NGO respondents highlighted concerns over the exclusion of individuals 
and groups from the proceedings. This occurred both in terms of their accessibility, 
as mentioned above, and as specific exclusions of particular groups. Sue Aubrey 
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suggested that not everyone is welcome at Site Stakeholder Meetings, which are 
designed to be an on-going engagement mechanism throughout the lifespan of the 
facility: ‘I do not think they like just anyone to go, although theoretically you can be 
an observer. They are always anxious about people who do not behave themselves. 
People that rant on are not welcome, they cannot cope with that. People have been 
excluded in that way’. This includes one individual who consistently raised the need 
for research into the health impacts of low-level radiation at DECC NGO meetings 
and had his requests rebuffed. For Sue the frustration over being the ‘unwelcome’ 
voice of dissent also extended to the inability for non-nuclear writers to contribute to 
the local press. For example, she stated that their local campaign group had 
struggled to get their articles published, attributing this to the belief that due to the 
high number of EDF adverts in the newspapers, the local press were scared of losing 
their advertising money.  
 
Consolidating her stance, Roy Pumfrey highlighted the difficulty of being a 
challenger, using the example that even if EDF Energy were to offer more shares to 
the public to increase engagement, ‘you have only got one vote and you would find 
that your stance is vastly outweighed’. Furthermore, Roy not only highlighted 
concerns over not being able to express his views, but also believed that they were 
not listened to even when he did. Calls for a Bridgwater bypass were not responded 
to, for example. Furthermore, Roy spoke about the jetty that is to be constructed as 
part of the new Hinkley Point C station, which can be used to unload material at 
Hinkley Point and is composed of a wharf and laydown area at Combwich. Roy 
believes that evidence produced by the Chairman of the Otterhampton parish 
council that suggests that the tides would not allow frequent or suitable use was 
ignored. He stated that campaign participants were asked repeatedly ‘have your 
concerns gone away? Are you now content?’, giving the impression that deals had 
been struck that ignored their concerns. 
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On the whole, NGO respondents reflected negatively on contemporary experiences 
of procedural engagement. Sue Aubrey believed that the difference between the 
1980s consultation – which she praised – and the 2012 consultation could be 
attributed to the privatisation of nuclear energy in the UK. She believed that the first 
consultation led by the government to assess the Central Electricity Generating 
Board’s Hinkley Point C proposals was publicised more widely and was more broad-
ranging, allowing discussions over the role of nuclear and the privatisation of the 
energy sector for example. In contrast, she suggested that in the most recent 
industry-led consultation ‘there was nowhere people could get the answer to their 
questions if they were asking “was it dangerous” because they just assumed it was 
going ahead’. 
 
Policy representatives were also asked to evaluate procedural mechanisms. In the 
resultant discourses policy respondents highlighted both positive examples of 
procedural engagement successes as well as considering the difficulty of procedural 
engagement overall. Thus, policy respondents offered more mixed responses to 
articulations of procedural justice, reflecting on the themes of (1) the purpose of 
consultations, (2) low levels of participation, (3) concerns over accessibility, (4) 
consultation stage, and briefly, (5) concern for over-consultation. 
 
On the whole, policy discourses reflected the sentiment that procedural mechanisms 
were understood first and foremost to be an opportunity to garner local opinions 
about the potential impacts of the Hinkley Point nuclear facilities. This included an 
opportunity to hear concerns about the new developments, explore possible 
opportunities to mitigate them and ensure that people’s views were being accurately 
represented by spokespeople, including the local councils. Representative Three 
from Energy Company One stated to this end that: 
 
‘You know, the power station is going to be operational for around 60 years or 
so, and the only way we can operate with the existing power stations is with the 
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support of the local community; if they feel they trust us to operate it safely and 
not to cause huge inconvenience to how they live their lives. So I think it is 
important to give the information out to the community and to genuinely be 
interested in their views’. 
 
The aim, according to Representative One from the same anonymous company was 
to ‘give good information to people in a timely way and to listen to what they have to 
say and what their concerns are’. In agreement, Representative Two also reflected 
that a broad spectrum of attendees to consultations was a positive opportunity, as 
‘to hear those questions, to understand them and to be able to answer them 
probably does us a lot of good in the longer term…it is good for us I think…otherwise 
it is too easy to become complacent and to assume everything is fine’. Doug Bamsey 
continued too that for some consultations the absence of debate around nuclear 
energy in general was productive, allowing a more focussed discussion on the 
practical impacts of local developments.  
 
Doug Bamsey explained that the emphasis for engagement procedures was now on 
front-loaded stakeholder-driven practices, which in his opinion represent a 
departure from past techniques that emphasised persuasion tactics and financial 
compensation, illustrating an evolution of procedural mechanisms through time. He 
added that government consultations were driven by both mandate and a concern 
for best practice. Early on then, there appeared to be broad agreement on the 
current purpose of procedural engagements. Further, there was agreement that the 
general public – both locally and nationally speaking – had a right to be part of the 
decision-making process around energy infrastructures, though from the offset the 
mechanisms of achieving this were problematised. Niall Riddell gave insights into the 
issues: 
 
‘People definitely have a right. So, I mean, the kind of thing we have in our legal 
and structured system at the moment is we have a planning process which 
enables decisions around where stuff should be built, and whether or not it 
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should be built, and whether people have specific objections to it to enable 
people to get engaged in that process.  
 
Within such processes, policy respondents revealed that the procedural mechanism 
in question varied according the station, whether it was A, B, or C, and therefore the 
stage that the station was at in its lifecycle: decommissioning, production or 
procedure. This highlights an often-understated dimension of procedural justice, that 
demands for procedural justice are not consistent through time. Doug Bamsey 
reported in line with this that local consultation is not required for the extension or 
decommissioning processes that have been affecting developments at Hinkley Point 
A and Hinkley Point B facilities. Further, he added that for all stations consultation 
primarily occurs at the start of the development process, after which different 
mechanisms take over. In the case of Hinkley Point A and B this includes the Site 
Stakeholder group, which is part funded by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
and EDF. Robert Birkenhead agreed as he stated in relation to the A and B stations: 
 
‘For them there is what is called the Site Stakeholder Group. It is a group of 
someone from EDF and someone from Cavendish Fluor, who operate Hinkley 
Point A, and then there are representatives from various councils and various 
organisations, county council and the parish councils, who form this group. It is 
chaired by someone who is not [from] EDF; at the moment it is chaired by one of 
the Sedgemoor District Councillors. They meet and EDF tell them what is going 
on at Hinkley Point A and B. It is an informative situation where they can inform 
the local people and some of the people on the group … They have that at every 
power station, so that is the local engagement’.  
 
Alongside explaining the purpose of procedures, policy respondents also reflected 
on negative experiences. Niall Riddell problematised the scale of decision-making, 
for example, as he stated that illustrated that gaining national consent provided 
different challenges to local consent: 
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 ‘So, the problem… is [that] you then have things like national planning 
statements, where government has put forward its perspective of what it 
believes should happen. And unfortunately, a lot of the time large infrastructure 
projects tend to be perceived relatively negatively’.  
 
For Joel Kenrick each social group – whether local or national – was entitled to a 
different set of decision-making processes. Such discussions highlight trade-offs in 
the perceived entitlement to information and input, where local consultations 
focused on site impacts but not on the ethics of nuclear energy more generally. In 
this regard, the rights of local communities were perceived as being different to 
those of communities further afield, where they received intimate-scale, hands-on 
attempts to mitigate injustices and encourage benefits.  
 
Representative Two from Energy Company One identified two reasons for failings in 
the consultative process: (1) that local people often do not believe that their voices 
are going to be listened to, and (2) that they assume the deal is already done. This 
included highlighting frustration over the low degree of participant uptake in 
consultation procedures, the first critique from policy respondents. Respondent 
Three from Energy Company One stressed that they were keen to hear people’s 
views as they aimed to mitigate the disruption caused during the construction phase 
of Hinkley Point C: 
 
‘We will try and mitigate against that but we can only do that effectively if we 
get local opinion telling us actually you know, what you are thinking about this 
access road here, we would much rather it were there, or whatever. You cannot 
get that if people are staying at home watching Emmerdale’. 
 
Respondent Two also reflected that generally attendance is poor as he recalled that 
‘if you are getting 5% of the population you think you are doing well’. It appears to 
be the case then, that by removing barriers to procedural engagement there is an 
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opportunity to improve the experience of both sample groups – NGO and policy. In 
agreement, Representative Three stated that: 
 
‘If you take ambivalence as a measure of success then we have been hugely 
successful. With any consultation, you know, it is a very self-selecting group who 
tend to come along, they tend to be older, they tend to be middle class, 
articulate… and it is the same for any consultation. How do you engage younger 
people in the process? It is extraordinarily difficult’. 
 
Respondent Three continued that given the small attendance at consultations, they 
have to think about different ways of reaching those audiences. This includes 
opening an office in the Bridgwater town centre and attending town meetings. He 
recalled the 2007 central government consultation on the future of nuclear power, 
where he outlined that there was an attempt to engage was many people as possible 
in the process, but that it was not as successful as it could have been (because, in his 
opinion, a lot of people were not aware it was happening), only gaining the opinions 
of quite a self-selecting group of people. He added that it is very difficult to engage 
genuinely undecided people, but that this group probably represents the people that 
you need to be talking to and develop a dialogue with. Without this you ‘are left to 
rely upon those who have already got very fixed views’. In this regard, the 
respondent demonstrated an overlap with justice as recognition as he highlighted 
that those who are absent from procedural mechanisms ought to be engaged.  
 
With regards to the second policy critique, consultation accessibility, Doug Bamsey 
stated that local communities are frequently frustrated by the complexity of 
developments, the length of the process and the technicality of some information, 
which he felt precluded some social groups. Further, he highlighted that previous 
government-granted public access funds had been withdrawn, leaving communities 
unable to access the resources required to engage. Doug continued that the issue is 
now that you are limited to how much you can influence the technical aspects of a 
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development: ‘instead, they engage at the margins, where developments interface 
with local communities’. Robert Birkenhead also reflected on the potential to exclude 
particular social groups based on their geographical location. He identified that no 
meetings about the potential developments at Hinkley Point were held in Burnham-
on-Sea, despite the fact that geographically it is closer than Bridgwater and if there 
was an accident, they are in line with the prevailing wind.  
 
Finally, policy members drew attention to the potential for over-consolation. 
Respondent Two from Energy Company One noted that the degree of consultation 
can often be counter-productive; ‘they have only seven nights of the week and they 
have got eight consultations to do, so how do they manage it? They have got to give 
one up’. These concerns not only reflected the number of consultations but the 
number of bodies hosting them, including the government, the National Grid, the 
Environment Agency and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Doug Bamsey added 
that the EDF visitor centre remains the legacy of the drives for a long-term presence 
outwith these intense periods of consultation. 
 
5.1.3.2 Normative Improvements 
 
In addition to describing current and past procedural mechanisms, both NGO and 
policy respondents also described potential improvements to the procedural 
systems, albeit more briefly. In so doing the respondents provided normative insight 
into how procedural justice might materialise and drew attention to the core values 
that underpinned these mechanisms. Further research could engage with this theme 
in more depth. The results are presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly 
from policy respondents. 
 
Speaking from an NGO perspective, both Sue Aubrey and Jill Sutcliffe raised the issue 
of financing consultations. For Sue, external funding for campaign groups would 
allow people who have full time jobs and do not have much time to participate fully 
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to engage more as, if they were being paid to not work they could put more effort in. 
She added that it would also enable people to ask whatever questions you want, 
without which engagement seems pointless. Jill continued that as a case study of 
alternative mechanisms, Sweden funds objectors to nuclear power, giving her belief 
that ‘they are more interested in the right answer than becoming complacent; a 
critical voice can raise problems you have previously glossed over’. For Jill, she 
believed there was a tendency within any industry to lose a common-sense touch, 
and in the Swedish case they were paying to make a better decision. As an extension, 
Regan Scott believed that community groups should be given ‘interested party 
status’ automatically, and that as part of that, planners ‘should deliberate in public 
sessions, not on paper behind closed doors’. 
 
In addition, Nichola Clark raised the concept of Nuclear Guardianship, which was 
based on the work of Joanna Macy in her book, Despair and Empowerment in the 
Nuclear Age. Nichola explained that she thought the concept of nuclear guardianship 
should be taught in schools and be part of the curriculum everywhere. She went on 
to state that ‘it should not just be an issue for the communities who have got 
facilities to have to deal with while the community over there does not have to think 
about it. It is far too important for that. Everyone needs to have some basic skill and 
appreciation of the issues. Given its inter-generational nature, that is a really 
important part of what is missing. We are not even going to create a society where 
people are going to make good decisions until everyone is a bit better informed’. 
Nichola finished that for her, she always questioned the stories she was going to tell 
her children so that they grew up with a literacy of the issues and a willingness to 
engage. Thus, she gave her opinion that nuclear energy should be part of the school 
curriculum. 
 
Regan Scott identified that in her opinion, energy justice is an issue over where 
planning power lies, where in her opinion, the UK’s new national infrastructure 
planning law is very wrongly anti-local voice. Thus, she identified that going forward, 
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siting processes must have a strong local community presence, and that national 
vetoes must be easily challengeable. Finally, normatively speaking, Josephine 
Smolton outlined that she believed that Hinkley C was being sited in the local area 
because of the pre-existence of Hinkley Point A and B, but that in fact they are very 
different projects. She closed, ‘it is like always having a doughnut and suddenly being 
given a cream slice’. In this regard, Josephine highlighted the need for independent 
nuclear new build decision-making processes. 
 
Both Doug Bamsey and Representative One from Energy Company One gave policy 
perspectives on how we ought to engage. Doug Bamsey highlighted that where 
concerns over injustice were raised he saw an on-going role for community benefit 
mechanisms, including long-term payments for local hosts and the facilitation of local 
support as a means of recognising the role of local communities in national gain. 
Policy respondents also queried when procedural mechanisms should occur during 
the development of a site – whether it is new build or an alteration to a pre-existing 
facility – offering the broad agreement that it should be as early as possible within a 
given decision-making process or in a site’s development. Representative One from 
Energy Company One offered their opinion that the most recent round of 
consultations were marred by the first, insufficient, consultation, hindering progress 
on nuclear development of the site. He went on the give the example of how the 
process should be undertaken: 
 
‘If you go in and say this is what we are going to do and do not worry about it, it 
will all be fine and it will all be over in five years and then you can go back to 
normal, then you will get an adverse reaction. If you go to people and ask what 
are your concerns, listening and see what we can do about it, then do go back to 
them and say this is what we propose to do about those issues, we are going to 
put it in place, we are going to invest in improvements on that particular road 
junction, whatever it might be, then people say OK that is fine get on with it 
then’. 
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Moreover, Joel Kenrick stated his belief that the threat of a judicial review ensured 
emphasis on due process. He continued that the permissions for the new Hinkley 
Point C development took so long because of the number of reviews it was subject 
to, but that this was necessary. In this regard, Joel made a place for the continued 
oversight of regulatory bodies in the provision of just decision-making.  
 
5.1.3.3 Summary of Procedural Articulations  
 
Alongside a high level of evaluative detail, the results of this section have provided 
key insights into the manifestation of procedural justice in practice. They have 
demonstrated that articulations both vary according to the actor in question and 
through time. NGO respondents critiqued their experiences of procedural 
engagement, including concerns over the scope of the discussion, its accessibility 
(both in terms of the technicality of the process and physical attendance), the timing 
of procedural engagement, and the exclusion of individuals and groups from the 
proceedings. Policy respondents, on the other hand, offered more mixed 
evaluations, as they reflected on both successful procedural engagements, the 
purpose of consultations, low levels of participation, concerns over accessibility, 
consultation stage, and briefly, concern for over-consultation. 
 
Secondly, extending the theme of time further, the results also demonstrate that 
procedural justice manifests as both evaluative statements concerning what is done, 
and normative statements reflecting on what ought to be done. Normative 
constructions of procedural justice reflected on the themes of openness, 
transparency, knowledge transfer, knowledge independence and the order of 
decision-making. In reflecting on how we ought to engage, the respondents gave 
insight into the perceived core values of just energy decision-making. Thus, overall, 
the findings have illustrated that the procedural justice concept, and the concept of 
energy justice more generally, can play a role in current and future energy decision-
making.  
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Moreover, respondents discussed primarily local issues revolving around local 
villages. Little reference was given to wider regional impacts, including the need for 
transmission networks, and mention of international scale concerns were entirely 
absent. A summary of these findings is provided in table 5.4. 
 
Sample Group NGO Policy 
Evaluative  Scope of the discussion 
 Accessibility (technicality of 
the process and physical 
attendance) 
 Timing of procedural 
engagement  
 Exclusion of individuals and 
groups from the 
proceedings 
 Successful consultations 
 Low participation levels 
 Accessibility concerns 
 Consultation stage 
 Over-consultation 




 Local community-led 
 Independent 
 Community benefit 
 Regulatory oversight 
 Consultation timings 
 




This chapter has presented results from the first of the two case studies – the Hinkley 
Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset – thereby addressing the overall research 
question of this thesis, ‘how do elite actors within the nuclear energy system 
articulate energy justice?’ from an energy production perspective. It has done so by 
 170 
exploring energy justice articulations across three tenets: distributional justice, 
justice as recognition and procedural justice. Throughout, all evidence was presented 
with attention to the analytical themes of time and actor, allowing later comparisons 
across the third variable of investigation, systems component through a comparison 
with the second case study – waste storage, disposal and reprocessing. The evidence 
has demonstrated the utility of this methodological approach in identifying the 
primary energy justice discourses surrounding the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex.  
 
Within the tenet of distributional justice the results above provide two main insights 
into discourses around the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex. They demonstrated, 
firstly, that articulations of energy justice did not just focus on the nuclear facility 
itself, instead manifesting as concerns over its associated developments, including 
local road infrastructure and the necessity of recognising ‘non-nuclear’ concerns. 
Secondly, the results demonstrate both variation and consistency in the 
distributional justice articulations according to actor in question, thus moving past 
typical pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear divides. In many instances, NGO respondents 
focussed on occurrences of ‘injustices’, points at which the site was perceived as 
negatively affecting the local area, whereas policy groups focused positively on the 
provision of ‘justice’ in terms of local benefits. Within this framework, NGOs were 
typically understood to be the recipients of just or unjust practices, and policy groups 
as the providers. However, the results also demonstrated united concerns over the 
costs of new nuclear power. In this regard, energy justice was characterised by both 
the distribution of benefits and burdens.  
 
For the second tenet, justice as recognition, the results of the interviews gave insight 
into the questions of not only ‘justice for whom?’ but also ‘justice by whom?’. Firstly, 
the results demonstrate that calls for justice as recognition varied according to the 
sample group in question. In this regard operations at Hinkley were not perceived to 
be to the benefit or burden of any one particular social group, but rather a range of 
groups. By considering the question of ‘justice by whom?’, the interview respondents 
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highlighted who is perceived to be responsible for remediating injustices, or 
conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. In discussing this idea of 
responsibility the respondents advanced the typical application of justice as 
recognition, which, generally speaking, has focused on the recipient of benefits or ills 
only, not those who create them. In terms of attributing responsibility, the results 
demonstrate that whilst everyone was perceived to share responsibility for injustice 
both groups identified that government and industry were ultimately responsible for 
energy production operations. Within this framework, they are the providers of 
energy justice, and the NGOs the assessors. 
 
Finally, the results reveal manifestations of procedural justice in practice. They have 
demonstrated that articulations of procedural justice vary according to the actor in 
question. Moreover, these discussions also represented opportunities where 
respondents believed it possible to remediate injustices. In this regard, the results 
presented above give both evaluative accounts of energy justice around Hinkley 
Point and provide normative recommendations of how it ‘ought to be’. Constructions 
of normative statements around procedural justice reflected on the themes of 
financial support, transparency, Nuclear Guardianship, local community-led decision-
making, independence, community benefit, regulatory oversight and consultation 
timings. In reflecting on how we ought to engage, the respondents gave insight into 
the perceived core values of just energy decision-making. This illustrates that the 
procedural justice concept, and the concept of energy justice more generally, can 
play a role in current and future energy decision-making.  
 
Table 5.5 presents simplified findings from this case study as a means of contrasting 
them to the other case study – waste storage, disposal and reprocessing at Sellafield 




Table 5.5 Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex Results Summary
Tenet Sample Group Themes 
Distributional Justice NGOs Disruption during infrastructure development, radioactive contamination, heath and safety, cost 
Policy Jobs and economic prosperity, education, disruption during infrastructure development, cost 
Justice as Recognition NGO For Whom: workers, those affected by health impacts, international actors, future generations 
By Whom: industry, policy, NGO groups 
Policy For Whom: consumers, youth, workers, local community 
By Whom: industry, policy (Inc. local councils), regulators 
Procedural Justice NGOs Evaluative: scope of the discussion, consultation accessibility, the timing of procedural engagement, 
the exclusion of individuals and groups from the proceedings 
Normative: financial support, transparency, Nuclear Guardianship/education, local community-led, 
independent 
Policy Evaluative: successful consultations, low participation levels, accessibility concerns, consultation 
stage, over-consultation 
Normative: community benefit, regulatory oversight, early consultation 
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Chapter 6: Waste Storage, Disposal and Reprocessing: Sellafield 
Complex, United Kingdom Results 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the energy justice themes emerging from the 
semi-structured interview data around the second of two case studies, waste 
reprocessing, storage, and disposal at the Sellafield nuclear complex in Cumbria. 
Results are presented throughout section 6.1 according to the three tenets of energy 
justice: distributional justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice. This 
addresses the overall research question – ‘how do elite actors within the nuclear 
energy system articulate energy justice?’ – from a waste reprocessing, storage, and 
disposal perspective. Throughout, attention is paid to the analytical themes of time, 
systems component and actor. This approach allowed comparability across the 
responses garnered from each of the research groups sampled: 16 NGO respondents 
and 21 policy respondents4. Section 6.2 then draws together common themes 
emerging from the results and presents them in table format as a means of contrast 
to the other case study of examination, the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in 
Somerset. To allow comparability with the Hinkley Point case study, this analysis 
takes a cut-off point of the 1st of January 2016, after which no further empirical 
investigations were undertaken. 
 
6.1 Articulations of Energy Justice: Sellafield Complex Results 
 
The themes presented throughout this results chapter were derived from both top-
down coding based on the research questions and literature, and bottom-up coding 
emergent from the interview transcripts. During the first phase of top-down coding 
using NVivo, excerpts, quotations and passages were coded into themes designed to 
mirror the interview question framework, focussing on distributional justice, justice 
as recognition and procedural justice. Following explorations of similarities and 
                                                     
4 The term ‘policy’ or ‘policy organisations’ is used throughout for simplicity’s sake. This 
group contains policy as well as industry representatives and academic experts, as discussed 
in section 3.4. 
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differences between the emergent codes, new group codes were then created that 
captured the meanings of information within them. This bottom-up process allowed 
identification of new details from the interviews. Overall, this analytic approach to 
the data analysis not only allowed for in-depth exploration of the texts, but of 
comparisons between the three variables of investigation: time, systems component 
and actor. This process is outlined in full in section 3.5. In all sections of this chapter 
the results are presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from policy 
respondents in order to highlight contrasts between their given perspectives.  
 
During the interviews the respondents requested varying degrees of anonymity, 
which are outlined in table 6.1 overleaf. Where participants requested full 





Table 6.1 Summary of Sellafield Site Interview Participants 
Name Position Name 
NGO 
Janine Allis-Smith Campaigns Coordinator Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive 
Environment (CORE) 
Jean McSorley Independent Consultant. 
Former head of Greenpeace 
International’s nuclear 
campaign in Asia; member of 
the Australian Nuclear Safety 
Committee from 2000-2003 
Author of Living in the Shadow, the 
Story of the People of Sellafield 
(Pan 1990) 
Jill Sutcliffe Member of Conference 
Coordinating Group, Member 
Low level radiation and health 
conference, Nuclear Waste Advisory 
Associates  
Martin Forwood Campaigns Coordinator Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive 
Environment (CORE) 
Pete Roche Press Officer Stop Hinkley, No 2 Nuclear Power 
Ruth Balogh Nuclear Issues Campaigner  West Cumbria and North Lakes 
Friends of the Earth 
Eurig Scandrett Chair Friends of the Earth Scotland 
Pete Wilkinson Director Wilkinson Environmental Consulting 
Ltd 
Regan Scott National Secretary Research 
and European Coordination  
UNITE, formerly TGWU 
Policy 
Andy Blowers Emeritus Professor Open University 
David Elliott Professor Open University 
Steve Thomas Professor of Energy Policy University of Greenwich 
David Sigsworth - - 
Joel Kenrick Special Adviser DECC 
Jude Maxwell Sustainability Specialist Scottish Enterprise 
Ian Fairlie - - 
Robert Armour Chairman Smarter Grid Solutions Ltd 
Gregg Butler Director/ Head of Strategic 
Assessment, Dalton Nuclear 
Institute  
Integrated Decision Management 
Ltd/University of Manchester 
Hergen Haye - - 
Lynda Warren Member Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) 
Brenda Boardman - - 
Bill Hamilton  Head of Stakeholder Relations Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
Oliver Epsom Lead Mechanical Engineer APL 
Rep One - Energy Company One 
Rep Two - Energy Company One 
Rep Three - Energy Company One 
Rep Four Head of Sustainability, 
Generation 
Energy Company One 
Niall Riddell - - 
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 Distributional Justice 
 
Across the two case studies, the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex and the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex, 12 distributional themes emerged from the interview discussions. 
For Sellafield, these included seven primary topics: radioactive contamination; 
health; military usages; jobs and economic prosperity; the cost of nuclear waste 
management; safety and emergency planning; and planning for contemporary and 
legacy wastes. Each of these themes is discussed here. These themes represent 
common threads of discussion and topics of concern as selected by the interview 
participants, and were identified via the coding process outlined above. As with the 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex case study, the extent and form of these concerns 
varied according to the time, systems component and actor in question. These 
differences are explored in the following paragraphs.  
 
Discussions around Sellafield appeared primarily as temporally complex, with 
questions over legacy waste, contemporary management, and future handling, 
including the potential to move the waste from Sellafield into a Geological Disposal 
Facility. In this regard, the issue of nuclear waste management appeared to take a 
distinctive inter-generational pattern, looking both forward and back. To illustrate 
this temporal relationship, this section explores distributional articulations within the 
illustrative categories of historic, present and future energy justice articulations. In so 
doing the results illustrate that energy justice articulations vary through time.  
 
6.1.1.1 Historic Articulations 
 
In line with the presentation of results throughout the results chapters, NGO 
discourses are introduced first followed by policy discourses. The discourses 
presented here cover the themes of radioactive contamination, health, military 
usages, and jobs and economic prosperity. Of these, NGO respondents focused on 
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three particular themes: (1) radioactive contamination, (2) health, and (3) military 
usages.  
 
Jean McSorley, an independent consultant on nuclear issues whose father had 
worked at Sellafield, drew on personal and professional experience to explore the 
first theme, radioactive contamination in and around the Sellafield complex. Jean 
explained, based on personal testimony of Sellafield workers and her family, what 
happened following a major fire in one of the Windscale Piles in 1957. Jean stated 
that it was only three days after the fire started that the authorities told the public of 
the widespread radioactive contamination from the accident. Jean’s family, like 
others in the area, was given cans of condensed milk to use instead of fresh milk, as 
the milk from the surrounding region was considered unsafe to drink due to cows 
grazing on radioactively contaminated pasture. The impact of the Windscale Fire was 
what led, in part, to Jean attending a Greenpeace meeting in 1980, in her home town 
of Barrow-in-Furness; a shipbuilding town approximately 40 miles from the Sellafield 
site. The meeting was designed to discuss spent fuel transport from Japan to Britain. 
Despite anticipating a small audience, the meeting was attended by around 300 
people, including a mixture of local workers and cancer patients. The meeting led to 
the creation of the campaigns group ‘Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive 
Environment’ (CORE), which started a campaign against the import of highly 
radioactive spent fuel into Barrow. Jean, one of CORE’s founders, was campaign 
secretary until 1990. 
 
Martin Forwood, now Campaigns Coordinator for the anti-nuclear group CORE, 
reflected that the group’s campaign role had changed through time. He explained 
that whilst the campaign group initially protested against the import of nuclear 
waste through the port of Barrow, CORE later broadened its remit beyond its original 
anti-nuclear-waste-shipping focus to include campaigning against Sellafield’s 
reprocessing facilities on the grounds that they were known to be a source of 
radioactive contamination. Martin added, as an example, that the rationale for the 
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Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield, which was designed to 
reprocess waste to protect against uranium scarcity, had entirely disappeared by the 
time it came online, but that THORP went ahead on the back of signed contracts. 
Martin highlighted, therefore, that whilst the industry framed the practice of waste 
reprocessing as recycling, CORE perceived, and still perceive, that to be a myth. He 
went on to explain that the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) provided 
evidence to the Sizewell B Public Inquiry outlining that the reprocessing operation 
creates 160 times more waste than the storage and disposal of the original material, 
and that after 60 years of operations at the site very little waste has been recycled. 
Instead, Martin explained that it has been stockpiled, leading to a steady increase in 
the hazard of the Sellafield site.  
 
As a further illustration of concerns around radioactive contamination, Pete 
Wilkinson, the director of Wilkinson Environmental Consulting Ltd, recalled the 
actions of Greenpeace towards the site in 1983. Within this example, he explained 
that Greenpeace identified that 2 million gallons of plutonium-contaminated water 
was being discharged from the Sellafield site into the Irish Sea per day, leading to 
widespread radioactive contamination. As a consequence of Greenpeace’s 
investigations and direct action at the site, which included attempts to block outlet 
pipes by boat, Greenpeace was fined £50,000 and British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, the then 
owner of Sellafield, £10,000. Alongside expressing concern over the perceived 
imbalance in the fines received, Pete reported that the radioactive discharges had 
ceased as a result. In this regard, Pete’s case study highlighted that the risks posed 
from the site were not consistent through time, and that some management 
practices had been improved, with NGOs securing successes in renewing site policy. 
Reinforcing the incidence of successful interventions, Jill Sutcliffe, a member of the 
Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates, recalled the 1983 direct action of six people 
against the ocean dumping of nuclear waste. The group of six attempted to erect a 
tower on the train line carrying the waste to the sea. Although they were 
unsuccessful and were fined £2000, their efforts later secured the support of the 
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National Union of Seamen, who refused to carry the waste, thereby causing outright 
cessation of sea dumping. 
 
Jill Sutcliffe referenced historical investigations into the health impacts of radioactive 
contamination, the second theme for Sellafield’s distributional concerns. Jill cited the 
1983 Black Report – an old but seminal contribution – which identified leukaemia 
clusters around Sellafield, as well as the work of Alice Stewart on the impacts of 
radiation on health between approximately 1956 and 1958. Such instances led to her 
involvement as part of the organising committee for the Low Level Radioactive 
Waste and Health Conferences, which aim to highlight the latest research on the 
health implications of radiation exposure and contamination. Jill stated that the 
industry’s understanding for a long time was that only large doses of radiation were 
a risk, whereas Jill’s opinion is that low-level radiation has also proved damaging. She 
added that radiation’s invisibility does not help, instead leading to a reliance on 
experts to give evidence. She added, partially in jest, that ‘it would be better if we 
came out in green spots’. 
 
Finally, NGO respondents also spoke to the link between nuclear power and nuclear 
weapons. Ruth Balogh, a nuclear campaigner for West Cumbria and North Lakes 
Friends of the Earth, who was originally involved in the peace movement and anti-
nuclear activities, stated that a major contribution of David Lowry’s work during the 
1980s Sizewell Inquiry was to demonstrate the links between the two, with 
implications for perceptions of Sellafield. As a summary, then, NGO reflections on the 
historical operations at Sellafield appeared on the whole as critiques on the grounds 
of its contribution to radioactive contamination, its negative health impacts and its 
connection with the military. 
 
Throughout the interviews, policy respondents focused on three of the 
aforementioned distributional themes: (1) radioactive contamination, (2) military 
usages and (3) jobs and economic prosperity. In line with NGO discourses, policy 
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interviewees also highlighted concerns over past incidents of radioactive 
contamination as the result of both accidents and poor practice. Oliver Epsom, a 
former nuclear engineer and now engineer for SSE Renewables, highlighted the 
‘breath-taking incompetence’ when it came to past handling of the site, stating that 
the workers at Sellafield had been ‘chucking waste into swimming pools without 
even knowing how much you were throwing in there or where it came from’. Hergen 
Haye, an unattributed respondent who identified that the complexity of the nuclear 
waste problem in the UK was in fact the complexity of Sellafield, reinforced this view. 
In particular he cited the hazards of the highly radioactive waste produced by the 
weapons program, the damage done to the Windscale Piles during the 1957 fires, 
and the existence of their associated storage ponds and silos, for which there is no 
known inventory. Lynda Warren, a member of the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) further echoed his sentiments as she stated ‘there is no 
doubt that things have been left in a worse state than they should have been’.  
 
Joel Kenrick, Special Advisor for the now-defunct Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), explained that these hazards at Sellafield continued to build 
throughout the decades following Sellafield’s construction: 
 
‘The thing about Sellafield that I did not realise when I went to Cumbria, is how 
recent the mess-ups were. It was not just that we messed things up in the 50s 
and 60s; these were conscious decisions that the nationalised energy industry 
made in the 70s and 80s. There are people who should have faced serious 
charges in court for things that went on in those days in terms of decisions that 
were taken’.  
 
Joel explained that during the miners’ strike in the 1970s and 1980s the decision was 
made to push power stations harder than they could go, knowing that there was no 
means of dealing with the waste that was produced. He added, ‘surely that is a 
criminal offence?’, especially when, in his opinion, people then knew about the risks. 
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Gregg Butler, the director of Integrated Decision Management Ltd, suggested that 
the existence of radioactive hazards were linked to the haphazard development of 
the Sellafield site. He stated ‘you would not design to end up with a Sellafield, but if 
you start in 1946, which the program did, with the perceived urgent need to have a 
nuclear weapon, you do things with that driver behind you. You do things literally to 
get progress, and you do not worry too much about how you are going to clear it up 
afterwards’. Gregg Butler identified that modern-day Sellafield was inextricably 
bound with the Sellafield Piles and later, the Calder hall power stations, which were 
designed to produce plutonium for defence purposes. For Robert Armour of Smarter 
Grid Solutions Ltd, the past military link was also clear as he recounted that Sellafield 
‘was seen as both a huge technical hope and a quasi-military establishment, making 
the atoms for peace and atoms for war distinction quite problematic’. These 
examples illustrate two points: firstly, that Sellafield was initially viewed positively by 
policy respondents on the basis of its contribution to the weapons program, and 
secondly, that it was the then management of the site that was responsible for 
perceived injustices today; the existence of both known and unknown sources of 
radiological risk. 
  
As further evidence of concerns over management practices Gregg Butler remarked 
that ‘it was almost an afterthought that the nuclear reactors could produce power’; 
he explained that Magnox power stations capable of using reprocessed fuel and 
producing military plutonium were developed on the assumption that uranium 
would become scarce, and that the out-coming plutonium could be used for fast 
breeder reactors. However, he added that uranium did not become scarce and 
therefore a design which reprocessed fuel was not necessary; ‘so, if you started with 
knowing what we know now, you would find a way of getting yourself plutonium for 
our independent nuclear deterrent, but it probably would not be as big, as 
cumbersome and as messy as Magnox reactors’. This reflects his opinion that the 
decisions made during the early stages of the Sellafield site were unnecessarily 
complex. Further, Gregg also reflected on the changing socio-economic landscape of 
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the surrounding area and its influence on the Sellafield site. Gregg explained that 
historically, West Cumbria has around 30% of the railway lines in the UK because of 
the mines and quarries, which fed the region’s iron and steel industry. A 
government-funded Volvo bus factory also later closed. Now that these facilities 
have ceased operation, the only major employer in terms of high-qualification, high-
pay employment is Sellafield.  
 
For policy respondents, where positive stances were expressed they emerged as 
normalisation discourses. By way of an example, Gregg Butler praised the fact that so 
little had gone wrong during Sellafield’s early history, especially as American nuclear 
developments were subject to several criticalities. He stressed in this regard, that 
things at Sellafield could have been worse.  
 
In summary, there was notable critique of the Sellafield site from both sectors 
represented in the interviews – NGOs and policy – as acknowledgement of apparent 
historical mishandling of the facilities at Sellafield and as a consequence, the 
radiological burdens they presented.  
 
6.1.1.2 Present Articulations 
 
Speaking in the present tense, there was a more complex division in the views held 
towards the Sellafield site. Firstly, there was a consistent concern about radioactive 
contamination across the two sample groups. Thereafter, NGO respondents focussed 
on occurrences of ‘injustices’, points at which the site was perceived as negatively 
affecting the local area, whereas policy groups focused positively on the provision of 
‘justice’ in terms of local benefits. As with the Hinkley Point case study, NGOs were 
typically understood to be the recipients of just or unjust practices, and policy groups 
as the providers. Across the two sample groups, these discourses focused on five of 
the aforementioned core distributional themes: jobs and economic prosperity, 
radioactive contamination, the cost of nuclear waste management, health, and 
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safety and emergency planning. Throughout this section, NGO discourses are again 
introduced first, followed by policy discourses.  
 
In the present-day context, NGO respondents focused on critique of the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex on the grounds of four of the abovementioned distributional 
themes: (1) jobs and economic prosperity, (2) radioactive contamination, (3) the cost 
of nuclear waste management, and (4) safety and emergency planning, before 
expressing reluctant acceptance of the need to address legacy nuclear wastes. Giving 
an NGO perspective on the first theme, jobs and economic prosperity, Martin 
Forwood (CORE) stated that despite the fact that economic input into the area was 
high in terms of employee numbers – around 10,000 permanent positions and 2000 
contractual – local deprivation in the nearby villages of Seascale and Whitehaven was 
on-going, adding that they were still ‘time-warped and deprived’. Thus, in his view, 
the employability and economic benefits of the Sellafield nuclear complex were not 
extant. Further, he believed that Sellafield had dominated the local landscape, 
causing the local population to become dependent on the jobs it provides, therefore 
preventing non-industry investment. In this regard, he characterised West Cumbria 
as ‘a nuclear state it its own right’. Martin’s statements exemplify the view from NGO 
respondents that the jobs and economic benefits from Sellafield were not well 
distributed. 
 
Speaking in relation to the theme of radioactive contamination, Pete Wilkinson 
described his work in characterising the nuclear waste within the historical ponds 
and silos present on the site, including B30 and B38 in particular. Pete explained that 
‘the plant itself is ageing and a lot of the facilities are leaking. The entire 
groundwater under Sellafield is contaminated. The whole place is just an absolute 
disgrace’. He went on to label the complex ‘a disaster waiting to happen’, reinforcing 
concern over the structure of high-level active waste tanks in particular. Martin 
Forwood also considered the theme of radioactive contamination as he recalled that 
before the British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) bankruptcy in 2005, CORE used to 
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host their own local meetings and consultations on radioactive waste management. 
He went on to explain that following the Nuclear Decommissioning Authorities’ 
(NDA) creation to clean up and decommission the Complex, the group thought ‘the 
bad days were over’, but it never happened that way and the NDA continued to 
support reprocessing. Thus, in Martin’s opinion, the NDA have become a major 
waste producer and discharger in their own right as the income from the 
reprocessing operations help to cover the costs of site clean up. In this context, 
Martin described the role of the CORE as being to lobby for attention to 
reprocessing, which he understands is currently being overshadowed by new GDF 
developments and proposals for new reactors at Sellafield. Thus, in contemporary 
constructions of energy justice around the Sellafield site there was continued 
concern about the potential radioactive burden of the facilities.  
 
Martin Forwood summarised these concerns as being fourfold as he went on to 
reflect on the themes of radioactive contamination, health, and safety and 
emergency planning around the processes at Sellafield: 
 
1) The reprocessing operation creates 160x more nuclear waste than the storage 
and disposal of the original material, 
2) Radioactive discharges to the environment, primarily from the Magnox 
reprocessing plant and to a lesser extent, THORP, 
3) The health implications of discharges, and 
4) The transport of nuclear waste, which he characterised as unnecessarily risky  
 
The radioactive hazards outlined above were perceived to extend internationally by 
three respondents. Martin stated, for example, that whilst the impact of the site was 
primarily local, his work did engage with the national or international scale for the 
reason that radioactive discharges could be monitored along the UK coastline and as 
far abroad as Canada. This included concern about the radioactive contamination 
caused by uranium mining, as is explored in section 6.1.2.1. Jean McSorley explained 
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that Britain originally reprocessed spent fuel in order to separate plutonium for use 
in nuclear weapons. She gave the opinion that this justified later reprocessing 
activities on the grounds that the recovered plutonium would be used as a nuclear 
fuel in reactors. This, effectively, helped other countries justify their civil spent fuel 
reprocessing activities. Such programmes could, however, also be used as a disguise 
for countries to recover plutonium for military purposes. Civil reprocessing by some 
countries has, therefore, led to concerns over weapons proliferation by stealth. 
Consequently, Jean gave the opinion that herself and other nuclear specialists think 
the debate about the present-day reprocessing facilities at Sellafield is inherently 
linked, even if only in political terms, to militarisation and nuclear weapons 
proliferation and gave the green light to other countries to do so too, which has 
proliferation implications. Consequently, Jean perceived the debate about the 
present-day reprocessing facilities at Sellafield to be inherently linked to questions of 
militarisation and proliferation. 
 
‘What Sellafield will do ultimately with its plutonium stockpile will be a big 
international issue. It has never been anything but something that has had local, 
national and international implications’. 
 
For Jean, these international implications include the import of spent fuel from 
overseas. Jean explained that during the second consultation on the development of 
a GDF, which took place from 2008 to 2013: 
 
‘People would keep saying, “oh, but we have already got 97% of the waste at 
Sellafield” and, therefore, what followed from that was this whole “we should 
think about disposing of the waste here because of the risk of transport”. But 
when you break down the figures, the vast majority of the radioactivity in the 
inventory that is at Sellafield has been shipped in from other areas of Britain and 
other countries. So what you are saying is that what is a national problem is 
now being very deviously turned in to a local issue’.  
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NGO discourses also reflected on the theme of the cost of nuclear waste 
management. Anti-nuclear academic expert, Andy Blowers, stated that Sellafield 
absorbs about 80% of DECC’s budget – which he estimated to be about £7 billion – in 
order to maintain legacy wastes. Yet despite the high expenditure, the facility was 
only ‘passively safe’ and conditions continue to degrade. This includes seagulls 
floating on cooling ponds and rusting cast iron boilers next to the cores. In line with 
these concerns, Pete Wilkinson added that ‘we are spending billions every year on 
trying to deal with it, and I do not think we are getting very far’. Such concern over 
the price of management also transitioned into the decision to proceed with new 
build nuclear in the UK and the continued reprocessing of spent fuel, which will 
increase the volumes of radioactive waste that require management. In this regard, 
the costs of nuclear waste management were seen to directly coincide with concerns 
over the fourth theme, safety and emergency planning. Jill Sutcliffe relayed, for 
example, that she had discovered contradictions in statements about the methods 
for waste management, including information on waste casings that needed to 
simultaneously let gas out but not let water in. In this regard, she highlighted that 
nuclear waste is an extremely long-term issue, but that we have already seen short-
term failures in waste management.  
 
Yet despite the emergence of negative views towards the operations at Sellafield, 
Pete Wilkinson also acknowledged reluctant acceptance of the facility, based on the 
idea that if radioactive material was present it ultimately had to be dealt with: 
 
‘The legacy waste is here now; whatever created it, whatever stupid policies we 
went in for, created it. We have to do something with it; whether we continue to 
store it above ground or whether we think we can know about disposal to put it 
underground is neither here nor there’.  
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Therefore, alongside opposition of the creation of new nuclear waste, there was 
acceptance of the continued role of the Sellafield facility in the care and 
maintenance of legacy materials. 
 
In the present-day context, policy respondents offered more mixed evaluations of 
the Sellafield facility under three of the aforementioned distributional themes, (1) 
jobs and economic prosperity, (2) radioactive contamination, and (3) the cost of 
nuclear waste management, before referencing the continued need to address 
legacy nuclear wastes.  
 
In contrast to the negative views outlined above, three policy respondents 
highlighted the contemporary benefits that Sellafield has for jobs and economic 
prosperity, thus highlighting the perceived distribution of benefits rather than ills. As 
an illustration, Hergen Haye highlighted that many of the local communities formed 
around the Sellafield site, including in the nearby areas of Allerdale and Copeland, 
due to the facility’s positive impact on jobs and economic prosperity. In the case of 
Copeland in particular, he underlined that the site was something of a lifeline, and 
suggested that the local population might argue for Sellafield’s expansion. Niall 
Riddell, an unattributed respondent, followed that ‘they have had their problems up 
there, but realistically, the primary employer with any sort of financial backing 
around it is the Sellafield site and the associated working environment’. With this in 
mind, Niall also advocated the continued expansion of the site on the grounds that 
you could take advantage of the localised skills and populous communities that have 
built up in the area. Further, Bill Hamilton from the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA), which now has oversight of the operations at Sellafield, explained 
that the outcome of investment was that the wages around the site and in Copeland 
are the highest outside London.  
 
Bill Hamilton went on to state that under the guidance of the Energy Act 2004, the 
NDA is required to recognise the socio-economic impact of closing nuclear sites. 
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According to Bill, the NDA seeks not only to recognise this, but also to deal with it, 
and as a consequence, has invested £50 million in ten years into the socio-economic 
future of West Cumbria. Investment includes the Energus centre in Lillyhall, between 
Whitehaven and Workington, which offers youths entry into the nuclear industry. 
Other opportunities include STEM subjects at school, the creation of apprentice 
opportunities, the funding of the Dalton Nuclear Faculty and further community 
projects. Thus, whilst NGO actors discussed the provision of jobs as having limited 
impact on local deprivation, characterising Sellafield as a facility that negatively 
dominated the job-market and prevented non-industry investment, policy actors 
perceived it as a positive site and a positive opportunity. These contrasting 
perspectives of the same theme, jobs and economic prosperity, serve to highlight 
differing conceptions of energy justice around the Sellafield site. 
 
Alongside positive accounts of local impacts in terms of jobs and economic 
prosperity, the results also highlighted complexities within policy constructions of 
local acceptance and benefit. Policy respondents referenced, in particular, the idea 
that positive opinions of the site did not extend to a regional scale. Hergen Haye 
pointed towards wider Cumbria, including the Lake District, as a source of negative 
opinions, where the populace labelled the facility as a blight on the community, 
which could prevent tourism. At this scale, there was recognition of the negative 
impacts of construction and maintenance, and the potential disruption caused by 
site developments. Gregg Butler commented, for example, that ‘if you are in your 
little puddle and all of a sudden you are going to have lots of lorries going through 
your village, which has not seen anything bigger than a milk float for the last 30 
years, you are going to get annoyed’. He described contemporary concerns around 
housing for incoming workers; concerns based on the fact that around 4000 
construction employees entered the local area during the construction of THORP and 
that as a result, ‘places like Egremont became like the Wild West’. Gregg added: 
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‘You know, when the councils voted to carry on or stop on the geological 
disposal facility, the district councils on the coast voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of going on, and Cumbria County Council, which of course, has got 
interests in Carlisle and Kendal and things, voted narrowly against it. So, there is 
a big fall off in support with distance, as you would expect really’. 
 
Such discussions represented discursive tensions between geographical areas and as 
such, constructions of energy justice. Within such discussion about the spatial impact 
of the site, however, almost no mention was given to the European or global scale. In 
this regard, the justice issues presented here are locally or nationally based, in 
contrast to the international focus of NGO discourses outlined above. 
 
Policy discourses also exposed present day concern over radioactive contamination. 
Gregg Butler distinguished between local and localised threats of contamination, the 
difference between a whole area and distinct pockets, for example. Gregg gave the 
example of one particular hot spot, Freckleton on the River Ribble, where the mud 
had been found to contain higher than average levels of radioactive particles, though 
he did criticise the calculation of radioactivity levels and question the health risks 
they presented. He went on to identify such radioactive contamination, or the so-
called transferable detriment, as a primarily UK issue on the grounds that on a 
European or worldwide scale, the individual doses produced by Sellafield were the 
equivalent to natural radiation nanoseconds. He added, ‘there is nothing Sellafield… I 
am being careful here... but certainly on the sort of pan-Irish Sea to world-scale, 
there is nothing Sellafield has ever emitted which would be detectable in an 
epidemiology’. Thus, whilst radioactive contamination was mentioned, it was 
perceived as being a primarily national issue. This was also the case for 
Representative One from Energy Company One, who characterised high level spent 
fuel and intermediate level waste as relatively low hazard when compared with toxic 
wastes produced by other non-nuclear processes, suggesting that, ‘in the case of 
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radioactive waste, it does have a kind of emotional attachment to it and we over 
engineer it’. 
 
Further concerns arose concerning the cost of nuclear waste management, adding 
discourses of affordability to contemporary energy justice articulations in addition to 
those around electricity affordability in the case of Hinkley Point C, as highlighted in 
chapter 5. To this end, Oliver Epsom estimated that around £17 billion was spent in 
2014 cleaning up ‘the sort of mess we have got at Cumbria’. Echoing such concerns, 
Representative Two from Energy Company One expressed the opinion that the cost 
of disposing of nuclear waste ought to be taken into account in the pricing of nuclear 
energy. He stated, ‘if that means digging a very deep and safe hole and putting it 
there for many years, that should be included in the price. I think that the consumer 
has also got to realise that very little is free these days, especially in terms of waste’. 
 
Despite the somewhat mixed opinions from policy representatives outlined above, 
and in line with NGO discourses, the operations at Sellafield were understood to be a 
necessity. Bill Hamilton from the NDA stated in this regard, that ‘Sellafield has an on-
going role in the UK’s nuclear waste legacy’. With responsibility for the management 
of the interim storage of nuclear wastes, he explained that the NDA has identified 
Sellafield as the place it can be best stored, particularly high-level radioactive 
material and ‘exotic material’ from Dounreay.  
 
Joel Kenrick closed that ‘the ponds at Sellafield which are dealing with the new 
wastes are much better and more organised ponds than the ones that deal with the 
old waste’, expressing the opinion that operations have improved. Yet Joel also 
explained that legacy wastes as Sellafield present an on-going concern and the 
historical management issues at Sellafield were still extant today: 
 
‘It is absolutely horrifying. I went there in 2011 and got a tour and the ponds, 
the open-air ponds, which have nuclear waste in them, have seagulls in them 
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and are leaking. Then the new ones do look a lot better. The thing about 
Sellafield is that compared to the equivalent site in the US or elsewhere it is such 
a compact site, it is absolutely mad. You have got a couple of old nuclear 
reactors right beside your new waste storage place and then you have got a 
bunch of the old ponds that are all there, right beside the plutonium store’.  
 
In this regard, whilst policy respondents recognised the benefits of the site, its 
historical legacy and the consistent concern about radioactive contamination at 
Sellafield still appeared as significant discourses. 
 
6.1.1.3 Future Articulations 
 
Alongside evaluative accounts of past and current distributional justice 
manifestations at the Sellafield site, interview discussions also addressed the future 
handling of nuclear waste, including the potential for a Geological Disposal Facility. 
Within such discussions, the interviewees touched upon the themes of facility 
maintenance, technological feasibility, connections with new build nuclear stations, 
uncertainty, and growth and development. In discussing these future scenarios, the 
interviews included insight into perceived future distributional justice concerns 
around nuclear waste management. 
 
NGO respondents addressed three of the aforementioned themes, (1) facility 
maintenance, (2) technological feasibility, and (3) connections with new build nuclear 
stations. For NGO respondents, future distributional justice articulations included 
concerns around the processes of waste storage, disposal and reprocessing under 
the theme of facility maintenance. Andy Blowers expressed concern over the 
tendency to leave infrastructure standing, and not proceed with its 
decommissioning. He stated, to this end, that ‘you can say it will stand there forever, 
but it is a bit like the pyramids, you know something will happen. And of course, the 
longer it is left the more difficult it is to deal with. We cannot deal with it now so we 
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have to leave it, but if we leave it then it will be harder to deal with, so it is a Catch 
22 is it not?’. He continued that nobody knows exactly what the risks are as there are 
too many intervening variables. In this regard, Andy highlighted concerns over future 
accidents and discharges. Pete Wilkinson agreed, stating ‘if ever anything does go 
wrong, particularly with the high active liquor, then we are in big trouble’. Pete 
Wilkinson went on to express concern that the eventual decommissioning of the 
facilities at Sellafield would create heightened discharges from the plant and as a 
result, elevated levels of radioactive contamination. In this regard, NGO respondents 
expressed concern over the uncertainties of future nuclear waste handling, as is 
effectively summarised by the following quote from Pete Roche, Press Officer for No 
2 Nuclear Power: 
 
‘The people that want to bury the nuclear waste say “oh, we have got to sort 
this waste now because we do not want to leave it for future generations” but 
we say, “well there is no point in leaving future generations with a load of 
nuclear waste down a hole that is leaking into the surface environment, and you 
can not guarantee that that is not going to happen”. So, you still end up with 
this sort of “tis”, “tis not” argument. I think it has happened a bit with 
decommissioning nuclear power stations; you can either try to dismantle them 
as soon as they are shut by inventing lots of robotics, or, you can leave it for 60 
to 100 years before you start chopping it up, and then the radioactivity inside is 
much less. But then you have got the dilemma of leaving it for people who have 
had nothing to do with it, that had no jobs, no electricity. They might get a job 
chopping it up but then their health is being impacted in the future. So, it is a 
dilemma but it is definitely something that needs to be dealt with’. 
 
Thus, within this quote Pete reflects on whether it is just to pass the distributional 
burdens of nuclear waste on to future generations who have not received any 
distributional benefits.  
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NGO respondents also questioned the technical feasibility of the GDF, as well as 
justifications of why it should be hosted in Cumbria. Andy Blowers identified, for 
example, that ‘one of the great motivators of the GDF is that it provides a safe and 
secure solution forever and forever, actually, is an impossible concept’. Instead, Andy 
believed that there would be eventual leakage. Further, Pete Wilkinson noted in this 
vein that as over 90% of the radioactive burden in the country is at Sellafield, it 
creates an unbalanced debate about the siting of future repositories due to the 
potential logistics of moving the selected site. He closed, ‘the thought of actually 
moving that stuff a long way away from where it is currently stored, beggars belief’. 
In this regard, the future of Sellafield was perceived as directly bound by its historical 
operations and the long lifespan of nuclear waste. Ruth Balogh also explored this 
idea. She explained that when talking about plans for a GDF, a leader of the 
Copeland Council had once suggested that there was an ethical duty to hold the GDF 
in Cumbria as they have the waste already, and have the responsibility to keep it 
safe. However, Ruth perceived this as an untruth as she explained that the 
contributing reactors were going to be outside Cumbria, mainly, and so the Leader 
was incorrect, as more waste would be coming from external sources. In essence, 
that the GDF would include waste from new reactors, not only material already held 
in Cumbria, thus voiding the leader’s ethical stance. 
 
NGO respondents also highlighted connections between nuclear waste management 
and new build nuclear power. Jill Sutcliffe explained that her current involvement in 
a campaign group opposing the development of Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) 
was due to concerns about continued development of nuclear power despite the fact 
there was no solution to the waste issue. Ruth Balogh developed this point in more 
detail as she stated that according to CoRWM, the search for a GDF should be taking 
place independently of new build nuclear as a means of disposing of legacy wastes 
only, but that in fact these decisions had gone hand-in-hand. Pete Wilkinson added 
that ‘we have an obligation to … take on those ethical dimensions of the problem. To 
go into a new build program without knowing what you are going to do with this 
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highly radioactive waste, which remains dangerous for a very, very long period of 
time, which affects future generations, it is irresponsible in the extreme’.  
 
In addition, and going beyond material impacts, Martin Forwood suggested that with 
reprocessing set to end by 2020, the campaign group Cumbrians Opposed to 
Radioactive Environment may also cease operation, as their main campaign point 
ceases to exist. Instead, Martin believed that other groups would cover the issues 
they do not, as well as new developments. In this regard, the changing role of the 
plant through time had a direct effect on the perceived injustices stemming from the 
site, and therefore on the NGO campaigns being held against it. Pete Wilkinson 
reinforced this view by stating that ‘the object of the exercise as far as in government 
and the industry is concerned, is to create such a momentum to convince people it is 
going to happen and to make sure that there is support generated from the 
communities by talking about jobs and talking about infrastructure and how it is all 
going to be wonderful for the area. The fact is that it is going to change this area, 
change the character of this area, forever’. Thus, the focus of his work was to go into 
outlying areas – away from the plant itself where he perceived that support was high 
– to talk about what the response would be in the event of an offsite release of 
radioactivity, akin to those from Fukushima. In debates about the future of nuclear 
waste, then, Pete wanted to reach the people who did not give it too much thought. 
 
When considering future distributional justice manifestations, policy respondents 
offered more mixed evaluations of the Sellafield facility under three of the 
aforementioned distributional themes, (1) technological feasibility, (2) uncertainty 
and (3) growth and development.  
 
Steve Thomas, Professor of Energy Policy at the University of Greenwich, expressed 
concern about the technical feasibility of the GDF, including where we store 
intermediate level waste in the interim, the lack of robotic technology needed to 
handle waste within the facility and fundamentally, the cost of the procedure. As an 
 195 
additional example, Gregg Butler highlighted that the eventual closure of THORP and 
the decommissioning and clean-up operations of the facilities presented increased 
risk of non-negligible radioactive discharges: 
 
‘Yes, and this is one of the straight trade offs between the good of commerce 
and the bad of discharges in that they have not had any new spent fuel to 
reprocess in for a while and that is so they will essentially finish doing their 
backorders in 2018. At that point, there will be 2000 people with no jobs. It will 
not work quite like that, but I mean there are 2000 people in THORP and 
associated plants now, and once they have finished, they will essentially become 
redundant’. 
 
In addition, Gregg Butler warned of excess conservatism around radioactive 
discharge, where too much focus on finding new mechanisms to prevent them could 
delay decommissioning; he added, ‘at the ultimate level, you cannot store things 
forever and you cannot keep up societal control forever, so if you keep delaying you 
have got to say, well, what is the end point of my continued delay? The end point of 
my continued delay is a loss of control and the lot falling over’. Discussions included 
potential pollution from the Magnox reprocessing facilities, on-going potential from 
the THORP facility, and discharges from the wider site clean-up operation. Lynda 
Warren echoed such sentiments as she explained that ‘we should do the best we are 
doing now, not go with a “what if” based on every possible problem in the future. In 
the meantime, people could die of something else’. 
 
Two policy respondents also shared concerns about future uncertainty. 
Representative Two from Energy Company One expressed the view that, 
 
‘I think the government’s position of saying well, I am not quite sure when it is 
going to be ready so you have got to design your power station to be able to 
accommodate this waste until 20, 30, 40, 50 years or whatever. It is a little bit of 
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a concern because it adds an air of ambiguity, it adds an air of uncertainty and 
people do not like uncertainty. It would be really nice if the government could 
say “okay, the repository will not be ready in 2020, it will not be ready in 2025, 
but we can guarantee it will be ready in 2030, or even 2040”. But saying, “well, 
we are not quite sure” it does not help us and it is an issue we have got to 
manage. So as I have said, we have got to manage it very, very securely, very 
safely and all those sorts of issues’. 
 
In agreement with NGO discourses, then, policy respondents were also concerned 
about the uncertainties of future radioactive waste management, and the potential 
for accidents and radioactive contamination. Despite the appearance of concerns, 
however, three respondents also reflected positively on our future capacity to deal 
with nuclear waste issues. Hergen Haye believes, for example, that the industry has 
now learnt to build nuclear power stations with decommissioning in mind, and have 
far more clarity about what is in waste storage ponds, flasks or silos, therefore 
ensuring that future waste handling will be much more predictable. Further, Joel 
Kenrick explained that given that the waste exists and has to be dealt with, the real 
question was, ultimately, whether it is better to ship that to Sellafield where we 
know what is happening and deal with it there, or whether it better to store is 
somewhere, which may be less safe, or to deal with it in another way? Joel added:  
 
‘In a way I think this comes back to one fundamental issue of nuclear, which is 
that, I would not have started here but now I am here what do I do? And that is 
the problem really. We might not have wanted to have this waste in the first 
place, but now we do, what do we do with it? If you have got somewhere to deal 
with it and they have got excess capacity then why not deal with other people’s 
waste as well? I do not see any moral objections to that’.  
 
For Hergen Haye, the role of Sellafield also extended beyond waste and disposal to 
continuing the reprocessing of nuclear waste and developing a plutonium disposition 
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route, which could handle overseas waste from Korea and Japan, for example. His 
argument was contingent upon the creation of plutonium disposition facilities as he 
perceived it to be ‘a disgrace that we are sitting on 140 tonnes of plutonium, the 
largest stockpile anywhere in the world, and on financial terms we are not willing to 
move on that one. Because we do not move on that one we cannot reprocess any 
more and because you do not do that, you are basically losing your nuclear fuel cycle 
capability’. Hergen Haye’s encouragement for expansion of the operations at 
Sellafield sat alongside statements from Bill Hamilton who explained that further 
investment in non-nuclear endeavours included the dredging of Workington Harbour 
so that it can take larger ships. Bill added that in his opinion, all funding is designed 
with the transition to a sustainable future in mind. 
 
In contrast, Lynda Warren believed that the GDF option was safer, and that the 
construction of a GDF was no more challenging than a petrochemical plant. She 
added that whilst she anticipates unpopularity during the construction and waste 
transport phases due to noise and the high number of workers, the complaints 
would not be due to its radioactivity. Instead, they will emerge because it is a major 
infrastructural investment. Lynda had faith, then, that the GDF would be inert. She 
explained that a positive of the GDF is that it would not allow for people to do things 
differently. Lynda added that if something went wrong at the Dounreay facility, it 
could result in an immediate injury or dose of radiation for a worker, as well as a 
delay in decommissioning, whereas if the same thing were to happen with the GDF, 
it would take thousands of years for the hazard to return to the surface. 
 
In closing, both NGO and policy respondents reflected on the uncertainty of future 





6.1.1.4 Summary of Distributional Articulations  
 
Alongside a high level of evaluative detail, the results above provide three main 
insights into a complex set of discourses around the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in 
Cumbria. They have demonstrated, firstly, that distributional justice articulations 
vary through time. The results show clear changes in historical management 
practices on the perceived threat of radioactive contamination, the influence of 
current site handling and new discourses around the possibility of a Geological 
Disposal Facility, for example. In this regard, distributional justice manifestations vary 
according to the life cycle stage and processes within a site. Given that Sellafield was 
the first nuclear site in the UK and that it has been criticised for a surrounding lack of 
understanding and regulation compared to later sites, it is reasonable to assume, 
too, that the distributional justice outcomes are also an outcome of the timing of its 
development, and the ensuing mistakes and instances of poor practice. 
 
Secondly, the results demonstrate both variation and consistency in the 
distributional justice articulations according to actor in question, thus moving past 
typical pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear divides. In many instances, NGO respondents 
focussed on occurrences of ‘injustices’, points at which the site was perceived as 
negatively affecting the local area, whereas policy groups focused positively on the 
provision of ‘justice’ in terms of local benefits. However, the results also 
demonstrated united concerns over management practices and radioactive 
contamination. Thus, in the case of policy respondents, they demonstrate attention 
to ‘non-nuclear’, the promotion of jobs and economic development, for example, 
and more negatively perceived nuclear elements in terms of cost and radioactivity.  
 
Finally, the results demonstrated that in many cases, waste storage, reprocessing 
and disposal at Sellafield was perceived to be intimately linked with other stages of 
the nuclear system, including energy production and military uranium production, 
strengthening the case for whole-systems approaches to energy governance. 
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Summaries of the core themes emerging from the distributional articulations across 
time are presented in table 6.2. 
 
Time NGO Policy 
Past  Radioactive contamination 
 Health 
 Military usages 
 Radioactive contamination 
 Military usages  
 Jobs and economic prosperity 
Present  Jobs and economic prosperity 
 Radioactive contamination 
 The cost of nuclear waste 
management 
 Safety and emergency planning 
 Jobs and economic prosperity 
 Radioactive contamination 
 The cost of nuclear waste 
management 
Future  Facility maintenance 
 Technological feasibility 
 Connections with new nuclear 
stations 
 Facility maintenance 
 Uncertainty  
 Growth and development  
 
Table 6.2 Summary of Distribution Results by Sample Group 
 
 Justice as Recognition  
 
Across the two case studies, the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex and the Sellafield 
Nuclear Complex, 13 justice as recognition themes emerged from the interview 
discussions. In the Sellafield case, this included concern for populations affected by 
radioactive discharges, future generations, uranium miners, local communities, 
taxpayers and volunteer host communities for the GDF as specific groups of concern. 
Each of these groups is discussed here. Across the two sample groups the results 
show that, on the whole, both NGO and policy respondents were concerned with 
those negatively affected by the facility. These findings are explored throughout the 
following paragraphs.  
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As with the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex case study, the results of the interviews 
gave insight into the questions of not only ‘justice for whom?’ but also ‘justice by 
whom?’, the two headings used throughout this section. By considering the question 
of ‘justice by whom?’, the interview respondents highlighted who is perceived to be 
responsible for remediating injustices, or conversely, ensuring the continuation of 
just practices. In discussing this idea of responsibility the respondents advanced the 
typical application of justice as recognition, which, generally speaking, has focused 
on the recipient of benefits or ills only, not those who create them – an aspect of 
justice that is very pronounced in climate justice debates. In terms of attributing 
responsibility, both groups identified that government and industry were ultimately 
responsible for nuclear waste storage, disposal and reprocessing operations. 
Illustrative examples are provided in the following paragraphs. Throughout, the 
results are presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from policy 
respondents in order to highlight contrast between their given perspectives. 
 
6.1.2.1 Justice for Whom? 
 
Throughout the interviews, NGO respondents recognised three main social groups: 
(1) populations affected by radioactive discharges, (2) future generations, and (3) 
uranium miners. In so doing they demonstrated variations in their ‘justice as 
recognition’ discourses according to analytical themes of time and systems 
component. As with the results from the distributional justice articulations, NGO 
respondents focussed on occurrences of ‘injustices’, groups that were negatively 
affected by the operations at Sellafield. 
 
Speaking to the first theme, populations affected by radioactive discharges, Martin 
Forwood highlighted concern over the potential occurrence of childhood leukaemia in 
and around Seascale, the nearest village to the Sellafield facility. He drew attention to 
the 1980s Black Report, which concluded that radiation was a known cause of 
leukaemia, and stressed that the industry denies the connection between the site and 
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the illness. CORE’s concern extended to local workers too and Martin referenced a 
1991 report, which suggested that workers who were exposed to radiation before 
they conceived children could pass on genetic damage. Jill Sutcliffe echoed such 
concerns as she explained that whilst research in around 1956 demonstrated that 
radioactivity could cause instability and cell mutation within consecutive genetic 
groups, no major investigative work was undertaken. In this regard, Jill focused on 
communities that have been affected by radioactive contamination, but have not 
always been able to prove its connection or effect, the ‘down wind-ers’. Jill went on 
to identify the ‘sweet and sour effect’, workers who have a vested interest in the 
Sellafield complex due to their jobs and working and family relationships, but who 
face negative health outcomes as a consequence of their involvement. Within these 
examples, both Martin and Jill expressed concern for both those facing contemporary 
health impacts, as well as for future generations via the health impacts of radiation 
and the potential for genetic mutation in successive cohorts. 
 
Alongside the potential for health impacts on future generations, Jill Sutcliffe also 
highlighted the potential for inter-generational information deficits, contributing to 
the development of the future generations theme. In this example, Jill suggested that 
information on how the Windscale fire, Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters could be 
avoided, controlled or contained is not being passed on.  
 
Although future generations were recognised as an important group by all NGO 
respondents, Pete Wilkinson also stated that he has never been part of a discussion 
on how to recognise them and that he does not think he can be, as ‘it is too far 
ahead and people cannot really get their heads around justice or equity for future 
generations in this sort of debate’. Therefore, he considered that whilst there was a 
need to recognise them in theory, it was harder to do so in practice. In contrast, 
Andy Blowers developed a positive example of their recognition through his work 
with CoRWM. Andy was responsible for orchestrating a debate on the ethical issues 
of nuclear waste management, which he explained primarily concerned inter-
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generational equity. His view was that the nuclear industry had been highly sensitive 
to the idea of inter-generational responsibility via the idea of stewardship, and that it 
is this principle that underlies the drive towards a GDF. Thus, Andy framed the GDF 
as a future-generation-sensitive waste management option. 
 
Finally, NGO discourses also reflected the need to recognise the role of uranium 
miners and to offer compensation over the disadvantages they face as a result of 
toxic operations. Jill Sutcliffe highlighted, for example, that the UK’s only uranium 
mine, South Terras near St Stephen’s in Cornwall, was closed in approximately 1906, 
as it was not deemed to be viable. Instead, the international shipment of uranium for 
UK nuclear reactors comes from countries including Canada and South Africa, 
creating ‘a blind spot’ that the industry takes for granted. For Jill this included the 
failure of the UK’s nuclear justification process – a European Union regulation which 
requires companies building nuclear facilities to demonstrate that the benefits 
outweigh the potential health risks – to acknowledge uranium miners, despite them 
bearing the highest radioactive burden in the nuclear lifecycle due to the widespread 
impact of uranium tailings and radioactive dusts. Andy Blowers, who also argued that 
the costs of dealing with the uranium mining should be included in energy pricing, 
shared Jill’s concerns. Further, Ruth Balogh added that as some of the waste held at 
Sellafield belongs to Germany and Japan, the question of nuclear waste management 
becomes both a local and international issue. As a consequence, Pete Wilkinson 
considered that discussions about whether to compensate potential host 
communities for holding GDF opens the debate as to whether compensation is also 
due to communities that host radioactive waste today, whether from the front or 
back end of the nuclear lifecycle.  
 
Throughout the interviews, policy representatives also reflected on the question of 
‘justice for whom?’, identifying: (1) local communities, (2) populations affected by 
radioactive discharges, (2) future generations, (3) tax payers and (4) volunteer host 
communities for the GDF as specific groups of concern. Thus, as well as two distinct 
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groups of their own, policy respondents shared two groups of concern with the NGO 
discourses presented above – populations affected by radioactive discharges and 
future generations – and they continued the articulation of justice as recognition as 
concern for those negatively affected by the operations at Sellafield. 
 
When speaking to the first theme, local communities, Bill Hamilton (NDA) split his 
answer into two separate responsibilities. Firstly, he stated a need for the NDA to 
ensure that ‘the local community was suitably recognised and recompensed for the 
role it has played in firstly, the nuclear deterrent, and secondly, in producing 
electricity’. For Bill, this included acknowledgement of the WAGR and Calder Hall 
facilities as recognition of the local community’s role in keeping the lights on, and of 
the wider contribution of the area to the UK economy. Secondly, in anticipation of 
the eventual run down and closure of Sellafield, and as recognition of the socio-
economic role the facility has locally, he stated the need to include support for the 
communities undergoing future transitions. This included acknowledging the 
individuals who form part of the approximately 10,000 permanent and 2000 
contracted jobs from a widespread set of communities in Cumbria. In summary, his 
articulation of recognition was two-fold, (1) recognising the role of the site in the UK 
economy and (2) recognising the role of the local communities in the site. Bill’s 
second point referenced positive opinions on Sellafield’s contribution to the local 
area, as supported by assertions from Hergen Haye and Niall Riddell in section 
6.1.1.2.  
 
However, four respondents also reflected on controversy when it came to identifying 
the ‘local’ community. Niall Riddell suggested that within the Lake District in 
Cumbria, you tended to find relatively affluent communities, whereas the wider area 
of Cumbria, including Maryport down to Sellafield, was relatively disadvantaged 
because all industry apart from Sellafield had gone. For Gregg Butler, of the 10,000 
workers at Sellafield he identified that some are incomers that are there for the job 
and go home at the weekend, but that the majority are resident in the area. Yet 
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despite the high percentage of local workforce, he went on to describe that there 
was also opposition to Sellafield: those who ‘really, really want it to go away and will 
march to try and prevent it, and mainly with fairly short term aims like, “you bastards 
are not coming to build a repository under my village” –Gosforth amongst other 
places’. Given the existence of such differences, Bill Hamilton stated that there was 
some controversy around which groups to recognise. This included tensions between 
Copeland and Allerdale over the placement of the Energus Centre in Lilyhall, which 
lies 100m within Copeland, and therefore is not perceived to be of benefit to 
Allerdale residents. Further, he went on to reference complaints from the local 
community that investment has created ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, and to acknowledge 
that despite investment, pockets of deprivation remain. In this regard, policy 
respondents problematised social engagement and categorisation. 
 
Bill Hamilton went on to express that whilst they do give some funding, including 
sponsored apprenticeships, he emphasised too that the NDA was not a community 
development body. He stated shortly, ‘that is not my job’. According to Bill, the 
NDA’s solution to defining local communities is therefore to deal with government 
bodies only – including formal, elected representatives within the district and county 
councils. Lynda Warren went on to explain a different approach taken throughout 
the government’s Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) process, which also 
included explorations of the definition of local communities in a bid to aid the siting 
of the GDF. Speaking as one of the members of the CoRWM committee tasked with 
this challenge, she explained that the outcome was that they ‘simply did not know’. 
Thus, the government’s answer is that there is a range of things that are in some way 
representative of the population. For this theme there was recognition that the local 
community was not a homogenous group and that it was hard to define, with down-
the-line implications for consultation processes. 
 
In relation to the second theme, populations affected by radioactive discharges, the 
results from the interviews demonstrate that the answer to the question ‘justice for 
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whom?’ was, at times, consistent across both sample groups. By way of an example, 
Gregg Butler introduced the concept of Critical Groups and Critical Group Dose – the 
exposure of certain societal groups to harmful quantities of radiation. He introduced 
this as a localised phenomenon where particular members of the population had 
been identified as being at risk, including those living on houseboats around 
Freckleton Creek on the River Ribble, and fisherman around a nearby landfill site, 
Clifton Marsh, who may have been eating contaminated flounders. Despite 
expressing some doubt over the realities of the risks these groups actually faced, his 
example reflected the reoccurring theme of radiological risk and highlighted 
potentially vulnerable groups. 
 
In agreement with NGO discourses once again, policy respondents also referenced 
future generations. Gregg Butler highlighted his belief that ‘we will protect future 
generations as much as we protect our current one’. He went on to describe the 
‘conservative’ exposure levels that are currently worked to within plant operations, 
which he stated ‘is enshrined and is worked to’, adding ‘I think we are protecting 
future generations with nuclear to an extent unthinkable from any other industry’.  
 
Within this construction of ‘justice for whom?’ there were two groups of concern: (1) 
those exposed to radiation and (2) the future generations of affected peoples, 
whether they too are exposed or are genetically damaged. Hergen Haye extended 
this concern for future generations past those affected by radiation to include 
society in general, ‘if you talk about inter-generational then we should also think 
about building a society, for example, where climate change is taken seriously. That 
is as much building for future generations as determining what energy mix we have 
today and therefore what liabilities we may have to transfer into the future. So you 
have to weigh both of them up’. However, in line with NGO representative Pete 
Wilkinson, Lynda Warren highlighted that in her opinion whilst the issue of 
radioactive waste does raise questions of inter-generational equity, there is no 
correct way to deal with it. Instead, she stated that it is a value-based judgement 
 206 
based on where we are, and is combined with an understanding that the risks are a 
lot less if we make decisions now. Thus, again, the recognition of future generations 
in practice was problematised. 
 
For Robert Armour of Smarter Grid Solutions Ltd, the stakeholder of concern was 
more widely defined. He included attention to the third and fourth theme, those that 
subsidise the facility through their taxes, and those that are faced with the siting of a 
GDF to deal with existing nuclear wastes, which many communities are reluctant to 
host. He stated in relation to the last group that, ‘at that point the democratic line 
that says the rights of the individual must be protected, I think has to be tempered 
with the collective rights of the majority’. In sum, he gave his opinion that one 
community has to take the GDF for the benefit of the rest of the population. 
 
Overall these results demonstrate that across both actor groups, and within policy 
discourses in particular, there is no one group of concern, rather a range of groups. 
Moreover, some groups were more easily identified and defined than others. 
 
6.1.2.2 Justice by Whom? 
 
In addition to considering the question of ‘justice for whom?’, interview respondents 
also highlighted who they perceived to be responsible for energy justice, albeit more 
briefly. Consequently, the results advance the energy justice literature to question 
who is responsible for the inequity and/or its remediation. The results reflect on both 
evaluative and normative examinations as respondents considered (1) who is 
responsible (evaluative) and (2) who ought to be responsible (normative). Further, 
respondents reflected both on their own responsibilities and on those of others, 
acknowledging, therefore, that all groups represented in this research study – NGOs 
and policy – are involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice. 
Evidence supporting this assertion is given below. Throughout, the results are 
presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from policy respondents in 
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order to highlight contrast, or more pertinently in this case the similarities, between 
their given perspectives.  
 
Firstly, from an NGO perspective, Jill Sutcliffe highlighted that who is responsible for 
ensuring the provision of energy justice varies according to the stage of the nuclear 
system in question. This included input from policy oversight groups such as DECC, 
the ONR, the Department of Business, the Health Services Commissioner, and the 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. She identified that the number of different bodies 
who have some oversight was an issue in its own right, and that if you include all of 
the people, departments, companies, and regulators who are technically responsible 
for the oversight of nuclear power, members of the public are weighed down by an 
edifice of stakeholders involved, at all systems stages. She closed that this added to 
engagement challenges. Further reflecting on the perceived role of regulators, 
Martin Forwood returned to his concern for the genetic damage to workers caused 
by radiation exposure, and blamed a weak trade union at Sellafield for not properly 
protecting the health of its workers. 
 
Discussing the siting process and CoRWM’s involvement in the search for a GDF site, 
Andy Blowers stated that the search had to be based on a process of volunteerism 
and partnership, ‘deliberative democracy, openness, transparency, all those kinds of 
things. All these good buzzwords that we had in the late nineties and early 2000; but 
it is not quite as simple as that, because the decision ultimately, is one that is taken 
by the Secretary of State on the basis of what the infrastructure planning people say. 
It is not actually within the remit of the local people’. Andy Blowers went on to 
explain that Britain is highly centralised and as a result, the local government’s role is 
weak. In the case of nuclear, this means it has a consultative role but not a decision-
making role, ‘I mean the English system is powerless. It is completely bust. Centrally, 
yes, ultimate power does lie with the Secretary of State in Westminster’. Thus, again, 
Andy placed emphasis on policy respondents for energy-decision making although, in 
contrast to Jill this meant one person rather than a number of groups. 
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In slight contrast to Andy Blowers’ perspective, Ruth Balogh did highlight a role for 
local government, although not a positive one. Reflecting her opinion that it was 
difficult to have any voice in consultations, she stated that the Allerdale constituency 
was lucky to have a very good MP who could get parliamentary questions answered. 
In contrast Ruth believes that the Copeland MPs were pro-nuclear and as a result, 
were not open to hearing her perspectives. She added that ‘the MP for Copeland 
once threatened to issue a writ against me because of an article I wrote in the New 
Statesman about Sellafield’. Ruth added, however, that she is specifically trying to 
influence the government and the regulators because they are formulating policy, 
and she believes that within that policy, you have got to involve people from the 
outset or it is not going to work. She explained her view that it you are not interested 
in the dialectic, the dialectic will be interested in you. In this example, Ruth 
attributed responsibility for due process to the government in particular.  
 
Jo Smolton, who covered the issue of nuclear waste treatment as part of her 
campaign role for Stop Hinkley, stressed the dangers of not identifying who is 
responsible. She said, for example, that ‘all you hear about the waste story is “oh 
well, there is going to be a GDF”, “oh well, it is going to be dealt with, somebody is 
going to do something with it sometime and it will be fine” and “oh, we are assured”, 
and the guy who is assuring is not going to be around. How ethical is that?’. In this 
regard, Jo considered the ethics of decision-making now for future generations. Thus, 
she made clear that these decisions had to have an inbuilt accountability. 
 
Policy respondents also reflected on who is responsible for energy justice in their 
discourses. Representative Four from Energy Company One stressed that if you are 
the current operator of a facility and therefore the producer of waste, you have a 
moral and legal responsibility to ensure that it is safely stored and safely disposed of. 
Acknowledging that as an industry body they cannot make the Geological Disposal 
Facility happen, ‘we manage what we do have in the interim storage that we have 
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[and] we work hard to ensure that we are working on the waste hierarchy to 
minimise what has to go into that long-term storage in the first place’. 
 
Niall Riddell, an unattributed respondent stated in this regard that:  
 
‘We are going to be building a new nuclear asset and we want to be very 
successful at that. Therefore we should also probably be positioning ourselves to 
be the leader in decommissioning and managing the legacy wastes. With that 
comes the responsibility for the fact that we have employed 900,000 people 
directly within each of the power stations, which are often in remote locations 
and they in turn employ a whole bunch of local services and skilled workers 
within that area. If we want to have a true legacy with those assets then we 
should make sure that we are managing the life-cycle of those assets fully and 
ensure that we are providing jobs and opportunities for the people on those 
sites in the future, and managing responsibly the assets that we have built 
there. So yes, I think the answer to that is we do build in some of our strategy 
and some of our thinking, particularly around nuclear assets, because they 
obviously have this much longer life cycle’.  
 
Representative One from Energy Company One shared the opinion that the 
responsibility for managing nuclear waste whilst its in interim storage lay with the 
energy companies and that they ought to pay for it. However, they also added that in 
terms of policy and the provision of a national GDF responsibility, that rests with the 
government. 
 
Lynda Warren offered more critical reflections around who is currently responsible, 
and their successes in providing energy justice. She stated, for example, that ‘right 
now, the government and civil servants are scared and frightened of putting a foot 
wrong. They are paralysed and do not want to be seen as persuading people’. 
Further, she believed that although the decision was made to make the NDA and the 
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Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) responsible for 
nuclear waste decision-making she is doubtful they could do it. Lynda added that ‘a 
lot of experience form the NIREX days has led to issues around transparency and 
distrust, and now the people leading the charge are scientists with no experience of 
working with communities’.  
 
Finally, in contrast to Jill Sutcliffe’s statement above, Gregg Butler gave his opinion 
that the stakeholders involved in nuclear are very limited if you use the term 
stakeholders in the sense of people who have views and are willing to express them, 
rather than ought to have views and ought to be willing to express them. In this 
regard, he thought those that were engaged either come from the ‘plus two sigma 
box, who think it is absolutely bloody wonderful because “my lads work there”’, or 
those in the ‘minus two sigma box that think it is absolutely bloody dreadful and 
ought to be shut’. For Gregg, then, there was a belief that more people ought to be 
engaged than were. 
 
6.1.2.3 Summary of Justice as Recognition Articulations  
 
The results presented above provide a series of insights into justice as recognition in 
practice as they relate to the Sellafield Nuclear Complex. Firstly, they demonstrate 
that calls for justice as recognition vary according to the sample group in question. In 
this regard, operations at Sellafield were not perceived to be to the benefit or 
burden of any one particular social group, but in the case of this research, 13 groups. 
As outlined above, this included populations affected by radioactive discharges, 
future generations, uranium miners, local communities, populations affected by 
radioactive discharges, future generations, tax payers and volunteer host 
communities for the GDF as specific groups of concern. Throughout, these discourses 
addressed both who currently ‘is’ in focus and also who ‘ought’ to be, reflecting both 
evaluative and normative accounts of energy justice. 
 
 211 
Secondly, the results have given insight into not only who justice is for, but also who 
is responsible for it, therefore attributing responsibility. They demonstrate that 
whilst all groups represented – NGOs and policy (including the academic experts and 
industry representatives that are subsumed within this second category) – are 
involved in both the production and continuation of energy justice, industry and 
policy respondents are assumed to have a higher degree of responsibility. Within this 
framework, they are the providers of energy justice, and the NGOs the assessors. 
Respondents reflected both on their own responsibilities too, acknowledging, 
therefore, that all groups represented in this research study have a role to play in 
both production and continuation of energy justice. A summary of these findings is 
provided in table 6.3. 
 
Question NGO Policy  
Justice for whom?  Populations affected by 
radioactive discharges 
 Future generations 
 Uranium miners 
 Local communities 
 Populations affected by 
radioactive discharges 
 Future generations 
 Tax payers  
 Volunteer host 
communities for the GDF 
Justice by whom?  Industry 
 Policy 
 Industry  
 Policy 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of Justice as Recognition Results by Sample Group and Question 
 
 Procedural Justice  
 
Throughout the interviews, all respondents referenced and evaluated a range of 
procedural mechanisms through which decisions about the Sellafield Complex were 
made. The mechanisms mentioned included the following stakeholder engagement 
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and consultative exercises, which took place at the local, national and international 
scale: 
 
 The NIREX Inquiry into a GDF (1995-1996)  
 CoRWM Consultations (Stage One: 2003-2006) 
 DECC Managing Radioactive Waste Safely consultation (2009-2013)  
 Drop-in Sessions (intermittent) 
 Local Site Stakeholder Groups (quarterly) 
 DECC NGO Forums (beginning September 2010, occurring semi-annually) 
 NDA consultations (beginning 2010, occurring intermittently) 
 
For NGOs these discussions primarily took the form of critiques of their experiences 
of procedural engagement, including concerns over the exclusion of individuals and 
groups from the proceedings, when consultations took place, and the transparency 
and truthfulness of consultations. However, in addition to these critiques, four 
respondents also drew on positive experiences, offering insight into perceived ‘just’ 
processes. Policy respondents gave more mixed evaluations, reporting on both 
successful procedural mechanisms and areas of future development; within these 
discussions policy respondents appeared critical and open to alternatives. In the case 
of discussions around the potential for a GDF, this was taken as reflecting the role of 
the interviewees in an on-going and uncertain process.  
 
In addition to describing current and past procedural mechanisms, respondents also 
described potential improvements to the procedural systems, providing normative 
insight into how procedural justice might materialise. Section 6.1.3.1 introduces the 
evaluative constructions before section 6.1.3.2 discusses normative constructions. 
Throughout, the results are presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly 




6.1.3.1 Evaluation of Procedural Mechanisms  
 
For NGO respondents evaluating past and current procedural mechanisms, the 
primary focus was on their legitimacy. These discussions largely took the form of 
negative reflections on their experiences of procedural engagement, including 
concerns over (1) the exclusion of individuals and groups from the proceedings, (2) 
consultation timings, and (3) the transparency and truthfulness of consultations. 
Each of these themes is discussed here before a consideration of policy articulations. 
 
As an example of the first theme, the exclusion of individuals and groups from 
procedural engagements, Ruth Balogh reflected on her experiences with the MRWS 
process for identifying a GDF. Within this, she said that local councils had to be 
persuaded by the government that NGOs should be included in the decision-making 
process, and that ‘they regard us as the enemy’. She added that ‘what you have to 
understand about the way the nuclear industry operates around here is that 
anything it is involved in will not tolerate dissent’: 
 
‘What is really awful about this situation here is there is a lot of people do it 
themselves for the authorities – they say, “oh I do not think I can have you meet 
in our village hall” you know, “we better not let you have space in the hall 
because you might say something against the nuclear industry”. So what? So a 
lot of people just presume that is the dominant discourse and that is how it has 
to be and they have to be part of implementing the dominant discourse, and 
that really gets me a bit cross!’. 
 
This is despite Ruth’s opinion that some positive changes have been made as the 
process is at least being rehearsed in the open; the difficulties have shifted as she 
stated that now ‘you may have a voice, but do you get listened to? Probably not’. 
Thus, Ruth concluded that despite positive advancements further steps were 
required. 
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Martin Forwood also reflected on the recognition of his own NGO group and its role 
in the decision-making process. Martin stated that CORE ‘experienced verbal and 
physical rough handling from the outset’, including vandalism to cars that had an 
anti-nuclear sticker in the window. Further, at the local stakeholder meetings held 
around Sellafield, CORE was often the only opposition group and therefore, ‘the 
black sheep’. Indeed, Martin recalled that the meeting groups are primarily formed 
of Sellafield workers and union members with very opposing views to those of CORE. 
They argued in favour of reprocessing operations and against the GDF on the 
understanding that it put the nuclear waste resource underground. Martin perceived 
that the local authority members held the same position, including in particular the 
Copeland Council, which houses Sellafield. He added that they have ‘historically 
rubber stamped everything that Sellafield has done and have brought Allerdale along 
too’.  
 
Martin also spoke to his experiences of consultations for the GDF, the first of which 
was the NIREX Planning Inquiry in the mid-1990s, within which Cumbria County 
Council voted against the GDF on the grounds of insufficient investigatory work and 
poor information disclosure. The MRWS process which, according to Ruth Balogh was 
the most in-depth consultation that has ever taken place in the UK, was later initiated 
by DECC and took place between 2009 and 2013. The final decision of the MRWS 
process was presented in January 2013. Within, plans for a GDF were approved by the 
Copeland and Allerdale areas but vetoed at the higher Cumbria County Council level. 
Martin explained that if the consultations do not find a suitable site now, the 
government would select one, a process that he perceives to be unfair. He spoke to 
an alleged nuclear bias in the government in DECC, which, in his opinion, is leaving 
local groups disenfranchised. Ruth Balogh also reflected on the complexity of these 
decision-making processes as she explained that whilst Allerdale and Copeland are 
next door to each other, Cumbria County Council acts as an overarching entity, 
meaning that every consultation must be accessed by each group. Further, taking a 
wider lens, Andy Blowers questioned the local vs. national divide as he stated ‘do you 
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allow the centre of your activities to have a kind of ultimate veto, or is it the wider 
area? I mean, the point is you will never get anywhere with finding a site for nuclear 
waste because there is always something that is going to… I mean, I am still struggling 
with others in government to try and see a way forward’. 
 
Such legitimacy concerns also extended to the role of the organisations involved in 
nuclear oversight more generally. As one example, Pete Roche, reported that whilst 
the Committee or Radioactive Waste Management were initially one of the most 
forward thinking public consultation bodies, the government ‘just ignored a lot of 
their recommendations and sacked all the good members of the committee’. Thus, 
Pete gave the opinion that not only NGOs were excluded, but policy bodies were too. 
Indeed, considerations of the first theme, the exclusion of individuals and groups 
from procedural engagements, extended to the issue of scale more overtly as Andy 
Blowers questioned which level was most appropriate for decision-making: 
 
‘I think people will always say they were excluded, but how can you say they 
were excluded in the Cumbrian situation when the reason it did not proceed was 
because Cumbria County Council voted not to proceed? That represented a very 
wide area. I would say in one sense it was very widespread, not including 
everybody obviously, but there were all sorts of techniques we used, and on the 
other hand you could say it was too narrow because it did not home in enough 
on the areas that really cared, and this is always going to be the problem’. 
 
On the second theme, consultation timings, Ruth Balogh also referred to her 
experiences of the 2008 MRWS consultation on the potential siting of a GDF, which 
she thinks ‘compromised the process for the future’. Ruth gave the opinion that the 
local councils colluded in favour of being the host communities for the GDF as, two 
weeks after the 2008 White Paper on Managing Radioactive Waste Safely was issued, 
Copeland Council had already expressed an interest in hosting the facility without 
consulting the local population. Ruth went on to explain that in contrast, Allerdale 
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Council did do some consultation, as did the Cumbria County Council. According to 
Ruth, however, after Copeland came forward no one else needed to volunteer and 
the process became immediately compromised, despite the fact that the area was 
not geologically suitable. She added in relations to the MRWS consultation, ‘I do not 
think anybody is going to take it seriously now, because it was so poorly designed’. In 
this regard Ruth highlighted her belief that the order of the decision-making process 
was incorrect and as an outcome, damaging for future consolations.  
 
Reflecting on the order of process, Martin Forwood went on to state that he no 
longer gives long responses to the consultations because he knows that they will not 
be read. Martin added: 
 
‘At public consolations held by the NDA and DECC you always get the feeling 
that they are consulting after a decision has been made and because they have 
to’. 
 
Pete Wilkinson, who questioned the ability to inform government policy, shared 
these views: 
 
‘You can talk about all the issues that arise form the policy but you cannot 
question the policy. The policy has been set and no matter who you speak to, 
whether it is ONR, NDA or the Environment Agency or whoever else, they will 
say, “we will talk about anything you want but we can not talk about policy 
because policy’s set by government”. So, you know, you have got this very neat 
situation where the policy is set in what I consider to be a totally undemocratic 
way and once the policy is set, it is untouchable’.  
 
Pete added that whilst the regulator’s – the NDA and ONR’s – job is to look after 
safety and security, he got the impression that the assessment processes that they 
go through are very routine, and that their overriding desire is to make sure that 
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they enable the policy to go through. Within this, he questioned the legitimacy of 
claims that the radioactive waste management plans for new nuclear are in place, 
adding, ‘it might be there on paper what they want to do, but how they can actually 
put that into operation is a million miles away because we do not even have a host 
community yet’. Referencing the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates, who posed a 
series of issues and questions about disposal, he went on to state that ‘none of the 
backend issues to do with radioactive waste have been resolved, yet minsters still 
say that the situation is sufficiently stable for them to go ahead with a minimum of 
ten GW of new build. I mean the whole thing is absolutely crazy, absolutely 
ridiculous’.  
 
Finally, Ruth Balogh focused on the overlaps of energy production and nuclear waste 
handling. Ruth explained that according to CoRWM’s commentary during the MRWS 
consultation, the search for a GDF should take place independently of discussions 
around new build nuclear because there is a large stockpile of waste that already 
needs to be handled. She stated that solving the waste dilemma should be resolved 
before any new build plants are build, but: 
 
‘That is completely thrown out of the window, you know, the government’s not 
interested in that. What it wants is a solution to the existing problem of waste in 
order to support its new build programme, so they went hand-in-hand. So there 
you have got a justice issue that was compromised from the outset, and that 
was really the main reason for not taking part in that; because, it was a 
justification for the building of new nuclear plant’.  
 
In summary then, NGO reflections on the second theme, consultations timings, 
appeared as critiques of the order in which decision-making processes are 
undertaken, where, in the opinions of the interviewees outlined above, consultations 
were frequently undertaken after the fact. 
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Finally, on the third theme, the transparency and truthfulness of consultations, Pete 
Wilkinson explained that for the most recent MRWS consultation on the potential of 
a waste repository in Copeland and Allerdale, the word safety was only mentioned 
around once. ‘What they talked about is the surface footprint of it, what it would 
look like, how many jobs it would create – they talked about everything but if the 
damn thing was safe! They did not mention once that the NDA are sitting on 150 odd 
potentially show stopping outstanding technical and scientific problems associated 
with disposal. They just try to side step the issues’. Echoing Pete Wilkinson’s 
sentiment, Ruth Balogh, identified that one of her major procedural concerns was a 
lack of awareness about the facilities it houses; 
 
‘One of the things I have found out people did not really know was that it was 
only a nuclear waste site, people think it is a nuclear power plant – it is wrong, 
there is not a nuclear power plant there at all, there is a reprocessing facility 
which does not work properly, and there is a lot of highly dangerous nuclear 
waste’.  
 
Ruth said, in this regard, that ‘it is not a question of transparency; it is more a 
question of confusing people and telling them lies’. Ruth also commented that the 
MRWS process was very longwinded and deliberative, as attempts to get people 
involved and do things in a public and transparent way meant blind alleys, 
superfluous material and ‘an awful lot of dross’. For Ruth, then, there was a balance 
between the need for widespread consultation and an efficient and streamlined 
consultative process. Finally, Ruth added that whilst there were aspects of the 
process that appeared trustworthy, including the fact that an independent facilitator 
organised the meetings, they did not have an independent chair, and ‘sometimes the 
chair quite clearly held sway’. Jill Sutcliffe, who also participated in the CoRWM 
process, agreed that the non-transparency of information made the consultation 
process more difficult to access. Further, she referenced consultation fatigue and 
stated that despite some successes in the CoRWM process, ‘it was very hard to keep 
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up when you are on the outer circle; you are running against a very heavy headwind’. 
This included concern for failings in the translation of technological issues. Jean 
McSorley added that the nuclear industry is perceived to be arrogant and secretive, 
because almost all of its activities can be shielded from public and Parliamentary 
scrutiny under the Official Secrets Act. 
 
Throughout the interviews then, all NGO respondents reflected negatively on 
incidents of procedural engagement and negatively on their legitimacy. Yet, despite 
these critiques, four respondents also drew on positive experiences, offering insight 
into perceived ‘just’ processes. Martin Forwood felt that at times CORE’s voice had 
been heard, and that as an consequence there was grudging acceptance that the 
group was useful for keeping the industry on their toes, where they were respected 
for presenting accurate and reliable opposition. Further, Pete Wilkinson reflected on 
the Joint Fact-Finding exercise implemented by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd during the 
BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue. The Joint Fact-Finding exercise explored, in 
part, the necessity, potential health impacts, and cost of end of pipe technology to 
reduce the discharges from Sellafield into the Irish Sea. Through the process, a team 
of relevant experts were appointed to discuss nuclear management, including 
individuals with both a pro and anti-nuclear stance. Pete Wilkinson, an anti-nuclear 
NGO participant in the process, concluded that, ‘although you disagree on your 
positions, you can actually bring a polarised debate much closer together’.  
 
Pete Wilkinson also reflected on his engagement with the CoRWM public 
engagement exercises, where he believed that through a comprehensive public and 
stakeholder engagement program ‘we not only engaged stakeholders, we also 
engaged the public through CoRWM’. He added, ‘the eye-opening thing for me was 
when you took ordinary members of the public on this sort of rapid information 
programme about radioactive waste – we saw them week after week after week, we 
had four or five weekends in a row with the same people, so their learning curve was 
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very steep – they realised that there is nothing you can really do constructively with 
radioactive waste apart from dump it in a hole somewhere or store it indefinitely’. 
 
Continuing the theme of positive recollections of procedural engagement, Andy 
Blowers gave the example of his 1990s work with RWMAC and later CoRWM, who he 
thought had a big influence on opening up the debate on nuclear energy, though he 
did acknowledge ‘that was the window of opportunity when the nuclear industry was 
in retreat’. Later in his career following the MRWS process Andy had tried to 
convince some of his anti-nuclear colleagues that the MRWS process was effective. 
Andy added that ‘you will always proclaim that people were not consulted, but they 
made a huge effort I think through deliberation, forms of engagement, all kinds of 
things’. Finally, Ruth Balogh drew attention to the work of CoRWM, which she stated 
was rooted in notions of justice and gave an ethical position on inter-generational 
concerns. She added, ‘you do not normally find that in policy documents on nuclear 
waste. Whether you agree with it or not is another matter but yes, at least it was 
being open about what its ethical position was on certain aspects of nuclear policy’. 
Thus, NGO respondents began to construct visions of just procedural engagement.  
 
During the interviews, policy representatives were also asked to evaluate procedural 
mechanisms. In the resultant discourses policy respondents highlighted both positive 
examples of procedural engagement successes, as well as considering the difficultly 
of procedural engagement overall. Thus, policy respondents offered more mixed 
responses to articulations of procedural justice, reflecting on the themes of (1) 
successful exercises, (2) consultation timings, and (3) scale.  
 
On the first theme, successful exercises, Gregg Butler provided a positive account of 
procedural justice as he reflected on the BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue Joint 
Fact-Finding Exercise, outlined above by Pete Wilkinson. Gregg stated that one 
outcome of the project was a process that led to the BNFL installing the end of pipe 
technology at a lower than anticipated cost. He labelled the exercise a ‘seminal 
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experience’, adding that, ‘people who have not had that sort of … revelatory 
experience just talk past each other and say “tis”, “tis not”, “it is red”, “no it is not, it 
is blue” and nobody gets anywhere’. In this regard, this mechanism was perceived as 
a useful tool for meaningful collaboration from both pro and anti-nuclear ends of the 
spectrum. Gregg explained that this process was also seen to have influenced later 
stakeholder engagement exercises as, for example, the favourably looked-upon 
Managing Radioactive Waste Safely exercise in West Cumbria which utilised some of 
the same facilitators and convenors that worked on the BNFL dialogue. In this regard, 
there was some evidence that positive procedural justice elements had been 
continued and that experiential learning had been passed on. 
 
Bill Hamilton of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority explained and defended the 
role of Site Stakeholder groups, which are funded by the NDA and attended by 
representatives including local councillors, Sellafield’s trade union, and the Parish 
and County Councils. The groups meet on a regular basis to explore any on-going 
issues around the Sellafield site. Bill explained that the group is run by an 
independent secretariat to ensure impartiality, attended by senior representation 
from Sellafield Ltd, and that they are entirely open to the public, including many 
members that have been working with nuclear in West Cumbria for many years. For 
Bill, this ensured multi-generation representation. Gregg Butler also referenced the 
Sellafield Site Stakeholder Committee, but instead of focusing on the positives of 
long-stayed representatives, expressed concern that the committee does not get 
regularly refreshed, can stagnate, and as a result, can cease to represent the local 
population.  
 
Reflections on the role of the Site Stakeholder Committees also prompted 
consideration over the differing forms of engagement according to the lifecycle stage 
of each station. Gregg Butler reflected that once the facility has started its operation, 
having a Site Stakeholder Committee was sufficient. Giving an example with some 
comedic value, he went on to state that ‘in a steady state there is not much point in 
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stirring up lots of interest when there is nothing to stir up interest about: “How many 
terawatt hours did you produce this year?” “ten”. “Oh, that is interesting, how many 
did you produce last year?” “ten”. “How many are you going to produce next year?” 
“Oh, ten”’. This point illustrates Gregg’s perspective that whilst on-going procedural 
mechanisms are required there are specific junctures or points of change within a 
facility’s lifespan at which they become more important. 
 
For Bill Hamilton, future procedural justice articulations primarily concerned the 
potential development of a GDF. Bill gave his opinion that that at the end of the most 
recent MRWS consultation process, the Cumbria County Council chose to override 
Copeland and Allerdale’s votes of support. As such, DECC and Radioactive Waste 
Management, a subsidiary of the NDA, was now leading the search across the rest of 
England and Wales for a potential host site. At the stage of these interviews, prior to 
January the 1st 2016, community leaders were currently volunteering areas through 
the Managing Radioactive Waste Safely process, on the understanding that at the 
end, the area might volunteer to host the facility.  
 
Finally, recollections of positive engagement not only referred to set consultation 
exercises but also the evolving role of organisations. Bill Hamilton characterised the 
NDA as an impartial group that could rectify the past procedural mistakes of the 
BNFL management, which he stated, operated with ‘company sensibility’, focusing 
on profit and loss. In contrast, Bill explained that the NDA focussed on strategically 
working with partners, including the local communities, parishes etc. to aid a major 
transformational process, including granting funding for local projects. This new 
focus was seen to provide opportunity for remedial engagement. 
 
Despite positive characterisations, however, policy respondents also recognised that 
stakeholder engagement was recognised as a very challenging process for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, there was the reoccurring nature of some of the discussions. Steve 
Thomas recalled that he was hearing the same discourses that were occurring 40 
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years ago, including promises that ‘the transmutation of high-level waste is just 
around the corner and that will solve the high level waste problem’. Gregg Butler 
reinforced this concern as he stated that ‘there is very little in nuclear that is ever 
going to surprise anybody because somebody is going to have tried all the 
arguments. So, I must admit, it gets all gets a bit sterile when you have done it for 
the 14th time’. Further, Gregg recognised that funding tended to disappear in 
between major upheavals. He added that ‘the whole thing about it is the stakeholder 
engagement is bloody difficult. It takes a lot of work, so where is the money coming 
from for a start? And where is the money coming from in the years between major 
upheavals? If you had carried on properly in between the major upheavals, if there is 
a major upheaval you have got something to fall back on. You have got people that 
trust people, you have got people that know people, who know who to talk to’. 
Gregg added in his capacity as an ex-industry respondent that during some 
consultation exercises he has been involved in in an advisory role, ‘you certainly got a 
feeling that, as far as the top brass in both organisations are concerned, we are doing 
stakeholder engagement because it says we have to. Here is a box, we have got to 
tick it’.  
 
Further, Lynda Warren reflected on CoRWM’s involvement with the implementation 
of the GDF. Lynda explained that due to opposition caused by failed planning 
enquiries in the past, and because of the success of the approach when taken 
overseas, the siting process was now based on volunteerism. She cautioned, 
however, that evidence demonstrates that the overseas approach does not apply 
here, adding that Europeans, including Sweden and Finland, have more faith in their 
regulator, whereas the UK as a nation ‘tends towards distrust’. In addition, she 
explained that local communities do not have the same power as the French or the 
Finnish communities. Thus, the socio-political landscape of Britain was, for Lynda, 
inhibiting decision-making on the GDF. Further, Lynda offered the opinion that so far 
the government has always started with the wrong approach to the GDF process: if 
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you believe it is safe, ‘you have got to market it as an opportunity, not as something 
to compensate’. 
 
The third theme for the policy discourses was scale: more specifically, the scale at 
which energy decision-making should occur. Lynda Warren explained, for example, 
that the stakeholder engagement process undertaken depends on the scale in 
question. Lynda developed the example that for the countrywide National Policy 
Statement, anyone and everyone could be involved. She reflected that at this level 
the discussions are easier because they are considering generalities, not sites, and 
gave the example of the CoRWM public engagement process, a three-year, and 
several million pound countrywide consultation on radioactive waste management. 
Although there was no agreement on the outcomes of the final report, she said there 
was respect about the process that went in to the outcomes, and therefore, the 
process was deemed successful. In contrast, Development Consent Orders require 
consultation in more localised areas, where they are asking for concerns around 
those who are affected, and therefore have interest in the process. Lynda explained 
that the same is true of Cumbrian decision-making during the GDF siting process as 
the local council, Copeland, said yes, the county council said no and the government 
said yes. In terms of the structures of group representation, one idea within CoRWM 
was to act as an elected body with membership from each representative scale, but 
they could not agree or get approval on this. Lynda closed by questioning that if the 
GDF were to be sited in Manchester, do you also speak to people along the transport 
route? If this were to happen Lynda thinks the government could exercise 
compulsory purchase along the transport routes.  
 
Gregg Butler referenced Article 46 of the Euratom treaty, for example, which 
requires international consultation on nuclear developments, including his example 
of Irish objections to Sellafield. He stated in relation to the necessity of this 
engagement that: 
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‘We do to the extent we need to and of course, if the arguments next door to the 
site are fairly polarised with the rest of the UK, they are going to be totally 
polarised by the time you get to say France, or Germany. They might be 
polarised in totally different directions in the two, so if you went into an 
enormous international consolation … how on earth would you reconcile those? 
And what difference would it make to what you were going to do anyway?’ 
 
Finally, Joel Kenrick also expressed the difficulty of consultation scale. Firstly he 
explained that he assumed those in need of participatory engagement were the local 
community, which he characterised as being both those who lived nearby and those 
who were affected by the facility. However, he also discussed the difficulty of 
working within national boundaries as he asked, ‘what should the role of the Irish be 
in decided what can or cannot happen at Sellafield? Or what should the role of 
anybody who is actually anyone that is in a pretty large area of the UK who could be 
impacted if something went seriously wrong?’.  
 
In summary, evaluations of procedural mechanisms around the Sellafield site 
appeared as both accounts of successes and failures, and as appreciation of the 
difficulty of ensuring participation. 
 
6.1.3.2 Normative Improvements 
 
In addition to describing current and past procedural mechanisms both NGO and 
policy respondents also described potential improvements to the procedural 
systems, albeit more briefly. In so doing the respondents provided normative insight 
into how procedural justice might materialise and drew attention to the core values 
that underpinned these mechanisms, building on the positive accounts of procedural 
engagement outlined above. Further research could engage with this theme in more 
depth. The results are presented firstly from NGO respondents and secondly from 
policy respondents. 
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Jill Sutcliffe, a member of the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates and an NGO 
respondent, stated that knowledge transfer and knowledge independence are core 
aspects of her construction of energy equity. Developing the idea of knowledge 
transfer in more depth, she gave the example of good practice in Port Hope, Canada, 
which is sited next to uranium mining tailings. There she identified that the 
community employed their own scientists to keep the community up to date with 
the risks of the site, with the intention of encouraging open, transparent and 
accessible engagement. She recalled that as a consequence of this model, trust has 
been built with the community. Jill believed that the DECC geological disposal 
process could adopt a similar framework where the community controls the funds 
and employs their own independent scientists. For Jill this meant that engagement 
would not just be top-down, and therefore it provided the opportunity to shift the 
power balance.  
 
Pete Wilkinson added that his idea of successful procedural engagement is based on 
the idea of openness and transparency, which although it is a bit of a mantra and can 
be interpreted differently by different people, ‘it should be defined as what it 
actually means and people should adhere to it and be open and transparent. Make 
sure you have as many stakeholders’ constituencies as you can get, start with as 
blank a piece of paper as possible and do not railroad people. Let them come to their 
own decisions about it in an open and frank way and live with the result’. 
 
Both Lynda Warren and Gregg Butler gave policy perspectives on how we ought to 
engage. Lynda began by stating that in hindsight, she would restart the GDF process 
entirely with no NIREX and no NDA connection. Instead, she would focus on public 
engagement-based expertise. Lynda also made a case for the importance of oral 
histories in energy operation and decision-making, reinforcing the importance of 
knowledge transfer outlined by Jill above. She explained that the legacy of bad waste 
management at Sellafield reflects, in her opinion, how we all used to deal with 
waste. She recollected that as a child she would drop litter on the ground, thinking it 
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was someone else’s job to clear it up. In the nuclear context, this means that during 
the design process no one has thought about how to deal with waste, and in the 
planning process no one has taken account of human nature. As a further example, 
Lynda explained that during the decommissioning process at Dounreay, an old 
worker had to be called in to demonstrate how the equipment actually worked not 
how it was recorded to have worked.  
 
 Gregg Butler reflected at length on potential improvements to procedural 
engagement mechanisms. Gregg began by suggested an Inspectorate of Stakeholder 
Management, an independent body to assess the efficacy of stakeholder 
engagement. This body was seen as an opportunity to provide impartial and 
knowledgeable insight and overcome the problem that, ‘I do not think the general 
consciousness in government of what real stakeholder engagement feels like and 
looks like is very high, it is not surprising that they set things up with the best of 
intentions but they do tend to get a lot of lip service, or a lot of “here are the boxes, 
what do I have to tick the box? I will tick the box”’. Gregg went on to explain that the 
key thing is stakeholder dialogue, and being up front about what is up for debate; ‘it 
is absolutely dreadful to go in to stakeholder dialogue knowing what the answer is 
going to be’; ‘the worst thing you can possibly do – it is worse than having no 
stakeholder dialogue at all – is to go to stakeholders with a fait accompli without 
telling them, or even with telling them’. 
 
Gregg Butler also reflected positively on the process of Stakeholder Preference 
Mapping whereby you can look at responses to consultations as a tool that can be 
used during later exercises. Gregg explained that throughout this process, which was 
used during the BNFL stakeholder dialogue, you can group likeminded stakeholders 
and identify what kind of groups they are, including those interested in transport, 
socio-economic development, those wanting specific outcomes etc., ‘so, depending 
on whom you are asking and when, you could tell the government what they are 
going to get’.  
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6.1.3.3 Summary of Procedural Articulations  
 
Alongside a high level of evaluative detail, the results of this section have provided 
key insights into the manifestation of procedural justice in practice. They have 
demonstrated that articulations of procedural justice vary through time and 
according to the actor in question. NGO respondents critiqued their experiences of 
procedural engagement, including concerns over the exclusion of individuals and 
groups from the proceedings, when consultations took place, and the transparency 
and truthfulness of consultations. Policy respondents gave more mixed evaluations, 
reporting on both successful procedural mechanisms and areas of future 
development; within these discussions policy respondents appeared critical and 
open to alternatives.  
 
Secondly, extending the theme of time further, the results also demonstrate that 
procedural justice manifests as both evaluative statements concerning what is done, 
and normative statements reflecting on what ought to be done. Here, normative 
constructions of procedural justice reflected on the themes of openness, 
transparency, knowledge transfer, knowledge independence and the order of 
decision-making. In reflecting on how we ought to engage, the respondents gave 
insight into the perceived core values of just energy decision-making. Thus, overall, 
the findings have illustrated that the procedural justice concept, and the concept of 
energy justice more generally, can play a role in current and future energy decision-
making. Summaries of the core themes emerging from the procedural justice 








Sample Group NGO Policy 
Evaluative  Exclusion of individuals and 
groups from the proceedings 
 Consultation timings  
 Transparency and 
truthfulness of consultations. 
 Successful exercises 
 Consultation timings  
 Scale 
Normative  Knowledge transfer and 
knowledge independence 
 Openness and transparency  
 Public engagement-based 
expertise 
 Knowledge transfer 
 Impartial oversight  
 Consultation timings 
 




This chapter has presented results from the second of two case studies – the 
Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria – thereby addressing the main research 
question of this thesis, ‘how do elite actors within the nuclear energy system 
articulate energy justice?’ from a waste storage, reprocessing and disposal 
perspective. It has done so by exploring energy justice articulations across three 
tenets: distributional justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice. 
Throughout, all evidence was presented with attention to the analytical themes of 
time and actor, allowing later comparisons across the third variable of investigation, 
systems component through a comparison with the first case study, energy 
production. The evidence has demonstrated the utility of this methodological 
approach in identifying the primary energy justice discourses surrounding the 
Sellafield Nuclear Complex.  
 
Within the tenet of distributional justice the results above provide three main 
insights into a complex set of discourses around the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in 
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Cumbria. They demonstrated, firstly, that distributional justice articulations vary 
through time as discourses emerged around legacy waste, contemporary 
management, and future handling, including the potential to move the waste from 
Sellafield into a Geological Disposal Facility. In this regard, the issue of nuclear waste 
management appeared to take a distinctive inter-generational pattern, looking both 
forward and back, illustrating clear changes in historical management practices on 
the perceived threat of radioactive contamination, the influence of current site 
handling and new discourses around the possibility of a Geological Disposal Facility, 
for example. In this regard, distributional justice manifestations vary according to the 
life cycle stage and processes within a site.  
 
Secondly, the results demonstrate both variation and consistency in the 
distributional justice articulations according to actor in question, thus moving past 
typical pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear divides. In many instances, NGO respondents 
focussed on occurrences of ‘injustices’, points at which the site was perceived as 
negatively affecting the local area, whereas policy groups focused positively on the 
provision of ‘justice’ in terms of local benefits. Within this framework, NGOs were 
typically understood to be the recipients of just or unjust practices, and policy groups 
as the providers. However, the results also demonstrated united concerns over 
management practices and radioactive contamination. Thus, in the case of policy 
respondents, they demonstrate attention to ‘non-nuclear’, the promotion of jobs 
and economic development, for example, and more negatively perceived nuclear 
elements in terms of cost and radioactivity.  
 
Finally, the results demonstrated that in many cases, waste storage, reprocessing 
and disposal at Sellafield was perceived to be intimately linked with other stages of 
the nuclear system, including energy production, uranium mining, and military 




For the second tenet, justice as recognition, the results of the interviews gave insight 
into the questions of not only ‘justice for whom?’ but also ‘justice by whom?’. Firstly, 
the results demonstrate that calls for justice as recognition varied according to the 
sample group in question. In this regard, operations at Sellafield were not perceived 
to be to the benefit or burden of any one particular social group, but rather a range 
of groups. By considering the question of ‘justice by whom?’, the interview 
respondents highlighted who is perceived to be responsible for remediating 
injustices, or conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. In discussing this 
idea of responsibility the respondents advanced the typical application of justice as 
recognition, which, generally speaking, has focused on the recipient of benefits or ills 
only, not those who create them. In terms of attributing responsibility, the results 
demonstrate that whilst everyone was perceived to share responsibility for injustice, 
both groups identified that government and industry were ultimately responsible for 
nuclear waste storage, disposal and reprocessing operations. Within this framework, 
they are the providers of energy justice, and the NGOs the assessors. 
 
Last, the results provided three key insights into the manifestation of procedural 
justice in practice. Firstly, they have demonstrated that articulations of procedural 
justice vary according to the actor in question. Secondly, extending the theme of 
time further, the results also demonstrate that procedural justice manifests as both 
evaluative statements concerning what is done, and normative statements reflecting 
on what ought to be done. Here, constructions of normative statements around 
procedural justice reflected on the themes of openness, transparency, knowledge 
transfer, knowledge independence and the order of decision-making. In reflecting on 
how we ought to engage, the respondents gave insight into the perceived core 
values of just energy decision-making. This demonstrates that the procedural justice 
concept, and the concept of energy justice more generally, can play a role in current 
and future energy decision-making.  
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Table 6.5 presents simplified findings from this case study as a means of contrasting 





Table 6.5 Sellafield Nuclear Complex Results Summary 
Tenet Sample Group Themes 
Distributional Justice NGOs Radioactive contamination, health, military usages, jobs and economic prosperity, cost of nuclear waste 
management, and safety and emergency planning, facility maintenance, technological feasibility, 
connections with new build nuclear stations and growth and development 
Policy Radioactive contamination, military usages, jobs and economic prosperity, the cost of nuclear waste 
management, facility maintenance, uncertainty and growth and development 
Justice as Recognition NGOs For Whom: populations affected by radioactive discharges, future generations, uranium miners 
By Whom: industry and policy 
Policy For Whom: Local communities, populations affected by radioactive discharges, future generations, tax 
payers, volunteer host communities for the GDF 
By Whom: Industry and policy 
Procedural Justice NGOs Evaluative: The exclusion of individuals and groups from the proceedings, consultation timings, the 
transparency and truthfulness of consultations 
Normative: Knowledge transfer, knowledge independence, openness and transparency 
Policy Evaluative: Successful exercises, consultation timings, scale 
Normative: Public-engagement based expertise, knowledge transfer, impartial oversight, consultation 
timings 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
Within the broader context of the socio-technical systems and multi-level 
perspective literatures, this thesis has sought to advance the understanding that 
concepts from ethics and justice provide a structure to think about energy dilemmas 
(Sovacool et al. 2016). Against this background, it has aimed to introduce, critique, 
and reconceptualise the theory of energy justice as it stands to date, assessing if, and 
in what form, its core tenets of distributional justice, justice as recognition and 
procedural justice emerge in practice (McCauley et al. 2013). It has done so through 
the exploration of three areas of conceptual growth in the energy justice literature 
highlighted in the literature review, represented by the three key variables of time, 
systems component and actor. Throughout, it has utilised a whole-systems approach, 
whereby it has investigated elite perspectives on energy justice across two indicative 
stages of the nuclear energy lifecycle represented by case studies of (1) energy 
production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and (2) waste 
reprocessing, storage, and disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. This 
research is amongst the first to advance a whole-systems approach to energy justice 
discourses (Hall et al. 2013; van der Horst and Evans 2010; Adams et al. 2012; Hiteva 
2013; Harrison 2013), and is the first to take an explicitly elite focus to energy justice 
as it addresses the overall research question and research questions: 
 
Overall Research Question: How do elite actors within the nuclear energy system 
articulate energy justice? 
 
RQ 1: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary through time? 
RQ 2: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary according to 
energy systems component in question? 
RQ 3: How do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary between actors? 
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This chapter consolidates the results from chapters 5 and 6 and draws parallels with 
the wider literature presented in chapter 2, as well as introducing new literatures in 
light of its findings. Firstly, section 7.1 compares the results of the two case studies, 
before section 7.2 discusses emergent knowledge claims, the themes of (1) facility 
lifecycles, (2) systems approaches, and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’. In so 
doing, sections 7.1 and 7.2 outline the contributions of this study to knowledge in 
relation to the study’s research questions, and examine its contributions to academic 
thought. Last, section 7.3 offers initial interpretations of the implications of these key 
contributions for nuclear energy scholarship, UK nuclear policy, and the wider energy 
transitions literature. 
 
7.1  Case Study Comparison 
 
This section returns to the findings presented in the results chapters to draw 
comparisons between the two case studies of research: (1) energy production at the 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and (2) waste reprocessing, storage, and 
disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in Cumbria. It does so according to the 
three tenets of distributional justice, justice as recognition, and procedural justice, 
mirroring the approached used in chapters 5 and 6. Throughout, it draws on 
examples from these chapters and, in view of its findings, discusses new insights into 
the manifestation of energy justice in practice. It considers the ideas of non-
nuclearity and NIMBYism; the case that justice as recognition reveals that energy 
justice is perceived to affect elite groups, not just poor ethnic minorities; and the 
finding that procedural justice investigations offer normative contributions. 
 
 Distributional Justice 
 
The results of this research have revealed both similarities and differences in 
distributional justice articulations across the two research case studies. These results 
are compared here before introducing the concept of non-nuclearity and rejecting 
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the idea of NIMBYism as a reflection of the fact that distributional justice discourses 
between NGO and policy respondents moved past assumed pro- and anti-nuclear 
divides. To begin, table 7.1 outlines the themes raised by NGO and policy participants 
across the two research case studies. 
 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex Sellafield Nuclear Complex 
 Disruption during infrastructure 
development 
 Radioactive contamination 
 Health and safety 
 Jobs and economic prosperity 
 Education 
 Cost 
 Radioactive contamination 
 Health 
 Military usages 
 Jobs and economic prosperity 
 Safety and emergency planning 
 Planning for contemporary and legacy 
wastes  
 The cost of nuclear waste 
management 
 
Table 7.1 Hinkley Point and Sellafield Case Comparison: Distributional Justice 
 
The most notable contrast between the two sites was the emergence of non-nuclear 
distributional justice discourses in the Hinkley Point case study, and more classically 
nuclear discourses in the Sellafield case study. For Hinkley Point, articulations of 
distributional justice did not just focus on the nuclear facility itself, instead 
manifesting as concerns over its associated developments, most frequently including 
local road infrastructure. NGO respondents referenced the on-going construction 
works at Hinkley Point C and their impacts of lorry traffic, the influx of workers, local 
biodiversity displacement, housing development and rent prices, and the clearance 
of significant areas of archaeological remains, for example. Furthermore, policy 
respondents focussed on issues of jobs, economic prosperity and education as 
positive cases of the provision of justice, without reference to wider nuclear 
critiques. Indeed, Hergen Haye, an unaffiliated policy respondent stated that ‘in 
 238 
nuclear terms, we have identified all the communities that already have nuclear 
power – have had it for the last 40 years – and broadly speaking (there are always 
pockets) but broadly speaking, these communities want nuclear power stations to be 
built’. In this context, the siting of the proposed Hinkley Point C station was taken to 
be contingent upon the social acceptance of the pre-existing Hinkley Point A and B 
facilities. Thus, distributional justice concerns appeared as comparatively benign and 
detached from assumed nuclear risk discourses. This is taken to represent a degree 
of ‘non-nuclearity’, the detachment of energy justice discourses from issues of 
nuclear energy production. The use of this term extends Hecht’s (2012) idea of 
‘nuclearity’, which she uses as a techno-political category to describe the ‘quality of 
being nuclear’, to move past considerations of either pro- or anti-nuclearity to 
recognition of non-nuclearity, the impact of associated non-energy-specific 
infrastructural developments as part of energy justice discourse. 
 
In contrast, the discourses emergent from the Sellafield case study appeared more 
classically nuclear in nature as the interview respondents raised the distributional 
themes of radioactive contamination, health, military uses, safety and emergency 
planning, and planning for contemporary and legacy wastes as concerns rooted in 
past accidents and poor management practice. Oliver Epsom, a former nuclear 
engineer and now engineer for SSE Renewables, described one such historical 
incident when the workers at Sellafield had been ‘chucking waste into swimming 
pools without even knowing how much you were throwing in there or where it came 
from’. For Hergen Haye, such lax practices led to the hazards of the highly radioactive 
waste produced by the weapons program, the damage done to the Windscale Piles 
during the 1957 fires, and the existence of their associated storage ponds and silos, 
for which there is no known inventory. He concluded that the complexity of the 
nuclear waste problem in the UK was, in fact, the complexity of Sellafield. Given that 
Sellafield was the first nuclear site in the UK and that it has been criticised for a lack 
of technical understanding and regulation compared to later sites (see Kershaw et al. 
2001; Dunster 1984; Nilstun and Inskip 1996; Macgill 1989) it is reasonable to 
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assume that the distributional justice outcomes are a consequence of the timing of 
its development, and the ensuing mistakes made in its operation.  
 
This research posits that this distinction between how actors articulate each site is an 
outcome of perceived risk, where individuals frame issues in terms of ‘nuclearity’ 
when perceived risk is high and ‘non-nuclearity’ when the risks appears more benign. 
This assertion both follows and develops the work of Venables et al. (2012), who 
highlight two potential explanations for apparently low levels of perceived risk 
around energy facilities. Firstly, Venables et al. (2012) introduce a body of authors 
who believe that in the absence of major accidents – as is the case with Hinkley Point 
– increased familiarity creates lower levels of perceived risk and more positive 
attitudes (e.g. Greenberg 2009; Lima 2004; Lima and Marques 2005; Parkhill et al. 
2010; Fahlquist and Roeser 2014; Downer 2015). Secondly, Venables et al. (2012) 
identify a range of researchers who suggest that more positive attitudes may arise 
from perceived economic and social benefits of the facility to local people (e.g. 
Blowers and Leroy 1994; Burningham and Thrush 2004; Hecht 1998; Williams et al. 
1999). Both explanations fit with the research findings which demonstrate that 
firstly, NGO energy justice discourses emerge as a concern not for the nuclear facility 
itself, but instead for its surrounding infrastructure, and secondly that policy 
discourses framed Hinkley Point positively in terms of the job and economic benefits 
it provides. As an extension, these examples serve to highlight that distributional 
justice discourses are an outcome of the processes and history at a particular facility, 
and that, dependent on the levels of perceived risk that the facility presents, energy 
justice discourses may transcend energy-specific concerns.  
 
Moreover, in both case studies the results also demonstrated cases of consistency in 
the distributional justice articulations according to the actor group in question – NGO 
or policy – thus moving past typical pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear divides. In many 
instances, NGO respondents focussed on occurrences of ‘injustices’, points at which 
the site was perceived as negatively affecting the local area, whereas policy groups 
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focused positively on the provision of ‘justice’ in terms of local benefits. However, 
the results also demonstrated moments of distributional justice overlap. This 
included united concerns from all represented actors over the costs of nuclear power 
in terms of the costs of new build in the Hinkley case, and united concerns over the 
cost of waste management, management practices and radioactive contamination in 
the Sellafield case. Finally, the policy respondent discourses around the Sellafield 
facility drew attention to both ‘non-nuclear’ distributional justice manifestations – 
the promotion of jobs and economic development, for example – alongside more 
negatively perceived nuclear elements in terms of cost and radioactivity; in this 
regard, policy respondents appeared both pro- and anti-nuclear. 
 
Given the emergence of both differences and similarities in distributional justice 
articulations according to the actor in question, the results demonstrate the need to 
move past typically assumed pro- and anti-nuclear divides and to reject the assumed 
idea of NIMBYism. Devine-Wright (2009: 430) defines this as public opposition to 
unwanted local developments, or more formally, ‘the protectionist attitudes of and 
oppositional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome 
development in their neighbourhood’. Thus, in summary, this represents a call to 
consider the discourses of a diverse range of social groups who simultaneously 
recognise both the justice burdens and benefits of energy infrastructures, sometimes 
extending beyond the energy facility itself.  
 
 Justice as Recognition 
 
In keeping with the distributional justice results of this study presented in section 
7.1.1, the results have revealed both similarities and differences in justice as 
recognition articulations across the two research case studies. These results are 
compared here. Firstly, reflecting on responses to the question ‘justice for whom?’, 
this section describes that the operations were perceived to both positively and 
negatively affect a range of stakeholder groups. It follows that energy justice 
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concerns are both expressed by and perceived to affect elite groups, not just poor 
ethnic minorities. Secondly, it briefly considers the question of ‘justice by whom?’ as 
it discusses how, in the context of the UK nuclear energy case studies presented in 
this work, industry and policy groups were perceived to hold a higher degree of 
responsibility for the provision of energy justice than other actors in the nuclear 
energy system. This concept is explored further in section 7.2.3 as one of three 
emergent key contributions from this research. Table 7.2 outlines the themes raised 
by NGO and policy participants across the two research case studies.  
 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex Sellafield Nuclear Complex 
For Whom:  
 Workers 
 Those affected by health impacts 
 International actors 
 Future generations 
 Consumers 
 Youth 
 Local communities 
 
By Whom:  
 Industry 
 Policy (Inc. local councils) 
 NGO groups 
 Regulators 
For Whom:  
 Populations affected by radioactive 
discharges 
 Future generations 
 Uranium miners 
 Local communities 
 Tax Payers 
 Volunteer host communities for the 
GDF 
 
By Whom:  
 Industry  
 Policy 
 
Table 7.2 Hinkley Point and Sellafield Case Comparison: Justice as Recognition 
 
Interview respondents reflecting on the question of ‘justice for whom?’, provided 
both evaluative and normative accounts of justice as recognition, addressing who ‘is’ 
in focus – local communities, and workers, for example – as well as who ‘ought’ to be 
 242 
– including international actors at the stage of uranium mining. Across the two case 
studies, 13 justice as recognition themes emerged from the interview discussions; 
thus, the operations at the two case studies were not perceived to be to the benefit 
or burden of any one particular social group. This included shared concern by the 
participants in the Hinkley Point and Sellafield cases for populations affected by 
radioactive discharges, including workers, local communities, future generations and 
those affected by health impacts (or populations affected by radioactive discharges 
as it is termed in the Sellafield case), but revealed differences in each case study over 
the need to recognise other actor groups including uranium miners, youth, 
consumers, tax payers and volunteer host communities for the GDF.  
 
In both case studies, NGOs were primarily concerned with those negatively affected 
by the facility as opposed to policy groups who focused on those that would gain 
from it, illustrating differences in the framings of justice as recognition. As an 
example from the Hinkley Point case, Stop Hinkley members Sue Aubrey and Allan 
Jeffrey began by recognising that the Hinkley Point complex was a good source of 
employment in an area where no other industry was particularly stable. However, 
they also identified that this employment meant higher exposure to the risks of 
potential health impacts. Primarily, this concerned workers at the facility who faced a 
greater risk of exposure to radioactive contamination, thus recasting the provision of 
jobs in a negative light. Jill Sutcliffe, a member of the Nuclear Waste Advisory 
Associates and respondent for the Sellafield case study, identified this as the ‘sweet 
and sour effect’, where workers have a vested interest in the Sellafield complex due 
to their jobs and working and family relationships, but face negative health outcomes 
as a consequence of their involvement. In contrast, policy respondents highlighted 
workers in only a positive sense, without connection to the negative health 
externalities. This shows that even when a group is recognised, it may be for both 
positive and negative reasons, so demonstrating the complexity of energy justice 
manifestations in the nuclear case. 
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Within such discourses, issues of energy justice were described as affecting both elite 
and non-elite actors. Hergen Haye, an unattributed respondent who spoke to both 
case studies, identified energy justice responsibilities to business and industry, for 
example, as (1) they were reliant on large quantities of base-load energy, and (2) the 
nuclear industry and associated wider industry groups themselves created and 
sustained a broad spectrum of jobs and careers that they could capitalise on – in the 
Hinkley Point case this included a new fleet of nuclear power stations. Further, 
Representative Four from Energy Company One stressed too that if you are the 
current operator of a facility and therefore the producer of waste, you have a moral 
and legal responsibility to ensure that it is safely stored and safely disposed of. Thus, 
they recognised the importance of their own role and the energy justice burdens it 
presented. 
 
The inclusion of elite groups in justice as recognition discourses questions the activist 
origins of energy justice. With its roots in the environmental justice movement, 
applications of justice as recognition are typically manifested as concerns that 
‘minorities, low income, and otherwise disadvantaged and susceptible 
neighbourhoods are disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards’ (Bowen 
2002: 3), highlighting local community, activist perspectives. Together with links to 
the politically excluded civil rights movements across North America (Gibson-Wood 
and Wakefield 2013), this includes attention to issues of class (Taylor 2000), gender 
(Buckingham and Kulcur 2009) and religion (Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010). Thus, 
the focus was and is on the groups that were facing perceived injustices in the form 
of the unequal distribution of environmental risk. The results demonstrated 
however, that elite actors – NGO and policy groups (including the academic experts 
and industry representatives subsumed within this second category) – are both 
concerned with and perceive themselves to be affected by energy justice concerns, 
even when claims vary across the sample groups. This finding illustrates that energy 
justice investigations must widen their scope beyond solely bottom-up activist 
concerns. Building on the work of Fraser (1999), this requires the recognition not 
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only of the divergent perspectives of different ethnic, racial and gender differences, 
but, as this study has suggested, the perspectives of different operative groups. This 
finding evidences the claim of ‘an anti-establishment’ past to energy justice 
discourses referenced in Jenkins et al. (2016a: 180). 
 
Secondly, the results of both case studies showed not only who justice is for, but also 
who is responsible for it, thereby attributing responsibility. The results also show that 
whilst NGO and policy groups are understood to share responsibility for the 
production of energy justice, industry and policy respondents are assumed to carry a 
higher degree of responsibility. This concept is discussed further in section 7.2.3, 
which considers the key contribution of this research, the question of ‘justice by 
whom?’. 
 
 Procedural Justice 
 
Procedural justice articulations manifested as the emergence of both evaluative and 
normative reflections on energy justice as respondents considered (1) how 
procedural justice is being or has been enacted (evaluative) and (2) how it ought to 
be enacted (normative). In contrast to the results for the previous two tenets, the 
findings for the procedural justice investigations primarily demonstrate consistencies 
in the articulations across the two case studies. These results are presented here. It is 
argued that with further research – outside the scope of this research – it may be 
possible to develop a set of overarching energy justice frames representing a united 
concern, for example for transparency and due process. In keeping with the format 
above, table 7.3 first outlines the themes raised by NGO and policy participants 








Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex Sellafield Nuclear Complex 
 
Evaluative: 
 Scope of the discussion 
 Consultation accessibility 
 The timing of procedural engagement 
 The exclusion of individuals and groups 
from the proceedings  
 Successful consultations 
 Low participation levels 
 Accessibility concerns 





 The exclusion of individuals and groups 
from the proceedings  
 Consultation timings 
 The transparency and truthfulness of 
consultations 




 Financial support 
 Transparency 
 Nuclear Guardianship/education 
 Local community-led 
 Independent 
 Community benefit 
 Regulatory oversight 
 Consultation timings 
 
Normative: 
 Knowledge transfer 
 Knowledge independence 
 Openness and transparency 
 Public-engagement based expertise 
 Impartial oversight 
 Consultation timings 
 
 
Table 7.3 Hinkley Point and Sellafield Case Comparison: Procedural Justice 
 
In the Hinkley Point case study, the majority of procedural justice discussions 
revolved around the development of the new Hinkley Point C facility. For NGOs these 
discussions primarily took the form of critiques of their experiences of procedural 
engagement, including concerns over the scope of the discussions, the accessibility 
of mechanism both in terms of the technicality of the process and physical 
attendance, and the exclusion of individuals and groups from the proceedings. Policy 
respondents gave more mixed evaluations, reporting on both successful procedural 
mechanisms and areas of future development. Procedural justice articulations for 
the Sellafield case followed a similar pattern as NGO respondents firstly critiqued 
their experiences of procedural engagement, including concerns over the exclusion 
of individuals and groups from the proceedings, when consultations took place, and 
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the transparency and truthfulness of consultations. As one of numerous examples, 
Pete Wilkinson stated that whilst the regulators’ (the NDA and ONR) job is to look 
after safety and security, he got the impression that the assessment processes that 
they go through are very routine, and that their overriding desire is to make sure 
that they enable the policy to go through. Within this commentary, he questioned 
the legitimacy of claims that the radioactive waste management plans for new 
nuclear are in place, adding that ‘none of the backend issues to do with radioactive 
waste have been resolved, yet ministers still say that the situation is sufficiently 
stable for them to go ahead with a minimum of 10 GW of new build. I mean the 
whole thing is absolutely crazy, absolutely ridiculous’. Likewise, policy respondents in 
the Sellafield case reported on both successful exercises and areas of development.  
 
These areas of future development manifested as insights into normative 
constructions of ‘just’ processes, where in reflecting on how we ought to engage the 
respondents offered insights into the perceived core values of just energy decision-
making. It is in this area that the primary similarities across case studies emerged. As 
an example, Ruth Balogh, a nuclear campaigner for West Cumbria and North Lakes 
Friends of the Earth, drew attention to the work of CoRWM, which she stated was 
rooted in notions of justice and gave an ethical position on inter-generational 
concerns. She added, ‘you do not normally find that in policy documents on nuclear 
waste. Whether you agree with it or not is another matter but yes, at least it was 
being open about what its ethical position was on certain aspects of nuclear policy’. 
Thus, she referenced what she perceived to be core constituents of energy justice. 
Further, Gregg Butler provided a positive account of procedural justice as he 
reflected on the BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue Joint Fact-Finding Exercise, 
which he characterised as a ‘seminal experience’ and a useful tool for meaningful 
collaboration from both pro- and anti-nuclear ends of the spectrum, and which 
influenced later stakeholder engagement exercises, including the Managing 
Radioactive Waste Safely exercise in West Cumbria. In this context, there were 
consistencies in the discourses presented at each research site, therefore pointing to 
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the existence of overarching energy justice frames. Indeed, in describing potential 
improvements to procedural systems and providing insights into how procedural 
justice might materialise, respondents drew attention to the core values that 
underpinned these mechanisms, including openness, transparency, knowledge 
transfer, knowledge independence, the order of decision-making and due process. 
Thus, overall, the findings have illustrated that the procedural justice concept, and 
the concept of energy justice more generally, can play a role in both current and 
future energy decision-making, informed by a set of core principles.  
 
Following Jenkins et al. (2016a), this chapter argues that the evaluative and 
normative reach of energy justice gives a dual analytical role for the concept (table 
7.4). Firstly, as stated from the outset of this research, the investigation of past and 
present injustices provides the opportunity to remediate these failures. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that energy justice emerges as a tool that can identify potential 
injustices in the future, making recommendations on how they should be 
approached. The emergence of these core notions develops the work of Sovacool 
and Dworkin (2015) who identify availability, affordability, due process, good 
governance, prudence, inter-generational equity, intra-generational equity and 
responsibility as central energy justice principles that, when overcoming the neglect 
of social justice in energy decision-making, should help inform our energy choices.  
 
Tenet Evaluative Normative 
What: Distributional What are the injustices? How should we solve 
them? 
Who: Justice as 
Recognition 
Who is ignored? How should we recognise? 
How: Procedural Is there fair process? Which new processes? 
 
Table 7.4 The Evaluative and Normative Contributions of Energy Justice 
 (Adapted from Jenkins et al. 2016a) 
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 Summary of Case Study Comparison Findings  
 
This section reflected upon the findings presented in the results chapters to draw 
comparisons between the two case studies according to the three tenets of energy 
justice, namely distributional justice, justice as recognition, and procedural justice. In 
drawing on examples from the results chapters, and in light of its findings, it 
introduced new insights into the manifestation of energy justice in practice as it 
discussed the concepts of non-nuclearity and NIMBYism, the case that justice as 
recognition reveals that energy justice is perceived to affect elite groups, not just 
poor ethnic minorities, and that within the tenet of procedural justice, investigations 
offer normative contributions of how energy justice ought to emerge. Drawing on 
these insights and the material presented in chapters 5 and 6, this chapter now 
presents three key knowledge claims emergent from this research. 
 
7.2 Key Knowledge Claims  
 
As it is outwith the scope of this chapter to reflect on all of the discoveries presented 
in the results chapters, it discusses the most original findings – those that either 
contrast with the current literature, advance it, or signal new avenues of future 
research (table 7.5). The following three sections represent the main contributions of 
this research to academic thought. Specifically, the sections introduce three key 
knowledge claims according to the three variables of investigation, time, systems 
component and actor: (1) facility lifecycles, (2) systems approaches, and (3) the 
question of ‘justice by whom?’. Firstly, it illustrates the necessity of considering 
multi-cyclical notions of time that can (1) capture the transition of time at a 
particular site as part of its lifecycle, and (2) capture time across the energy system in 
total. Secondly, it argues for a whole-systems approach to energy justice 
investigations, including consideration of all systems components throughout an 
energy form’s lifecycle as a means of incorporating all the justice-related aspects of 
an energy source. Finally, it considers the question of ‘justice by whom?’ as it 
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explores who is perceived to be responsible for remediating injustices, or conversely, 
ensuring the continuation of just practices.  
 
Variable of Investigation Key Contribution  
Time Facility lifecycles 
Systems Component Systems approaches 
Actor Justice by whom? 
 
Table 7.5 Summary of Key Contribution by Variable of Investigation 
 
Returning to the discussion of the data analysis stages outlined in section 3.5.3 the 
discussion below and the analytical themes presented represent the third and final 
phase of data analysis. This stage of the research requires not just a record of 
conceptions of energy justice, but an understanding of their construction and 
articulation. Thus, it follows Thomas and Harden’s (2008) strategy of ‘going beyond’. 
This requires an advancement of the descriptive themes achieved in the results 
chapters above to create additional concepts, understanding or hypotheses. In 
following the three analytical themes of investigation throughout this research – 
time, systems component and actor – this section presents new insights within each 
of these previously identified areas of development for the energy justice literature 
outlined in section 2.6.  
 
 Reflecting on Temporality 
 
The discussion of temporality in this thesis began by drawing attention to Heffron et 
al.’s (2015: 169) statement that ‘energy justice is an inherently spatial, temporal and 
social concept’, and outlining the understated and confusing treatment of time 
within current research. It explained that where temporal considerations do appear, 
they do so in strongly contrasting ways as the literature either highlights a tendency 
to look back in time, taking an evaluative approach focused on the remediation of 
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past injustices, or in contrast, focuses on mitigation of potential injustices in the 
future (Sidortsov and Sovacool 2015; Sovacool 2013; Heffron et al. 2015). Developing 
the arguments presented in chapter 2, this section now highlights the increasing 
body of work which focuses on what is required to ensure energy justice, including 
reducing energy consumption (Hall 2013; Jenkins et al. 2014), mitigating climate 
change (Bickerstaff et al. 2013) and reframing policy (McCauley et al. 2013), for 
example – at the expense of considering temporal dynamics of when changes take 
place and how these processes overlap (McCauley et al. forthcoming). Building on 
this area of growth in the energy justice literature, it draws attention not only to 
evolving energy justice discourses through time, but as its key contribution, to the 
theme of facility lifecycles. This includes both circular and linear notions of 
temporality. Each of these points is considered in turn below following a brief 
discussion of RQ1, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
through time?’. 
 
In both the Hinkley Point and Sellafield case studies the issue of time emerged as a 
cross-cutting theme. In the Hinkley Point case study this included concern for the 
time taken to construct the new Hinkley Point facility, historic leaks that led to the 
community being prescribed iodine tablets, the longevity of the Hinkley Point 
complex in the landscape, questions over the uncertainty of processes and 
organisations that will exist in the future, the necessity of recognising future 
generations, and the timing of and time required to complete consultations. 
Considerations of time were even more apparent in the Sellafield case study as 
respondents reflected on past, present and future articulations of distributional 
justice, deliberating past management practice and historical incidents, current 
issues, and the long-term question of how to deal with nuclear waste. Using NGO 
articulations of distributional justice as an example, this temporal change between 
past and future discourses changed the topic of concern from radioactive 
contamination, health and military usages to future concerns over facility 
maintenance, the technological feasibility of geological disposal facilities and the 
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interconnectedness of waste discourses with new build nuclear power stations. Thus, 
in answer to RQ1, the answer appeared to be ‘extensively’. This suggests that the 
issue of temporality in energy justice research is a productive and necessary area of 
research, a point considered further below through a consideration of the emergent 
theme of facility lifecycles.  
 
The results presented in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that energy justice 
discourses varied at one site due to its evolving operational status through time, its 
own life cycle. Doug Bamsey, Corporate Director of Sedgemoor District Council, 
explained in the Hinkley Point Case study, for example, that the Hinkley Point A 
station was being decommissioned, the lifespan of Hinkley Point B is being extended, 
and Hinkley Point C is being constructed. Doug continued that as local consultations 
are not required for extension or decommissioning processes, these different 
lifecycle states at the same site required different procedural justice mechanisms. 
Furthermore, Doug outlined that each station raised different distributional justice 
concerns, with the issues around Hinkley Point A typically appearing as concerns for 
waste, contamination and safety in contrast to the issues of area transformation 
raised by Hinkley Point C. In essence, as the facility or facilities at a site evolve, so too 
do the distributional and procedural justice issues they raise.  
 
This finding that energy justice articulations varied at one site due to its own lifecycle 
was also supported by the results of the Sellafield case study, where clear changes in 
historical management practices – including the cessation of radioactive discharges 
from Sellafield into the Irish Sea following direct action led by Greenpeace – 
influenced the perceived threat of radioactive contamination. Indeed, Hergen Haye 
suggested that in contrast to early critiques of the operations at Sellafield, the 
industry has now learnt to build nuclear power stations with decommissioning in 
mind, and has far more clarity about what is in waste storage ponds, flasks or silos, 
therefore ensuring that future waste handling will be much more predictable. Thus, 
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as a consequence of both the transition of time and evolving skill across it, perceived 
risk changed, and as a consequence discourses of energy justices varied. 
 
Returning to an earlier case study from the energy justice literature, Heffron et al.’s 
(2015: 169) study on the utility of the energy justice concept for solving the energy 
trilemma argues that energy justice is specifically intertwined with the development 
of new energy infrastructure, and ‘that this is where the value and effectiveness of 
energy justice can be delivered in policy application’. Yet, as demonstrated above, 
this fails to evaluate and inform energy justice throughout the various stages of that 
site’s lifespan. Indeed, excepting the work of Rehner and McCauley (2016) who 
consider the justice implications of the nuclear phase-out in Germany, there is a 
failure to recognise the implications of closing infrastructure, changing policies, or 
accidents that may alter the energy justice discourses around a particular site. 
Instead, energy justice scholarship often appears as a static case study (see Reames 
2016; Simpson and Clifton 2016; Yenneti and Day 2016). Consequently, it is 
reasonable to suppose that such approaches also fail to address the potential to 
remediate past injustices at pre-existing sites. Going forward, energy justice 
scholarship must include attention to the evolution of sites and practices through 
time. 
 
Secondly, the results have illustrated that rather than being a discrete linear system, 
each stage within the nuclear lifecycle – in this research energy production and 
waste reprocessing, storage, and disposal – operates simultaneously and overlaps. 
Despite the inherent logic of this claim, the wider literature contains a predominance 
of linear notions of time, where each stage is treated separately, what Nasir et al. 
(2016: 2) identify as the ‘take-make-dispose resource model’ (see Simpson and 
Clifton 2016; Yenneti and Day 2016; Goedkoop and Devine-Wright 2016 for energy 
production examples). Yet to treat these stages as discrete represents a failure to 
acknowledge the passing of time across the entire energy lifecycle – uranium mining, 
milling, enrichment, energy production and so forth – as each system stage happens 
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simultaneously, and injustices in energy production can translate to injustices in both 
mining and waste disposal as each operation implicates the other (McLaren et al. 
2013). Whilst this in itself is not revelatory, it demonstrates the necessity of 
understanding energy systems as multi-cyclical and self-reinforcing. The claim for a 
multi-cyclical approach to energy justice concerns moves past the traditional 
understanding of a circular lifecycle – ‘enabling products at the end of their life cycle 
to re-enter the supply chain as a production input through recycling, re-usage or 
remanufacturing’ (Nasir et al. 2016: 2) – to acknowledge the simultaneous operation 
of each stage and therefore, the frequent potential and reinforcing moments of 
injustice. 
 
 Reflecting on Systems 
 
Section 2.7 presented a conceptual claim for a whole-systems approach to energy 
justice as recognition of both perceived and realised failures in energy systems 
governance, the understanding, for example, that some of our typically national-
scale ‘solutions’ to energy concerns both cause and fail to recognise widespread 
externalities, including the issues of climate change and resource depletion (Gagnon 
et al. 2002; Meadows 2009; Sovacool et al. 2014). It reflected on the need for a 
multi-scalar focus to energy concerns, and on the acknowledgement, according to 
Holifield et al. (2009: 4), that ‘place-specific policies and practices can have 
consequences that cross national boundaries, affect multiple scales, and extend 
across global networks’. The following paragraphs develop this literature in light of 
the research findings. 
 
In answer to RQ2, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
according to energy systems component in question?’, the results demonstrated 
both (1) variation between the emergent discourses at each case study and (2) that 
each systems stage implicated another. Firstly, as discussed in section 7.1 above, the 
two research case studies raised different energy justice concerns according to the 
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processes undertaken. Discourses at the Hinkley Point site reflected a degree of non-
nuclearity – the impact of associated non-energy-specific infrastructural 
developments as part of energy justice discourses (e.g. road infrastructure) – 
whereas discourses around Sellafield reflected more classically nuclear critiques, 
including the themes of radioactive contamination, health, military usages, and 
safety and emergency planning. Secondly, the results demonstrated that in many 
cases, the different stages of the nuclear energy system were perceived as 
interlinked. By way of an example, in the Hinkley Point case study three NGO 
respondents raised the need to recognise those in uranium mining areas in terms of 
their rights to energy justice. Josephine Smolton, a member of the anti-nuclear 
campaign group Stop Hinkley, argued that UK policy approaches to nuclear energy 
were too narrow, neglecting the full life cycle implications of the technology. 
Josephine stated that ‘when it comes to something that you are creating that affects 
the planet, the whole planet needs to be around that table, not a government. It is 
not one government’s decision; it is unethical to make decisions in one country that 
are going to affect people around the world’. Furthermore, in the Sellafield case, 
NGO respondents highlighted connections between nuclear waste management and 
new build nuclear power. As an example, Ruth Balogh explained that according to 
CoRWM’s commentary on the MRWS process, the search for a GDF should be taking 
place independently of new build nuclear as a means of disposing of legacy wastes 
only, but that in her opinion, these decisions had gone hand-in-hand. Consequently, 
the results have both verified and demonstrated the necessity of systems-wide 
approaches that can capture these dynamics. 
 
Although a growing number of authors have reflected on the need for whole-systems 
approaches (see Hall et al. 2013; van der Horst and Evans 2010; Adams et al. 2012; 
Hiteva 2013; Harrison 2013; Fuller and McCauley 2016; McLaren et al. 2013), this 
literature is not fully developed, with scant empirical reinforcement and little 
discussion of what such an approach means for energy justice theory (Jenkins et al. 
2014; Jenkins et al. 2016a,b; Bickerstaff et al. 2013). Indeed, a search of related 
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publications demonstrates a continued tendency to consider limited stages of energy 
lifecycles, with a focus on energy justice as a matter of energy production (see 
Simpson and Clifton 2016; Yenneti and Day 2016; Goedkoop and Devine-Wright 
2016) or energy consumption (Liddell et al. 2016; Simcock and Mullen 2016; Walker 
et al. 2016; Chatterton et al. 2016; Mullen and Marsden 2016). With a few notable 
exceptions (Rehner and McCauley 2016; Graetz 2015; Jenkins et al. 2016a), this 
represents an under-emphasis of the full energy lifecycle, including (in the case of 
nuclear power) uranium mining, uranium milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel 
fabrication, production, recycling and waste. This highlights the need for a whole-
systems approach to energy justice investigations, including consideration of all 
systems components throughout an energy form’s lifecycle. 
 
As argued by Heffron and McCauley (2014), this implies that such a systems-wide 
focus has two implications: (1) it allows the energy technology to be valued at full 
cost, and (2) this valuation would affect whether it is chosen as an energy source. 
Thus, whole-systems approaches provide a means of capturing all the justice-related 
aspects of an energy source as they (1) capture the energy justice nature of specific 
systems components – energy production, for example – and, (2) as a sum total of 
these parts, capture the energy justice nature of a particular energy form. In this 
respect, a whole-systems approach to energy justice provides a new framework for 
bridging existing and future research on energy production and consumption. This 
argument builds upon and furthers the work of Jenkins et al. (2014) and Jenkins et al. 
(2016a,b) and situates this research within an emerging body of literature seeking to 
embed questions of justice and equity within energy systems (Fuller and McCauley 
2016; Bickerstaff et al. 2013; McLaren et al. 2013; Adams et al. 2013; Sovacool 2013; 
Sovacool and Dworkin 2014, 2015).  
 
Conceptually, such an approach fits with Sovacool and Dworkin’s (2015: 436) 
characterisation of energy justice as a ‘global energy system that fairly disseminates 
both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one that has representative and 
 256 
impartial energy decision-making’. In essence, it seeks to reduce the energy justice 
externality and consider the justice implications of our energy decision-making in a 
global context. This will not only allow for a full valuation of energy, but also 
exposure to other considerations, and arguably potential solutions to our energy 
challenges – including different distributional concerns, the need for multi-cyclical 
temporal investigations (section 7.2.1) and recognition of responsibility (section 
7.2.3), for example. Thus, in line with Adams et al. (2012), this approach can identify 
and potentially prevent problems that could arise from unseen and unintended 
consequences of energy decision-making – in this case, issues of energy justice. This 
research has demonstrated that a whole-systems framework draws attention to 
different actors of concern and most pertinently, different scales of justice. In so 
doing, it provides a framework that may lead to a radical reappraisal of energy 
sources with appropriate emphasis being given to the justice benefits or dis-benefits 
of differing sources and the removal of moral blind spots (Jenkins et al. 2016a). 
Arguably, therefore, our concern should not just be for energy justice, but for 
‘energy systems justice’. 
 
 Reflecting on Actors 
 
This section reflects upon the third variable of investigation for this research, actor or 
in the case of this research, actors. It draws attention to one key knowledge claim 
emergent from the research findings, the question of ‘justice by whom?’ as it 
answers RQ3, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary between 
actors?’. It discusses the fact that, in the case studies presented, articulations of 
‘justice by whom?’ emphasised that governmental and industrial groups hold a 
higher degree of responsibility for the provision of energy justice than other actors in 
the nuclear energy system, including regulators, NGOs and general citizens. 
 
Firstly, in answer to RQ3, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
between actors?’, the results demonstrated both similarities and differences in 
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justice as recognition articulations across the two research case studies, as discussed 
in section 7.1.2 above. This included shared concern by the actors in the Hinkley 
Point and Sellafield cases for populations affected by radioactive discharges, 
including workers, local communities, future generations and those affected by 
health impacts between the actors groups, but differences in each case study over 
the need to recognise international actors including uranium miners, youth, 
consumers, tax payers and volunteer host communities for the GDF. Consequently, 
this approach has drawn attention to new actors of concern. Furthermore, the 
results show that whilst NGO and policy groups were understood to share 
responsibility for the production of energy justice, industry and policy respondents 
are assumed to carry a higher degree of responsibility. Within this framework, they 
are the providers of energy justice, and the NGOs the assessors. 
 
The literature on energy justice has focused on a number of key social groups, 
including the fuel poor (Middlemiss and Gillard 2015; Chard and Walker 2016; Hiteva 
2013; Sovacool 2015; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016; Walker and Day 2012), disabled or 
unwell members of society (Snell et al. 2015; Liddell et al. 2016) and ethnic minority 
groups (Reames 2016). However, the results promote reflection not only on the 
question of ‘justice for whom?’, but also on ‘justice by whom?’. As far as the author 
is aware, no research to date has explicitly engaged with this question. In discussing 
this idea of responsibility, the respondents advanced the typical application of justice 
as recognition, which, generally speaking, has focused on the recipient of benefits or 
ills only, not on those who create them – an aspect of justice that is very pronounced 
in climate justice debates (see Bulkeley et al. 2013, 2014; Barrett 2013, 2014). In this 
regard, the respondents highlighted who is perceived to be responsible for 
remediating injustices, or conversely, ensuring the continuation of just practices. This 
develops the work of Heffron et al. (2015) who identify that the purpose of energy 
justice is to (1) identify when and where injustices occur, and (2) to identify how best 
academics and practitioners can critically evaluate the impacts of energy policies and 
 258 
how best they can respond – thus attributing accountability. Simultaneously 
however, it prompts a reflection of who the ‘practitioners’ really are.  
 
In this study, interview respondents reflected both on their own responsibilities and 
on the responsibility of others, acknowledging therefore that all groups represented 
– NGOs and policy – are involved in both the production and continuation of energy 
justice. Nichola Clark explained her own responsibility, for example, in campaigning 
as part of an NGO on nuclear issues because of her own sense of responsibility to 
wider society, her children and her as yet unborn grandchildren. This finding 
coincides with the writings of Sovacool et al. (2014: 199), who identify that as each of 
us participate in the global energy system, each of us contributes to energy injustices 
as the decisions we make about which electricity company to patronise, for example, 
have moral and ethical implications. Later they add that our ‘moral orientation 
seems unequal to the task of accommodating energy and climate change problems’ 
and go on to reflect that energy policymaking needs to be directed by justice 
principles. Sovacool et al. (2016: 5) state that contemporary analysts, policymakers 
and even consumers should reconsider their energy decisions as not only technical, 
economic or even environmental concerns, but also moral ones. 
 
However, whilst the results demonstrated the shared opinion that everyone has 
responsibility for the production of energy justice, they also indicate that industry 
and policy groups are assumed to carry more. Robert Birkenhead, an unattributed 
respondent in the Hinkley Point Case Study outlined, as an example, that the 
responsibility for energy justice fell on the industry and the government based on the 
idea that firstly, the industry want to make money from that station and therefore it 
is in their interests to ensure that it can do so, and secondly, the government wants 
to ensure continuity of supply for its citizens. This finding was consistent across both 
case studies as NGO and policy respondents indicated that certain industry and 
governmental individuals, including the Secretary of State, and government bodies 
such as DECC, the ONR, the Department of Business, the Health Services 
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Commissioner, and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, held more influence over 
energy justice outcomes. Thus, the research findings illustrate that the question is 
not who is responsible for the provision of energy justice, but who has the highest 
degree of responsibility?  
 
Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) recognise that we need to make energy decisions that 
promote responsibility, including attention to the minimisation of negative 
externalities, or energy-related social and environmental costs. They continue that 
‘this element of energy justice is perhaps the most controversial and complex, as it 
blends together four somewhat different notions of “responsibility”: a responsibility 
of governments to minimise environmental degradation, a responsibility of 
industrialised countries responsible for climate change to pay to fix the problem (the 
so-called “polluter pays principle”), a responsibility of current generations to protect 
future ones, and a responsibility of humans to recognise the intrinsic value of non- 
human species, adhering to a sort of “environmental ethic”’. Notwithstanding the 
truth of these claims, a shift in attention is required from different instances of 
responsibility to different actors that can take responsibility for them. The indication 
that industry and policy groups hold a higher degree of responsibility provides 
promising ground for future research into targeted, practically-oriented approaches 
to energy justice, including the development of group-specific policy frameworks and 
economic metrics for example. This call is reflected upon in chapter 8 in the 
discussion of future research agendas. Consequently, the results advance the energy 
justice literature, which focuses almost exclusively on those facing injustices, to 
promote a simultaneous consideration of who has the highest degree of 
responsibility for the inequity and/or its remediation.  
 
 Summary of Findings 
 
Hall (2013: 434) noted the need to ‘widen the scope of energy justice…to dislodge 
debates from where they currently stand…towards a more nuanced understanding 
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of energy’. This investigation has provided three key insights into this goal as it 
introduced three key knowledge claims according to the variables of investigation. It 
has argued firstly, for a more nuanced understanding of temporality in both 
academic and policy energy justice discourses, cognisant of evolving facility lifecycles 
and the different justice concerns they raise. This assertion complements and 
advances the work of Fuller and McCauley (2016: 8) who identify that ‘questions of 
time may be significant in further understanding the impacts of energy justice 
activism for the future’, by adding elite and whole-systems perspectives. Secondly, it 
has represented a call for whole-systems approaches to energy justice investigations, 
including consideration of all systems components throughout an energy form’s 
lifecycle as a means of capturing all the justice-related aspects of an energy source. 
Finally, it has highlighted the necessity of considering the question of ‘justice by 
whom?’ as we consider not only those who face injustice, but also who can correct it. 
In summary, it has presented additional concepts that give new insights into the 
manifestation of energy justice in practice and in academic scholarship.  
 
7.3 Implications for Nuclear Energy and Energy Transitions 
 
This section offers initial interpretations of the implications of the three key energy 
justice contributions for nuclear energy scholarship, UK nuclear policy, and the wider 
energy transitions literature. Retaining a structure based on the three key variables 
of investigation, time, systems component and actor, it considers the themes of (1) 
facility lifecycles, (2) systems approaches, and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’. 
It advocates for longitudinal social justice approaches at each stage of the nuclear life 
cycle that can capture changing energy justice discourses through time, an increased 
emphasis on whole-systems social justice analysis in both academia and policy, and 




In the second half, it returns to the literature on socio-technical systems presented in 
chapter 2 to consider more broadly what this evidence means for wider energy 
transitions. It re-examines the role of energy justice as a component of the landscape 
level of multi-level perspective model on socio-technical transitions to challenge the 
perception that the only means of initiating energy transitions is through the ‘novel’ 
and the ‘niche’. It reiterates the case that it is within this overarching landscape of 
socio-technical change that issues of energy justice emerge, where inattention to 
social justice issues can cause injustices, or alternatively via their inclusion and the 
resultant pressure on the regime and niche levels of the MLP model, can provide a 
means to solve them. Throughout, this is positioned as a political process. This 
section asks, in effect, why do these theoretical contributions matter? 
 
 Temporal Energy Justice and Nuclear Energy 
 
Debates around the temporality of nuclear energy are well trodden and typically 
occur in relation to a number of key issues, including the inter-generational justice 
concerns caused for example by the longevity of nuclear wastes (Kelly 2015; Wagner 
et al. 2016; Surrey 1992; Hammond et al. 2013; Bråkenhielm 2014), sudden 
catastrophic events (Steinhauser et al. 2014; Beresford et al. 2016; Danzer and 
Danzer 2016; Hale 2011; Ahn et al. 2015; Wheatley et al. 2016) and the dependence 
of nuclear energy on finite uranium resources (Taebi and Roeser 2012; Taebi et al. 
2012; Kojo and Richardson 2014). It is recognised that the benefits of nuclear power 
exist primarily for the present generation, leaving the burdens of long-lived 
radioactive waste to future cohorts (Taebi et al. 2012; Kojo and Richardson 2014; 
Gardiner 2015; Hansson 2015). However, this has to be taken in the context of all 
energy sources which all leave waste in some form to future generations. In this 
regard, issues of temporality are heavily embedded in nuclear energy research as an 
artifact of its inter-generational justice implications – the negative and positive 
obligations one generation owes to another as a consequence of its usage (Kelly 
2015). 
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Whilst such a focus is necessary, nuclear researchers should also be cognisant of the 
evolving lifecycle of nuclear power facilities and the energy justice challenges that 
these localised transitions provide, thereby incorporating the transition of time at a 
particular site as part of its lifecycle. This includes the justice implications of all stages 
of the nuclear lifecycle, from site selection to the eventual closure. Taebi et al. (2005) 
note that most of the literature reflecting on the ethical and societal aspects of 
nuclear energy has been concerned with its military usage or whether it is morally 
justifiable as a production source (Routley and Routley 1981; Hollyday 1991; Bertell 
1991). Here, the emphasis is on moving past this event and stage-focused framework 
in nuclear energy research towards more longitudinal approaches.  
 
Such approaches are common in environmental justice studies of uranium mines in 
particular (see Jenkins 2004; van Eeden et al. 2009; White 2013; Renkhoff 2015). This 
includes attention to the finite lifespan of mines, which, alongside the social 
ramifications of their operation, carry a range of post-operation challenges. 
According to the results of African case studies by van Eeden et al. (2009), these 
include the fact that uranium mines are often left derelict and abandoned after 
usage with implications for polluted groundwater and human health, loss of 
earnings, and social disruption, the impacts of which can rapidly increase after mine 
closure when no further funds are available for remediation. Such longitudinal social 
justice approaches must be mirrored at each stage of the nuclear energy lifecycle. 
For Jasanoff (2004) this would allow better insights into the epistemic and normative 
complexity of the nuclear issue (descriptive and explanatory purpose) and its 
potential to instruct normative policy guidance (prescriptive and moral purpose) as 
long-term management challenges emerge.  
 
Such longitudinal approaches to social justice concerns are also of direct relevance to 
UK nuclear politics as they encounter the temporal challenges of the time taken to 
construct new plants, their production lifespan, decommissioning timescales, the 
long-term storage of nuclear wastes and long-term transitions away from fossil fuels, 
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as well as the risk of path dependency, for example. Keay (2016) notes that such 
issues include the risk of investing in long-lived infrastructural projects, comprising 
power stations, pipelines, terminals and grids, which increase the risk of 
infrastructure ‘stranding’ if and when policy changes. This frequently occurs, as 
Taylor (2016) illustrates in his exploration of UK nuclear policy’s history.  
 
The UK government and industry have strategies that cover all stages throughout the 
lifespan of one plant – construction strategy (BIS 2013), planning controls (DECC 
2011b), operation regulation (ONR 2016b) and decommissioning strategy (NDA 
2016), for example. Heffron et al. (2015) note that there are a range of practices and 
regulations in energy and environmental law that respect or protect future 
generations, reflecting a long-term focus on nuclear waste issues. This includes the 
ability of the electricity utility industry to defer or anticipate the costs of the project, 
including construction and decommissioning, so that the generation that reaps its 
benefit pays for them. This employs the same logic that incurring pollution control 
costs will prevent emissions in the future (Weston 2008). To this end, Keay (2016) 
notes that with the goals of economic effectiveness, environmental protection and 
energy security, UK plans are, to a large extent, long-term oriented. On the whole, 
however, these strategies are not rooted in attention to the on-going social justice 
implications of these changes, including remediation of the social disruption caused 
by their closure. This despite the fact that, as the results have demonstrated, the 
evolution of nuclear sites should not only be a question of security, finance and 
environmental protection, but also of social justice. 
 
As its second contribution under the theme of time or temporality, this chapter has 
called for approaches that incorporate time transitions across the energy system in 
total as acknowledgement that rather than being a discrete linear system, each stage 
within the nuclear lifecycle operates simultaneously. It outlined that despite the 
apparent sense of this claim, the wider literature contains a predominance of linear 
notions of time. As this chapter now goes on to discuss, not only is the transition of 
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time not acknowledged across the system within UK energy policy, but neither is the 
wider system, including the issues of downstream uranium mining. 
  
 Whole-Systems Energy Justice and Nuclear Energy 
 
A growing body of research has emerged that investigates the social justice 
implications of the different stages of the nuclear energy system, including attention 
to issues of uranium mining (Karlsson 2009; Jenkins et al. 2016b; Conway 2013), 
energy production (Rehner and McCauley 2016; Henwood and Pidgeon 2015), the 
rehabilitation of contaminated territories (OECD 2006; Till and Grogan 2008) and 
waste (Bergmans et al. 2008; Fan 2006a,b; Krütli et al. 2015; Endres 2009; Sovacool 
et al. 2016). However, scholarship across the systems is less common, with few 
studies outside of this research taking lifecycle approaches to social justice concerns, 
even within the energy policy literature (Florini and Sovacool 2009). The same is true 
of nuclear energy policy, which, despite the oversight of international regulatory 
bodies including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International 
Nuclear Regulators Association, is generally developed at a national or sub-national 
scale (see DTI 2006; BERR 2008; DECC 2013) and often at disparate energy systems 
stages (see DEFRA 2007, 2008).  
 
Inescapably, however, issues of nuclear justice do not always exist within the bounds 
of these geographical areas and therefore cannot be dealt with by national 
governments or local stakeholders alone (Hofmeester et al. 2012), a statement 
supported through the research findings as they discussed the implicated issues of 
climate change and potential radioactive contamination. Thus, the need for multi-
disciplinary research and broader societal involvement in nuclear decision-making is 
increasingly recommended at national and supra-national levels for all aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle (Schröder and Bergmans 2012; IAEA 2002; Hedemann-Jensen 
2004). Alongside the discussion presented in this chapter, and in line with the 
material presented in Jenkins et al. (2016b), the necessity of this approach can be 
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highlighted using the case of uranium mining. Most prevalent in Australia and 
Canada, though with increasing input from Kazakhstan, uranium mining commonly 
occurs on lands owned by indigenous and tribal people (Karlsson 2009; Conway 
2013). In such communities, the need to work with minority communities to 
overcome environmental injustices is widely acknowledged (Martinez-Alier 2001). 
This includes, for example, damage to human health and the local environment, poor 
economic compensation, and concerns over sovereignty and indigenous rights 
(Karlsson 2009; Jenkins et al. 2016b; Sovacool et al. 2014). Yet this is neglected from 
UK policy and UK assessments of nuclear energy’s viability, despite the policy’s 
obvious knock-on effects.  
 
Indeed, the UK Government, prior to the publication of their Energy White Papers, 
undertook public consultation, including survey-based consultation, focus groups 
and deliberative workshops (Stagl 2006). Despite some criticism, such consultation 
attempts show some attention to justice concepts at a national level (indirectly 
representing issues of distribution, recognition and procedure). Yet they fail to 
acknowledge justice manifestations in their systems context, including the upstream 
impacts of uranium mining and the downstream externality of nuclear waste 
(McLaren et al. 2013; Coplan 2008; Sheldon et al. 2015), albeit nearly all energy 
sources fail to account for down-and upstream externalities, so nuclear energy is no 
exception. To do so, however, is to regard the decision-making community as 
homogenous, and neglects the idea that injustices at one scale do not necessarily 
translate across others (Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009; Heynen 2003). Moreover, 
McLaren et al. (2013) illustrate that poor-quality participation in specific life-cycle 
phases contribute to breakdowns in trust in communities affected by that operation, 
as well as to the emergence of justice impacts and conflicts elsewhere in the life 
cycle as operational nuclear power stations necessitate both mining and waste 
disposal. Thus, they demonstrate that each stage implicates the other, as found in 
the research reported here. Consequently, such parochial policy approaches often 
fail to acknowledge system-wide implications, and as such do not acknowledge all 
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relevant systems actors, in effect, failing to represent the full social justice 
implications of nuclear energy.  
 
This suggests that socially oriented whole-systems analysis of nuclear energy is 
underemphasised in both academia and policy. In line with a growing body of 
researchers (Florini and Sovacool 2009; Butler and Simmons 2013; van de Graaf et al. 
2016), these findings support the case for the continued development of 
internationally governed, whole-systems policy and research. This represents a 
(somewhat ambitious, but nonetheless necessary) call to broaden perspectives 
beyond the boundaries of national governments to consider the global injustices that 
arise as a consequence of the complex relationships in the nuclear system. This 
follows a growing trend towards considerations of global energy governance (see 
Heubaum and Biermann 2015; Sander 2016; Monkelbaan 2014; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 
et al. 2012; Florini and Sovacool 2009). Through whole-systems approaches to 
nuclear scholarship and energy policy, other considerations, and arguably potential 
solutions to our energy challenges, become apparent. As Butler and Simmons (2013: 
157) state, ‘considering nuclear energy in this more open way would make it possible 
to see a wide range of approaches and courses of action that contribute to what 
might be described as more just decisions, processes and practices in the sector’. 
This includes exposure to different concerns about distributional justice, justice as 
recognition and procedural justice, all of which are required to evaluate the 
implications of selecting nuclear energy as an energy source in future energy mixes.  
 
 Actor: Attributing Responsibility for Energy Justice in Nuclear Energy 
 
A search of the literature on the role of actors in nuclear energy research illustrates a 
focus on public, and specifically student, attitudes towards the energy form (Corner 
et al. 2011; Siegrist et al. 2014; Arikawa et al. 2014; Wagner et al. 2016; Honda et al. 
2014; Stenseth et al. 2016; Komiya et al. 2008), alongside calls to recognise the rights 
of particular actor groups in nuclear decision-making, such as those facing health 
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impacts (Qvist and Brook 2015; Yamashita 2016; Zhu et al. 2016; Rahman et al. 
2013), indigenous communities (Graetz 2015; Jenkins 2004; Acuna 2015; Guerra 
2002; Banerjee 2000; Chamaret et al. 2007), and future generations (Kula 2015; 
Taebi et al. 2012; Brookshire and Kaza 2013; Kermisch 2015; Kermisch et al. 2016; 
Andrianov et al. 2015), amongst others. This suggests an emphasis on groups either 
positively or negatively affected by nuclear power and an under-emphasis on 
debates of who is able to solve them.  
 
Whilst it is sometimes acknowledged that nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy 
source (see Canfield et al. 2015, Lee 2013; Ramana 2016; Elliott 2007; Sovacool 
2008), Newell and Mulvaney (2013) discuss the frequent presentation of nuclear 
power as ‘clean’ energy, without acknowledgement of its social context, including 
the environmental injustices associated with uranium/yellow cake mining and long-
term nuclear waste storage problems (see also Doyle 2011; Karlsson 2009; Jenkins et 
al. 2016b; Conway 2013; Adamantiades and Kessides 2009). They warn of the 
burdens of nuclear power being unevenly distributed, ‘particularly if “clean energy” 
is pursued without attention to energy justice’ (Newell and Mulvaney 2013: 138). In 
agreement, Turcanu et al. (2016) state that research and policy-making in the field of 
nuclear technologies and radiation protection has been typically grounded on a split 
between ‘technical content’ and ‘social context’, with a strong division of labour 
between natural and social scientists. As an illustration, Bergmans et al. (2014: 2) 
identify that in the case of radioactive waste management, ‘despite a greater 
involvement of affected communities in decision-making processes, technical aspects 
are still most often brought into the public arena only after technical experts have 
defined the “problem” and decided upon a “solution”’. These statements appear 
consistent with the moral vacuum in energy governance highlighted throughout this 
research.  
 
This is particularly the case in the UK nuclear context. Throughout its history as a 
nuclear producer, the UK has experienced widespread opposition to nuclear 
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development and local objection to the siting of new reactors (Bickerstaff 2008; Mah 
and Hills 2014; Grimston et al. 2014; Henwood and Pidgeon 2015; Herring 2010). 
Thus, as part of this drive for new nuclear power UK policy has been drafted to draw 
attention to issues of social inclusion. Stagl (2006) notes that this policy has 
increasingly emphasised public participation, as governments seek to take more 
consideration of the opinions of the public on electricity generation techniques. Yet, 
using the example of nuclear waste disposal as an example, despite attempts to 
increase stakeholder engagement at all stages of the planning and development 
process (ICRP 2013), most technical strategies are conducted independently of social 
or ethical dimensions, which typically come at the later stages of siting due to public 
controversy (Turcanu et al. 2016). As an illustration, in 2006 the UK Government 
promised a full public consultation before taking a decision on new nuclear build, but 
through legal proceedings, Greenpeace highlighted that this never happened 
(Greenhalgh and Azapagic 2009). Such instances, alongside the continued debate 
over the future of the UK’s nuclear waste, highlight the necessity of continued 
concern for social justice in energy decision-making.  
 
In addition, it is also necessary to consider the role of policy and industry groups – 
those identified by the interview respondents in this research as holding the highest 
degree of responsibility for energy justice – in creating this change. Investigations 
into the history of UK nuclear energy policy (as outlined in section 4.1) illustrate that 
nuclear power has fallen in and out of favour with UK governments across its 
approximately 70 year commercial energy lifespan, receiving favour most recently 
due to the national desire for energy independence, and a long-term shift towards 
green, low-carbon technologies (Florini and Sovacool 2009; DECC 2011b; Watson and 
Scott 2009). The Long-Term Nuclear Energy Strategy (DECC 2013) contains no 
mention of justice concepts. Where they do appear in the 2008 Nuclear White Paper 
(BERR 2008), they appear only as a concern for the ethical dilemmas of nuclear waste 
and long-term carbon emission reduction targets. Despite some explicit attention to 
issues of procedural justice in other policy documents, including most notably the 
 269 
2007 Planning White Paper (HM Government 2007) and the MRWS process, this 
suggests a failure to appreciate and engage with the full extent and diversity of social 
justice implications as outlined throughout this research. The same is true of the 
industry strategy, shown by the fact that EDF Energy, who own eight of the ten 
currently operating nuclear reactors in the UK and are leading the developments at 
Hinkley Point C, fail to include mentions of fairness, equity, justice, morality and like 
concepts in their strategy documents. This appears to reflect the continued division 
of ‘technical content’ from ‘social context’, as outlined above, and points to the need 
for greater integration of justice principles into UK nuclear energy politics and 
industry strategy.  
 
 Just Energy Transitions 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, social science perspectives on energy transitions are under-
represented in academic scholarship (Guy and Shove 2000; Wilhite et al. 2000; 
Sovacool 2015). Moreover, where they do exist, the economic and geopolitical 
aspects of energy take precedence (Edberg and Tarasova 2016). Chapter 2 
highlighted that a social perspective is required to complement the conventional 
focus of energy studies on the costs of certain energy choices and technologies in 
order to fulfil the emergent moral vacuum in energy transitions research. Specifically, 
it argued that it is within the under-theorised macro-level landscape of the multi-
level perspective model on socio-technical systems that issues of energy justice 
emerge. In light of the research findings, this section briefly re-examines the role of 
energy justice as a component of that landscape level of the multi-level perspective 
model to challenge the perception that the only means of encouraging energy 
transitions is through the ‘novel’ and the ‘niche’. It reiterates the case that 
inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, or alternatively via their 
inclusion can provide a means to solve them, as it considers the implications of the 
evidence presented throughout this chapter for the energy transitions literature. 
Most pertinently, it positions this as a political process. Whilst a few studies have 
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emerged that explicitly address the role of energy justice in the socio-technical 
transitions literature (Mullen and Marsden 2016; Eames and Hunt 2013; Fuller and 
Bulkeley 2013; McLaren et al. 2013), this is the first to explore the role of energy 
justice in socio-technical systems models and its political operationalisation.  
 
According to Newell and Phillips (2016), the landscape level of a socio-technical 
regime comprises structuring forces, including ideologies, institution’s discourses, 
and political and economic trends that constitute enduring forms of socio-technical 
organisation. It is the role of discourses and institutions that is particularly relevant 
here as shifts in landscape conditions, such as government intervention in markets or 
changes in social preferences (Unruh 2002; Dolfsma and Leydesdorff 2009) are 
understood to create windows of opportunity to disrupt the status quo in, in this 
case, the mode of energy provision (Li and Strachan 2016). Leiss (1978) offers the 
example that the rise of consumer culture based on individual definitions of needs, 
channelled through to expanding commodity consumption. Alternatively, the rise of 
neo-liberal models of globalisation led to more mobile capital and market 
deregulation (Smith et al. 2005). In these examples, social changes were not targeted 
at any specific regime – market structures, food production and energy supply, for 
example – yet brought about selection pressures on the regime. As a further 
illustration, the climate change agenda is widely recognised for having initiated an 
energy transition, where its framing at the landscape level encouraged regime actors 
to pursue low-carbon technologies, many of which appeared through the niche level 
as new forms of innovation. Energy justice can arguably undertake a similar role, 
where the reframing of energy decision-making (including whether or not to accept 
nuclear power) as ethical issues can affect which technologies we select as part of 
our energy mix. It follows that transition plans need to incorporate notions of energy 
justice. 
 
This claim is reinforced by focusing on the variable of actor and the idea that 
governmental and industrial groups hold a higher degree of responsibility for the 
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provision of energy justice. Energy transitions are increasingly recognised as 
inherently political processes (Meadowcroft 2009; Shove and Walker 2007; Geels 
2011; Pollitt 2012; Hess 2014), yet despite this acknowledgement and a few recent 
attempts to pay greater attention to the role of politics and power in transitions 
(Geels 2014; Scoones et al. 2015), there are few studies scrutinising how political 
elites represent energy in their rhetoric (Brondi et al. 2015; Edberg and Tarasova 
2016). Indeed, the transition literature has not thoroughly engaged with the political 
question of which energy sources are prioritised, by whom and why, and what this 
means for who secures access to energy (Newell and Phillips 2016). Yet, despite this 
apparent neglect, Edberg and Tarasova (2016) illustrate the importance of such 
approaches by showing that politicians consider energy issues in relation to the 
worldviews they adhere to – according to their interpretations of socio-economic 
development models and political ideas. In essence, they construct their energy 
policy based on the interaction of energy and societal matters – the surrounding, and 
continuously changing public context, and the resultant priorities. Furthermore, 
Grubler (2012) and Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) argue that energy transitions can be 
induced by the policies that governments adopt. Accordingly, an understanding of 
how elites frame energy and energy transitions as moral concerns provides an 
opportunity to consider moral and ethical dilemmas alongside other political 
priorities.  
 
Of course, this claim comes with a number of caveats. Firstly, Lawhon and Murphy 
(2011) suggest that those wielding greater power in the context of the socio-
technical system – political and industry elites – are likely to have their own interest 
favoured unless mechanisms are established to limit their influence. In this case, this 
may manifest as continued inattention to questions of ethics, morality and justice. In 
this context, this research points again to the finding that policy and industry groups 
have a higher degree of responsibility, not sole responsibility. Therefore it casts 
NGOs and indeed, wider society, as the assessors of just energy practices.  
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Secondly, Eames and Hunt (2013: 50) note that transitions are not the outcome of a 
change in a single variable – the introduction of a new law, for example – but instead 
are the outcome of complex, mutually reinforcing changes across several domains 
that involve societal actors. Indeed, it seems futile to believe that such approaches 
can foster truly ‘just transitions’ without the framing of energy justice as a core 
concern for wider society, and therefore a pressure on a range of regime actors. This 
follows Turcanu et al.’s (2016: 90) claim that ‘ethics should both inform and enable 
methods of democratic decision-making, policy supportive research and education 
that would, “by design”, generate societal trust’, and Taebi et al.’s (2012) statement 
that the ethical acceptability of nuclear energy needs to be a continuous process, in 
which people’s moral emotions need to be included.  
 
Finally, there is recognition of the issue of ‘regime resistance’ (Geels 2014), where 
regime dynamics are characterised as stable and locked-in both by regime actors and 
infrastructure. This leads to the critique that they can be difficult to operationalise 
for the purposes of informing policy (Markard and Truffer 2009; Genus and Coles 
2008). This comes alongside the acknowledgement that varying institutional contexts 
give rise to very different forms of decision-making and power asymmetries that may 
influence sustainability trajectories in different ways (Hansen and Coenen 2015; Kern 
2011; Kuzemko et al. 2016). Consequently, Newell and Phillips (2016) state that 
governments need to exert authority over market actors to initiate more rapid 
transitions without detailed attention to the political processes and terrain upon 
which they play out. Where such issues emerge, quantitative models of energy 
systems have demonstrated their utility as part of an iterative evidence-based policy 
process (Strachan 2011), despite the often-simplified representations of actor 
dynamics and choice behaviour they contain (Li and Strachan 2016; Sovacool and 
Dworkin 2015). As suggested above this question of responsibility for energy justice 
provides promising ground for future research into targeted, practically-oriented 
approaches to energy justice, including the development of group-specific policy 




This chapter has discussed the contributions of this research to energy justice 
scholarship, as well as offering initial interpretations of the implications of its 
findings. In section 7.1 it drew comparisons between the two case studies of 
research according to the three tenets of energy justice: distributional justice, justice 
as recognition, and procedural justice. Following an examination of distributional 
justice articulations it introduced the concepts of non-nuclearity and NIMBYism on 
the understanding that (1) energy justice discourses may transcend energy-specific 
concerns, and (2) research groups moved passed classical pro- and anti-nuclear 
divides. Under the tenet of justice as recognition, it discussed that energy justice is 
perceived to affect elite groups, not just poor ethnic minorities. Finally, within the 
tenet of procedural justice it reflected on the normative contributions of the energy 
justice model. In essence, this section demonstrated the utility of the methodological 
approached used and outlined its ability to reveal new actors and issues of concern 
as well as, in the case of procedural justice, to offer new normative framings of 
energy justice that can aid future ‘just’ energy decision-making. 
 
Section 7.2 presented the three key knowledge claims emergent from this research, 
offering new insights under the three variables of investigation, time, systems 
component and actor. This discussion contributed to RQ1, 2 and 3 as, in light of the 
research findings, it considered the emergent themes of (1) facility lifecycles, (2) 
systems approaches, and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’. Firstly, in answer to 
RQ1, section 7.2.1 highlighted not only evolving energy justice discourses, but most 
pertinently the necessity of considering multi-cyclical notions of time that can 
capture the transition of time at both site level and across the wider energy system. 
Secondly, in answer to RQ2 section 7.2.2 argued for a whole-systems approach to 
energy justice investigations as a means of capturing all the justice-related aspects of 
an energy source. Finally, section 7.2.3 answered RQ3 by revealing the different 
actors of concern raised across the two case studies and discussing the question 
 274 
‘justice by whom?’ as it explored who is perceived to be responsible for energy 
justice. This discussion provided insights within each of the previously identified 
areas of development for the energy justice literature outlined in section 2.6, coming 
full circle to three novel contributions that contribute to filling these gaps. 
  
Finally, section 7.3 considered the implications of the three key contributions for 
nuclear energy scholarship, UK nuclear policy, and the wider energy transitions 
literature. Throughout, it advocated for longitudinal social justice approaches at each 
stage of the nuclear life cycle that can capture changing energy justice discourses 
through time, an increased emphasis on whole-systems social justice analysis in both 
academia and policy, and greater integration of justice principles into UK nuclear 
energy politics and industry strategy. Latterly, it considered the implications of its 
claims for the energy transitions literature, as originally discussed in chapter 2. 
Within, it made the case that it is in the landscape level of the MLP model that issues 
of energy justice emerge, and cast energy transitions as intrinsically political 
processes. It called for greater attention to the role of politics and power in 
transitions on the understanding that an understanding of how elites frame energy 
and energy transitions as moral concerns provides an opportunity to embed justice 
principles within energy decision-making. 
 
This chapter closes by stating that it is only by comparing nuclear energy with other 
energy sources, including both fossil fuels and renewables, that it is possible to 
comment on its true justice nature; whether it is the ‘lesser evil’ energy justice when 
it comes to energy provision, or whether it is the definition of injustice itself. Thus, it 
advocates for an extension of the methodological approach used throughout this 
research to other energy forms; one of four avenues of further research highlighted 
in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This final chapter evaluates the extent to which the research met its aim and 
answered the overall research question and three research questions. Thereby, it 
summarises the contribution of the study to knowledge and outlines its contributions 
to academic thought. It revisits each of the chapters in turn and highlights the core 
contributions achieved in each. Throughout, it reflects on three main areas of 
originality and novelty, the key contributions of (1) facility lifecycles, (2) systems 
approaches, and (3) the question of ‘justice by whom?’. Finally, it considers 
emergent areas of further research as it asks, where next? 
 
This thesis highlighted that in the face of contemporary energy challenges – failures 
to fulfil social, economic and environmental criteria – a range of transitions 
frameworks have evolved that focus on the desire to transition towards 
decarbonised, sustainable energy systems. It outlined that the ‘socio-‘ or social 
element is frequently missing from transitions frameworks as most of us confront 
climate and energy risks in a moral vacuum. Ultimately, it sought a means of 
increasing the consciousness of the ethical dilemmas of energy decision-making in 
transition models, and carried a conceptual ambition to unite the socio-technical 
systems and energy justice literatures – a combination that represents the first area 
of novelty gained through the research. It focussed in particular on the role of energy 
justice in filling the moral vacuum in transition models, as it makes a case for the 
concept of energy justice as a tool that can aid ethically defensible energy decision-
making. 
 
8.1 Chapter Based Conclusions 
 
Chapter 2 reflected on the model of socio-technical transitions – frameworks 
employed for understanding and governing energy systems transformations (Foxon 
2013). It cautioned against the neglect of the concepts of equity and justice in our 
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energy decision-making and the wider energy debate, which happens despite the 
fact that the driver of many energy transitions, sustainable development, is rooted in 
these core notions. 
 
More specifically, chapter 2 fulfilled two aims. Firstly, it introduced the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) model for understanding socio-technical transitions, before 
articulating the contention that it is within the landscape level of the MLP model – 
the top of three theoretical levels – that issues of energy justice emerge. It 
positioned nuclear energy as an on-going issue of socio-technical change because of 
its reframing as a potential means of securing both security of supply and climate 
change stability – its new ‘niche’ –, and because of its continued use in 30 countries, 
and proposed use in another 45 (Taebi and van de Poel 2015). Secondly, it 
introduced, critiqued and reconceptualised the theory of energy justice, introducing 
three emergent areas of conceptual growth, (1) time, (2) systems, and (3) actor. 
These so called ‘variables of investigation’ formed the basis of the research, guiding 
its methodological and analytical approaches. It suggested that concepts from ethics 
and justice provide a structure to think about energy dilemmas, and that all three 
areas of growth are not explicit enough in current energy justice thinking. 
Fundamentally, it argued that such an approach provided a means of engaging with 
the ethical gap in energy research and policy. 
 
Chapter 3 then set out the methodological approach taken. The research 
investigated elite perspectives around two case studies across the nuclear life cycle: 
(1) energy production at the Hinkley Point Nuclear Complex in Somerset, and (2) 
waste reprocessing, storage, and disposal at the Sellafield Nuclear Complex in 
Cumbria, following the whole-systems approach it advocated for. It sampled 
representatives from the most prominent NGO and policy groups engaged with the 
research case studies, employing semi-structured oral history interviews with 
participants identified through a directed snowballing approach. It sampled elite 
participants specifically, making the distinction throughout between an elite 
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organisation and an elite individual. The choice to select elite respondents was taken 
in order to address a gap in the energy justice literature, which to date most 
commonly approaches justice issues from a local community, activist perspective. 
Instead, the research sought to move past the present application to promote a 
simultaneous consideration of who is responsible for the inequity and/or its 
remediation. Projecting forward, the inclusion of elite participants is also perceived 
to increase its potential impact and aid its dissemination, a claim validated by its 
findings, which highlighted that industry and policy groups as members of the 
identified elite are perceived to hold higher degrees of responsibility for ensuring the 
provision, or where appropriate continuation of, energy justice. 
 
Following an introduction to the background of nuclear energy in the UK and each 
case study in chapter 4, the results were then presented in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 
5 explored articulations of energy justice around the first of the two case studies, the 
Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Complex in Somerset, UK. Chapter 6 then followed the 
same format, exploring articulations of energy justice around the second of the case 
studies, the Sellafield Nuclear Power Complex in Cumbria, UK. Both case studies 
contributed effectively to the overall research question of the study as they explored 
how elite actors within the nuclear energy system articulate energy justice, as well as 
contributing to the research questions as they allowed considered of variations in 
energy justice according to the time, systems component and actor of concern. The 
results presented provide a high degree of empirical insight into the emergence of 
energy justice in practice, alongside the energy justice nature of these specific sites. 
 
Chapter 7 then consolidated the results from chapters 5 and 6, and drew parallels 
with the wider literature presented in chapter 2. In so doing, it discussed the 
contribution of the study to knowledge in relation to the study’s research questions 
and the wider literature. It presented comparisons between the two case studies of 
research according to the three tenets of energy justice, distributional justice, justice 
as recognition, and procedural justice. Section 7.2 then reflected on the three key 
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knowledge claims presented. The following paragraphs summarise these 
contributions, before considering emergent areas of future research.  
 
8.2 Research Question Conclusions 
 
In answer to RQ1, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
through time?’, section 7.2.1 highlighted both temporally evolving energy justice 
discourses and the necessity of considering multi-cyclical notions of time that can (1) 
capture the transition of time at a particular site as part of its lifecycle, and (2) 
capture time across the energy system in total. These include both circular and linear 
notions of temporality. It highlighted that energy justice scholarship often appears as 
a static case study or with attention to new infrastructure only, but that such 
approaches failed to evaluate and inform energy justice throughout the various 
stages of that site’s lifespan. Thus it warned that such approaches may also fail to 
address the potential to remediate past injustices at pre-existing sites.  
 
Energy justice scholarship must include attention to the evolution of sites and 
practices through time. Moreover, the research demonstrated that rather than being 
a discrete linear system, each stage within the nuclear lifecycle operates 
simultaneously. This finding emerges in contrast to the wider literature, which 
contains a predominance of linear notions of time where each stage is treated 
separately. The thesis advocates multi-cyclical and self-reinforcing notions of systems 
temporality as acknowledgment of the simultaneous operation of each stage and, 
therefore, the numerous potential and reinforcing moments of injustice. 
 
In answer to RQ2, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
according to energy systems component in question?’, the research highlighted 
extensive differences in energy justice articulations according to the systems 
component in question. As a consequence, the thesis argues for a whole-systems 
approach to energy justice investigations – consideration of all systems components 
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throughout an energy form’s lifecycle – as a means of capturing all of the justice-
related aspects of an energy source. It argued through its empirical findings and 
through the early literature-based call for a whole-systems approach to energy 
justice; but that it is also necessary to look at specific energy systems components 
and sites as a means of capturing the process and site-specific energy justice nuances 
that emerge.  
 
The thesis asserts that through a grounded systems-wide approach it is possible to 
capture both the energy justice nature of specific systems components – energy 
production, for example – and, as a sum total of these parts, the energy justice 
nature of a particular energy type.  This provides a source-to-sink account of the 
social impacts of an energy technology’s lifecycle. Such a systems-wide focus has two 
implications: (1) it allows the energy technology to be valued at full cost, and (2) this 
valuation would affect whether it is chosen as an energy source. Moreover, such an 
approach will not only allow for a full valuation of energy, but also exposure to other 
considerations. As this research has demonstrated these considerations may include: 
different distributional concerns, the need for multi-cyclical temporal investigations, 
and recognition of responsibility. Potential solutions to our energy challenges may 
also emerge. 
 
In answer to RQ3, ‘how do the energy justice articulations of elite actors vary 
between actors?’, the research considered the question of ‘justice for whom?’ as it 
explored who is perceived to be responsible for remediating injustices, or conversely, 
for ensuring the continuation of just practices. It found that governmental and 
industrial groups are perceived to hold a higher degree of responsibility for the 
provision of energy justice than other actors in the nuclear energy system, including 
regulators, NGOs and general citizens. As far as the author is aware, no research to 
date has explicitly engaged with this question. 
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In discussing the idea of responsibility, the research respondents advanced the 
typical application of justice as recognition, which generally speaking has focused on 
the recipient of benefits or ills only, not those who create them.  This raises the 
feature that the purpose of energy justice is to (1) identify when and where injustices 
occur, and (2) to identify how best academics and practitioners can critically evaluate 
the impacts of energy policies and how best they can respond – thus attributing 
accountability. Simultaneously, however, it prompts a reflection of who the 
‘practitioners’ really are. Moreover, it shifts the attention from different instances of 
responsibility to different actors who bear that responsibility. 
 
In summary, this investigation has introduced three key knowledge claims. It argues 
firstly for a more nuanced understanding of temporality in both academic and policy 
energy justice discourses, cognisant of evolving facility lifecycles and the different 
justice concerns they raise. This assertion complements and advances the earlier 
work of Fuller and McCauley (2016) by adding elite and whole-systems perspectives. 
Secondly, it has represented a call for whole-systems approaches to energy justice 
investigations, including consideration of all systems components throughout an 
energy form’s lifecycle as a means of capturing all of the justice-related aspects of an 
energy source. Finally, it has highlighted the necessity of considering the question of 
‘justice by whom?’, as we consider not only those who face injustice, but also who 
can correct it. 
 
We can apply early analysis of the implications of these three knowledge claims for 
nuclear energy scholarship, UK nuclear policy, and the wider energy transitions 
literature. Based on the three key variables of investigation: time, systems 
component and actor, the thesis advocates for longitudinal social justice approaches 
at each stage of the nuclear life cycle that can capture changing energy justice 
discourses through time; for an increased emphasis on whole-systems social justice 
analysis in both academia and policy; and for a greater integration of justice 
principles into UK nuclear energy politics and industry strategy. 
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More broadly, what does the evidence mean for wider energy transitions? The 
research challenges the perception that the only means of encouraging energy 
transitions is through the ‘novel’ and the ‘niche’ avenues of the MLP, reiterating the 
case that it is within the overarching landscape of socio-technical change that issues 
of energy justice emerge – where inattention to social justice issues can cause 
injustices or attention can provide a means to solve them. The thesis positioned this 
downward pressure from the landscape level as a political process, suggesting that 
the question of responsibility for energy justice provides promising ground for future 
research into targeted, practically-oriented, approaches to energy justice, including 
the development of group-specific policy frameworks and economic metrics.  
 
8.3 Reflecting on Nuclear Energy 
 
This thesis has sought to deliver an impartial account of the energy justice themes 
surrounding nuclear energy, and in doing so it has provided numerous insights that 
move beyond classical pro- and anti-nuclear critiques. It has explored and revealed 
the ethical and moral dilemmas that nuclear energy presents. These include and go 
beyond the ethical concerns outlined by Sovacool, as the results illustrate both 
classical anti-nuclear injustice arguments – concerns for increased incidents of 
cancers and radioactive contamination, for example – alongside new discourses 
which evidence that in some cases nuclear energy is perceived to be an ethically 
defensible choice. This comes as recognition of its ability to contribute towards low-
carbon targets, and to offer a boost to jobs and economic prosperity in relatively 
deprived local areas. 
 
Moreover, the research results have demonstrated that in instances where the 
distributional risks were not always related to nuclear energy itself (as was the case 
with the Hinkley Point case study), it was the justice issues raised as an outcome of 
recognition and procedure that shaped opinions towards the energy form. Here, 
discourses of ‘injustices as risk’ were absent. In addition, through the case study of 
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waste management, storage and disposal the results have demonstrated that 
whether or not new power stations are built, there must be on-going concern for the 
justice implications (both positive and negative) of nuclear energy’s waste legacy. 
Thus in the light of the energy justice evaluations presented, even if nuclear energy is 
not deemed to be ethically sound in terms of energy production, it is continually 
important.  
 
Arising from these discussions, this thesis has considered the question of whether 
the morality of risk or the morality of carbon reduction is the more important. It 
argues, almost implicitly, that the latter represents the most pressing concern for 
society, and that this feature supplies a means of justifying the nuclear case. 
However, it is only by comparing nuclear energy with other energy sources, including 
both fossil fuels and the renewables specifically designed to contribute to this low-
carbon target, that it is possible to comment fully on nuclear’s justice-related 
aspects.  That is: whether nuclear is the ‘lesser evil’ when for energy production 
when compared to other energy forms, or whether it is the definition of injustice 
itself. As such, it is clear that it is necessary to extend the methodological approach 
used throughout the research to other energy forms. 
 
8.4 Agenda Setting: Areas for Future Research 
 
Alongside a series of contributions to the socio-technical systems and energy justice 
literatures, four areas of further research have emerged which can be broken into 
broadly methodological and impact agendas. These opportunities build on the strong 
foundation of empirical findings and publications already produced (Appendix 7). 
 
Firstly, the research took place under both time and financial restrictions, eliminating 
the possibility of investigations into energy justice discourses around uranium mining 
in Canada and nuclear energy production in the United States, as was originally 
planned. These limitations detracted somewhat from the overall aim for an 
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international, whole-systems approach. Thus, expanding methodologically, future 
research could engage with international examinations, including particularly an 
investigation of the missing uranium mining case. In so doing, there is potential to 
close the energy systems loop and develop the source-to-sink energy justice 
evaluation that the research advocates.  
 
Further, there are limitations not only in terms of systems scope, but as outlined 
above in the singular nuclear energy focus. Thus, future research could use the 
methodology to engage with other energy types. The real potential is to create 
‘energy justice accounts’ that allow comparisons between the social justice 
implications of our various energy sources, aiding evaluations of whether they should 
form part of energy mixes. 
 
A second methodological development arises from the opportunity to obtain more 
discrete research samples. Access to certain groups – primarily policy and industry – 
was limited, and as a result the decision was made to combine industry and policy 
perspectives in the results chapters under one sample. Although care was taken not 
to conflate policy and industry perspectives within the grouping, their treatment as 
stand-alone participant samples would have created more nuanced findings. Thus, 
future research in the area would benefit from not only a wider sample, but also a 
better-defined one. 
 
Conceptually, more work could also usefully engage with normative constructions of 
energy justice, and the potential for the energy justice framework to become a 
visioning tool through which we construct ideals of just energy futures that can 
inform our decision-making now. This assertion builds on the results, which 
demonstrate that in describing potential improvements to procedural systems and 
giving insight into how procedural justice might materialise, respondents drew 
attention to the core values that underpinned these mechanisms: openness, 
transparency, knowledge transfer, knowledge independence and the order of 
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decision-making amongst them. The emergence of these core notions develops the 
work of Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) who identify availability, affordability, due 
process, good governance, prudence, inter-generational equity, intra-generational 
equity and responsibility as central energy justice principles. 
 
Sidortsov and Sovacool (2015) note that the energy justice concept is only starting to 
emerge in legal and policy literature. Miller et al. (2015) identify three decision-
making areas where it is possible to enact socio-economic approaches that are 
conscious of ethical dilemmas: (1) the practices and techniques through which 
potential energy futures are envisioned, modelled, analysed, and evaluated, (2) the 
forums and methods for deliberating, debating, and making energy choices, and (3) 
the institutions for fashioning, operating, and regulating new energy systems. The 
energy justice framework has extensive potential to contribute to each of these 
fields. 
 
Thus one of the most exciting avenues for further development arising from this 
research is to contribute to mainstream policy-making and develop practical models 
that align with and add to transition frameworks. This includes the potential to 
develop a social justice inventory as one might a carbon inventory, with implications 
for how we view the entire energy system. This follows Sovacool and Dworkin’s 
(2015: 441) call for the design of modelling or quantitative metrics or indicators that 
can measure energy justice for the energy studies community. As Stern et al. (2016) 
suggest, identifying influences beyond those typically included in policy analysis 
offers significant opportunities for action, including notions of justice and fairness as 
non-economic motives for change.  
 
8.5 Closing Remarks 
 
In a review of 15 years worth of energy scholarship, Sovacool (2014) identified that 
energy research had been dominated to date by science and economics, and as part 
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of a wider agenda to increase attention to social science contributions to our energy 
debates he identified energy justice as an important area of future research. 
Sovacool et al. (2016: 552) later stated that ‘energy system interventions are about 
more than technology and economic development; they are about political power, 
social cohesion, and even ethical and moral concerns over equity, due process, and 
justice’.  
 
In developing this research topic, the results have contributed to a growing body of 
academic work that advances the idea that concepts from ethics and justice provide 
a structure to think about energy dilemmas. The author hopes that they have served 
as a timely contribution to both the formation and the proliferation of the energy 
justice concept. The thesis sought to fill (at least partially) the moral vacuum 
emergent in energy transition frameworks, making the case for energy justice as a 
tool that can help energy decision-makers to not only mitigate environmental 
impacts of energy production via socio-technical change, but to also do so in an 
ethically defensible, socially just, way.  
 
The research met its original aim, offering both conceptual and empirical 
contributions to both the socio-technical systems and energy justice literatures. It is 
hoped that the findings will inform justice in practice, presenting knowledge that is 
essential for understanding the ways in which energy justice is constructed, 
understood, and tackled across a range of scales. In addition, by introducing areas of 
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Appendix 1 - Semi-structured Interview Questions 
 
Theme Question Justification 
Definitions At this stage, could you please explain what you 
understand by energy justice? Please feel free to 
identify key themes or provide a definition. 
 
Distribution Many people object to energy developments on the 
basis of siting worries. What do you think are their 
main reasons for doing so? 
 
Do you think these opinions or concerns have 
changed over time? 
 
Simultaneously, there is a drive towards localization 
and globalisation of energies. At what scale should 
we be concerned about the distribution of energy 
infrastructures? Local, national, international? 
 
Do you think Sellafield should continue to 
handle waste from overseas? Why? 
 
Distributional concerns often revolve around the 
negative aspects of energy, should we be fighting 
for positive benefits too? 
 
Can you identify any UK communities you feel are 
disproportionately affected by nuclear waste issues? 
This may be positively or negatively. 
 
Sellafield has played a fundamental role in the UK 
nuclear industry for years; do you think it should 




The environmental justice movement stems from 
the belief that poor, often colored communities 
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often carried disproportionate burden of 
environmental ills. In your opinion, are any groups 
of society unfairly pressured or privileged? 
Who do you consider to be an energy 
stakeholder? Are any groups more prominent 
than others? 
 
Has this changed over the past 20 years? Is 
society in general more or less engaged with 
energy? 
 
How, if at all, should we recognise the views and 
rights of people at other stages of the energy 
system? Uranium mining, for example. 
 
What or who drives your stakeholder engagement 
initiatives? Organizational values, the government, 
or communities? 
 
Nuclear waste has an extremely long active lifespan. 
Should we consider and recognise future 
generations when making our energy choices? Is it 
feasible to do so? 
 
Procedure Do you think the public has the right to be part of 
energy decisions? Why? 
 
At what stage of the process? Determining the 
energy policy strategy and consent for individual 
sites, for example. 
 
Should we have any say or involvement in 
decisions made outside our national 
boundaries? 
 
What form should this engagement take?  
In some cases the government may choose to 
override local opposition to energy developments. 
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Do you agree or disagree with this? 
Sellafield Ltd runs several community engagement 
schemes including public meeting and charity 
events. Do you think these are effective or 
sufficient? How would you improve them? 
 
Systems If you could start from scratch, how would you 
design a just energy system? 
 
Definitions Following our discussion, has the way that you’d 
define energy justice changed? Again, please feel 
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2012: A Nuclear License 
awarded for Hinkley 
Point C, the first in the 
UK since 1987 
1989: Hinkley Point B 
Taken Over by Nuclear 
Electric 
2014: Hinkley Point A 
Enters Care and 
Maintenance Phase 
1957: Hinkley Point A 
Construction Begins 
1965: Hinkley Point A 
Production Begins 
2095: Hinkley Point A 
Final Site Clearance  
1967: Hinkley Point B 
Construction Begins 
1976: Hinkley Point B 
Production Begins 
2011: Hinkley Point 
Identified as a Potential 
Site for New Nuclear 
2023: Predicted 
Opening of Hinkley 
Point C 
2004: Hinkley Point A 
Defueling Complete 
2008: UK Government 
Green Lights New 
Nuclear Power Stations 
2000: Hinkley Point A 
Production Ceases 
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Past: Central Electricity 
Generating Board 
Hinkley Point B 
1976-Present 
 
Owner: Électricité de France 
Past: Central Electricity 
Generating Board, Nuclear 
Electric and British Energy 
 
Hinkley Point C 
Proposed 







Department of Energy and 
Climate Change 
 
Office for Nuclear Regulation 
 
 




1976: First Reprocessing 
Plant Closed 






1951: Both Windscale 
Piles Operational  
1951: First Reprocessing 
Plant Operational 
1947: Windscale Piles 
Commissioned 
2004: Calder Hall 
Production Ceases 
2005: The NDA takes 
over ownership of 
Sellafield 
2005: THORP 
Radioactive Waste Leak 
Discovered  
2001: Sellafield Mox 
Plant Opens 
2008: NWMP become 
parent organisation of 
Sellafield Ltd 
1981: Windscale 
Renamed by Sellafield 
by BNFL 
1981: WAGR Reactor 
Closed Down. 
1957: Windscale Piles 
Closed due to a fire in 
Pile One 







































Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs 
 
Guides government policy on 









impact of radioactive 









Site-licensed company responsible for tactical delivery at 




Public body responsible for 
decommissioning and 
government waste policy 
Department for Work and 
Pensions 
Develops welfare and 
pensions policy 
Health and Safety 
Executive 
 
Responsible for public heath 
and safety in the workplace 
 
Office for Nuclear Regulation 
 
Owner of Sellafield and 
regulator of civil nuclear 
industry in the UK 
 
Department of Energy and 
Climate Change 
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